The case concerned Mario Lamar Turner, who was charged with aggravated malicious wounding and use of a firearm during the commission of a felony after a shooting incident. The central issue was whether the circuit court correctly determined that a witness was unavailable to testify at trial under the standard set forth in Sapp v. Commonwealth, based on several witnesses' claimed inability to recall events despite reviewing prior statements. The court reviewed the trial testimony of multiple witnesses who had varying degrees of memory loss regarding the shooter and the events, as well as the use of a former defense attorney's testimony about statements made at the preliminary hearing. The core reasoning examined the legal criteria for witness unavailability and whether information from the preliminary hearing was generally known such that it did not implicate professional conduct rules.
The case involved a dispute over a 30-foot easement for ingress, egress, and utilities on property in Spotsylvania County, where the Harts claimed that Piney Meeting House Investments (PMH) had placed obstructions including a buried propane tank and well that interfered with their rights. The circuit court had sustained exceptions to a commissioner’s report, ordering removal of the underground items and awarding the Harts costs plus $6,000 in attorney’s fees. The Supreme Court of Virginia held that the buried propane tank and well did not constitute unreasonable interference as a matter of law when they did not impede vehicular access, reversing that portion of the ruling while affirming the award of costs. It further reversed the attorney’s fees award, finding the Harts’ request for admission under Rule 4:11 invalid and thus providing PMH a valid reason under Rule 4:12(c)(4) for not admitting it had no defenses. The matter was remanded for further proceedings.
The case concerned whether a transcript of a March 3, 2010 hearing, omitted from the appellate record due to a court reporter's error and filed after the 60-day deadline in Rule 5A:8(a), could be added to the record as a clerical mistake under Code § 8.01-428(B) and Rule 5A:9. Belew had been convicted in circuit court of felony failure to stop at the scene of an accident, and the Court of Appeals denied her petition for appeal because the missing transcript left the record insufficient to review her assignments of error. The Supreme Court of Virginia held that the circuit court's orders purporting to correct the omission were invalid, because a party's failure to ensure timely filing of a transcript constitutes noncompliance with appellate rules rather than a clerical error arising from oversight that the statute allows courts to fix at any time. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision declining to consider the late transcript.
In Mathews v. PHH Mortgage Corp., borrowers who had defaulted on a mortgage note secured by a deed of trust sought to enjoin foreclosure, arguing that the lender failed to satisfy a condition precedent requiring a face-to-face meeting under a HUD regulation (24 C.F.R. § 203.604) that they claimed was incorporated into the deed of trust. The circuit court sustained the lender's demurrer, holding both that the borrowers could not enforce the conditions because they committed the first material breach by nonpayment and that the regulation did not apply. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia addressed whether the first-material-breach doctrine under Virginia common law bars a defaulting borrower from enforcing conditions precedent to foreclosure. The court reasoned that the doctrine precludes a breaching party from seeking damages or specific performance for the other party's breach of contractual obligations but does not prevent the borrower from challenging the lender's exercise of its foreclosure remedy under the deed of trust.
Violet Seabolt sued Albemarle County alleging gross negligence in the maintenance of a public park that caused her injury. The circuit court sustained a demurrer to the gross negligence claim but did not rule on the county's plea of sovereign immunity. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia first addressed sovereign immunity as a jurisdictional issue and determined that counties retain common-law tort immunity. The Court held that Code § 15.2-1809 waives immunity only for cities and towns and does not extend a waiver to counties, and no other statute provides an express waiver. Because the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, the Court affirmed the dismissal of the complaint.
In this case, Mary Arnold sued Jonathan Peter Wallace for negligence after an automobile collision, with Travelers Insurance defending under uninsured motorist coverage; a jury awarded Arnold $9,134.61 in damages. Arnold appealed the circuit court's admission of her medical records from her treating physicians' practice under the business records exception to hearsay and its ruling allowing an expert physician to testify despite her partner's prior retention by the defense. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed both rulings, holding that a proper foundation was laid for the records' trustworthiness and that Arnold failed to show any transfer of confidential information to the testifying expert. The court reasoned that the records were regularly kept in the course of business and that no evidence established a conflict warranting disqualification.