William C. Mims

The case concerned Mario Lamar Turner, who was charged with aggravated malicious wounding and use of a firearm during the commission of a felony after a shooting incident. The central issue was whether the circuit court correctly determined that a witness was unavailable to testify at trial under the standard set forth in Sapp v. Commonwealth, based on several witnesses' claimed inability to recall events despite reviewing prior statements. The court reviewed the trial testimony of multiple witnesses who had varying degrees of memory loss regarding the shooter and the events, as well as the use of a former defense attorney's testimony about statements made at the preliminary hearing. The core reasoning examined the legal criteria for witness unavailability and whether information from the preliminary hearing was generally known such that it did not implicate professional conduct rules.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a dispute over a 30-foot easement for ingress, egress, and utilities on property in Spotsylvania County, where the Harts claimed that Piney Meeting House Investments (PMH) had placed obstructions including a buried propane tank and well that interfered with their rights. The circuit court had sustained exceptions to a commissioner’s report, ordering removal of the underground items and awarding the Harts costs plus $6,000 in attorney’s fees. The Supreme Court of Virginia held that the buried propane tank and well did not constitute unreasonable interference as a matter of law when they did not impede vehicular access, reversing that portion of the ruling while affirming the award of costs. It further reversed the attorney’s fees award, finding the Harts’ request for admission under Rule 4:11 invalid and thus providing PMH a valid reason under Rule 4:12(c)(4) for not admitting it had no defenses. The matter was remanded for further proceedings.

propertyprocedure

The case concerned whether a transcript of a March 3, 2010 hearing, omitted from the appellate record due to a court reporter's error and filed after the 60-day deadline in Rule 5A:8(a), could be added to the record as a clerical mistake under Code § 8.01-428(B) and Rule 5A:9. Belew had been convicted in circuit court of felony failure to stop at the scene of an accident, and the Court of Appeals denied her petition for appeal because the missing transcript left the record insufficient to review her assignments of error. The Supreme Court of Virginia held that the circuit court's orders purporting to correct the omission were invalid, because a party's failure to ensure timely filing of a transcript constitutes noncompliance with appellate rules rather than a clerical error arising from oversight that the statute allows courts to fix at any time. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision declining to consider the late transcript.

criminal lawprocedure

In Mathews v. PHH Mortgage Corp., borrowers who had defaulted on a mortgage note secured by a deed of trust sought to enjoin foreclosure, arguing that the lender failed to satisfy a condition precedent requiring a face-to-face meeting under a HUD regulation (24 C.F.R. § 203.604) that they claimed was incorporated into the deed of trust. The circuit court sustained the lender's demurrer, holding both that the borrowers could not enforce the conditions because they committed the first material breach by nonpayment and that the regulation did not apply. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia addressed whether the first-material-breach doctrine under Virginia common law bars a defaulting borrower from enforcing conditions precedent to foreclosure. The court reasoned that the doctrine precludes a breaching party from seeking damages or specific performance for the other party's breach of contractual obligations but does not prevent the borrower from challenging the lender's exercise of its foreclosure remedy under the deed of trust.

propertyprocedurebusiness & regulatory

Violet Seabolt sued Albemarle County alleging gross negligence in the maintenance of a public park that caused her injury. The circuit court sustained a demurrer to the gross negligence claim but did not rule on the county's plea of sovereign immunity. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia first addressed sovereign immunity as a jurisdictional issue and determined that counties retain common-law tort immunity. The Court held that Code § 15.2-1809 waives immunity only for cities and towns and does not extend a waiver to counties, and no other statute provides an express waiver. Because the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, the Court affirmed the dismissal of the complaint.

torts & liabilityprocedure

In this case, Mary Arnold sued Jonathan Peter Wallace for negligence after an automobile collision, with Travelers Insurance defending under uninsured motorist coverage; a jury awarded Arnold $9,134.61 in damages. Arnold appealed the circuit court's admission of her medical records from her treating physicians' practice under the business records exception to hearsay and its ruling allowing an expert physician to testify despite her partner's prior retention by the defense. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed both rulings, holding that a proper foundation was laid for the records' trustworthiness and that Arnold failed to show any transfer of confidential information to the testifying expert. The court reasoned that the records were regularly kept in the course of business and that no evidence established a conflict warranting disqualification.

torts & liabilityprocedure

In this case, Kent Sinclair challenged an Albemarle County zoning ordinance restricting construction on slopes of 25 percent or greater (critical slopes) and its waiver provision allowing the planning commission to modify or waive those requirements for a proposed cellular transmission tower on adjacent property. The Virginia Supreme Court considered whether the ordinance conflicted with state statutory law or violated the Dillon Rule by exceeding the powers delegated to the county. The court held that the waiver provision was neither a zoning variance nor a modification, and it addressed the validity of any delegation of legislative authority to the planning commission under the ordinance's detailed findings and procedures. The core reasoning examined the specific claims in the complaint, the nature of the waiver process relative to variances and special exceptions, and the limits of local zoning authority under Virginia law.

propertyenvironmentbusiness & regulatory

This case involved Home Paramount Pest Control suing former employee Justin Shaffer and his new employer Connor’s Termite and Pest Control for breach of contract and tortious interference after Shaffer joined the competitor within two years of leaving. The circuit court dismissed the claims on a plea in bar, ruling the non-compete provision in Shaffer’s employment agreement unenforceable as overbroad. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed, holding that the provision failed the test for enforceability because its function element was not narrowly drawn: it barred Shaffer from engaging in any pest control work in any capacity (including non-competitive roles) in the relevant geographic areas for two years. The court evaluated the function, geographic scope, and duration elements together and concluded the broad functional restriction was not justified by the employer’s legitimate business interests, even though the geographic and temporal limits were reasonable; it overruled prior precedent upholding an identical provision.

labor & employmentbusiness & regulatory

This case involved a dispute among former partners in a law firm over capital contributions, interest payments on equity, outstanding loans between partners, and the proper process for judicial dissolution of the partnership. The circuit court had ordered dissolution and ruled on certain interest obligations but without first conducting a full accounting of the firm's assets, liabilities, and partners' account balances. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the award of unpaid interest to one partner but vacated the remainder of the judgment, holding that an accounting is a prerequisite to settling accounts and dissolving the partnership under the partnership agreement and Code § 50-73.123(B). The court remanded for factual findings on the firm's liabilities, any surplus, the value of each partner's accounts, and appropriate distributions or liabilities among the partners.

business & regulatory

The case concerned whether the adult adoption of Mary Frances Kummer by her aunt severed the inheritance rights of her children from their biological aunt Justine Critzer's intestate estate. The circuit court ruled that the Kummer children were not heirs at law, and the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed. The court reasoned that Virginia statutes provide that an adopted person is the child of the adopting parent and not the biological parents, and that adult adoptions have the same legal effect as minor adoptions. Therefore, the adoption terminated the parent-child relationship for purposes of intestate succession under Code § 64.1-1 and § 64.1-5.1, preventing inheritance through the biological line.

family lawproperty

In Mulford v. Walnut Hill Farm Group, LLC, the dispute centered on whether Gardiner Mulford had a legal easement to access his landlocked property in Culpeper County via an old roadbed crossing Walnut Hill's land. Mulford claimed rights based on historical references in property titles and his purchase of title insurance, but Walnut Hill contested any such access and accused him of trespassing. The circuit court ruled against Mulford, finding he failed to establish the existence of an easement, and the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed this decision. The court reasoned that the burden of proving an easement rests on the claimant, and Mulford did not meet this burden since Walnut Hill never acknowledged a prior easement that was later abandoned.

property

This case involved D’Angelo Brooks appealing his conviction for possession of cocaine after police, responding to a report of shots fired, obtained his consent to search his home and found cocaine inside a gift bag along with cash; Brooks moved to suppress the evidence and his subsequent statements, arguing the search exceeded the scope of consent, that the statements were inadmissible as fruit of the poisonous tree and obtained without Miranda warnings, and that a certificate of analysis violated the Confrontation Clause. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the denial of the motion to suppress, holding that the search was within the scope of consent given the bag’s weight and shape and that Brooks was not in custody during the brief questioning so no Miranda warnings were required. The court reversed the conviction, however, because admission of the certificate of analysis was error under Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts and related precedent, and remanded for a new trial.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

The case involved the drowning of Charles Volpe in the Maury River below a low-head dam in a riverside park owned and operated by the City of Lexington. His parents sued the City for damages, alleging gross negligence, willful and wanton negligence, and public nuisance, claiming the City failed to warn of the dam's hidden hydraulic dangers. The circuit court struck the ordinary negligence claims, refused a nuisance instruction, and later struck the gross negligence claim on the ground that the danger was open and obvious, while the jury deadlocked on gross negligence. The Supreme Court of Virginia held that the City owed a duty to warn because the hydraulic hazard was not open and obvious to invitees, reversed the striking of the gross negligence claim due to sufficient evidence for a jury, and affirmed the striking of the willful and wanton negligence claim for lack of evidence of conscious disregard.

torts & liability

This case concerned whether two GEICO automobile insurance policies provided liability coverage for injuries from a 1999 car collision in which Steven Parent drove a vehicle owned by Sharon Bass without her direct permission. The circuit court had ruled that coverage existed under both Sharon's policy (listing the car) and Annie Parent's policy (covering relatives driving others' cars), but the Supreme Court of Virginia reversed. The court held that evidence showed Steven lacked permission under Annie's policy because he did not reasonably believe he had the owner's consent and that, under Sharon's policy, any implied permission from Krystal (the first permittee with general use) was exceeded when Steven took the car for his own purposes without authorization. Drawing on precedents interpreting omnibus clauses, the decision emphasized that a second permittee's use must stay within the scope of permission granted by the first permittee, who stands in the shoes of the named insured. Final judgment was entered for the insurers, GEICO and GEICO Indemnity.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

The case involved Donald Gunter's attempt to establish that he was the biological son of a decedent and thereby claim rights to the decedent's estate and real property. In 2005, Gunter sued to be added to the list of heirs, but the circuit court dismissed the action for failing to meet statutory requirements under Code § 64.1-5.1 regarding proof of parenthood. In 2009, Gunter filed a new suit seeking to quiet title and partition or sell two parcels of real property under Code §§ 8.01-81, -83, and 55-153, again asserting his status as the decedent's son. The circuit court sustained a plea of res judicata, finding that the 2005 dismissal barred the new claims. The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed, holding that res judicata did not apply under pre-Rule 1:6 standards because the remedies sought in the two actions were not identical.

family lawpropertyprocedure

Joseph C. Lee owned a duplex in Norfolk that suffered fire damage; he obtained permits to repair and elevate the structure but the City revoked the permits after inspecting the ongoing work, declared the building unsafe and a public nuisance under the building code, and ordered its demolition. Lee sued the City for compensation and damages, but the circuit court dismissed the claims on demurrer and pleas in bar. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed, holding that the City's demolition was an exercise of its governmental police power to abate a public nuisance rather than a proprietary or ministerial function, and therefore the City was protected by sovereign immunity.

propertytorts & liability

The case concerned whether the Fairfax County Redevelopment and Housing Authority could enforce a right of first refusal (ROFR) reserved in a 1989 deed conveying property to the Tovars, which was later foreclosed and transferred through multiple owners including the Kapanis and then Riekse. Fairfax sued the Kapanis and Riekse seeking to void Riekse’s deed, clear the encumbrance, and compel the Kapanis to convey the property to Fairfax under the ROFR as a covenant running with the land or condition subsequent. The circuit court ruled that Riekse’s deed was not void ab initio and that specific performance against the Kapanis was impossible because they no longer held title, so the proper remedy was an ejectment action; it granted a motion to strike and dismissed the case. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed, holding that the ROFR could not be enforced by specific performance against parties who had lost title and distinguishing prior cases where the relevant owners still held the property.

propertyprocedure

This case concerned whether custodians of accounts created under the Virginia Uniform Transfers to Minors Act (UTMA) breached their statutory duties by commingling funds, making improper withdrawals, and engaging in speculative investments. The plaintiffs (the children and their mother) sought removal of the custodians, an accounting, damages, and attorneys' fees after discovering that the funds had been withdrawn and mismanaged, including a $40,000 investment in US Airways stock that became worthless. The circuit court found limited breaches, awarded compensatory damages and attorneys' fees to the plaintiffs, and denied punitive damages; on appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the breach finding for the speculative investment and the attorneys' fees award based on a pattern of misconduct, reversed the determination that certain funds were untraceable, and entered adjusted final judgments allocating liability between the two custodians.

family lawpropertyprocedure

This case involved a will contest over the estate of Eugene Neal Parish, who had been declared incompetent after a brain injury and had conservators appointed, including his brother David Wayne Parish and sister-in-law Diane Parish. David challenged the will, arguing that Eugene lacked testamentary capacity and that the will was the product of undue influence by David Wayne, who was a major beneficiary, served as conservator, and acted as translator during the will's drafting. The circuit court found that Eugene had testamentary capacity and that there was no undue influence, and the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed. The court reasoned that the traditional requirements for presuming undue influence based on age and contrary disposition did not apply given Eugene's circumstances, and that the lower court had properly weighed the evidence under a clear and convincing standard to conclude the will reflected Eugene's intent.

family lawproperty

The case involved a wrongful death action under Virginia's Wrongful Death Act filed by one co-administrator of a decedent's estate against several physicians and a medical group for alleged medical malpractice. The circuit court dismissed the suit as time-barred after the second co-administrator was joined as a plaintiff following expiration of the two-year statute of limitations. The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed, holding that Code § 8.01-50 requires unity of action by all co-administrators but that Code § 8.01-5 permits post-limitations joinder of a necessary-party co-administrator who willingly submits to jurisdiction, and that the initial filing tolled the limitations period without prejudicing defendants under the policies underlying statutes of limitation.

proceduretorts & liability