In Brandon v. Cox, a Section 8 tenant sued her landlord and property manager in general district court to recover a security deposit that the defendants had retained to cover an alleged rent obligation owed by the local housing authority, despite a certification stating the tenant owed nothing. The district court ruled for the defendants, and the circuit court affirmed after a trial. On appeal to the Supreme Court of Virginia, the tenant argued that her security deposit could not lawfully be used to satisfy the housing authority's obligation, but the Court held that this argument was waived because it had not been preserved for appellate review. The Court reasoned that although the tenant filed a post-trial motion for reconsideration raising the issue, the record showed she neither sought nor obtained a ruling on the motion from the trial court, as required by Code § 8.01-384(A) and Rule 5:25 to allow the trial judge an opportunity to address the claim.
The case involved a dispute over the probate of Lucy Keith's 1996 will, which left her entire estate to her daughter Venocia Lulofs and excluded her stepson Walter Keith. Keith argued that the 1987 mirror-image wills executed by Lucy and her late husband Arvid were irrevocable reciprocal wills that became binding contracts upon Arvid's death, supported by an insurance policy and various statements. The trial court found the wills mutual and reciprocal but ruled there was insufficient evidence of a contractual agreement or corroboration under the Dead Man's Statute, and it admitted Lucy's later will to probate. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed, holding that mirror-image wills alone do not establish irrevocability and that the insurance policy and testimony provided no adequate corroboration of intent to create a binding contract.
In Environmental Staffing Acquisition Corp. v. B & R Construction Management, Inc., a subcontractor that was not paid for asbestos abatement work claimed it was a third-party beneficiary of a construction contract between B&R and a developer that required performance and payment bonds, and sued B&R for breach after the bond surety proved invalid. The trial court sustained B&R's demurrer and dismissed the claims. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed, ruling that the contract's plain language showed it conferred benefits only on the developer and its successors and included explicit disclaimers of third-party rights, so the plaintiff was merely an incidental beneficiary without standing to enforce the contract. The court further observed that the plaintiff had chosen not to pursue a direct action on the bond against B&R in its amended complaint.
The case involved a dispute between Orthopedic & Sports Physical Therapy Associates (OSPTA) and Summit Group Properties, LLC, arising from a commercial lease for a medical office building. OSPTA counterclaimed for fraud in the inducement after Summit sued for breach of the lease, alleging that members of Summit concealed plans to open a competing physical therapy practice. At trial, the court gave Jury Instruction 15, which stated that an LLC could not be liable for fraud unless the fraudulent acts were approved by its members. The Supreme Court of Virginia held that this instruction was incomplete and misleading because it omitted the principle that an LLC can be bound by a member's acts performed in the ordinary course of the LLC's business. The Court reversed the judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings.
This case involves the classification of stock options, restricted stock, and a special stock award granted to Mary Schuman during her marriage to Daniel Schuman for purposes of equitable distribution upon divorce. The trial court and Court of Appeals ruled the awards were Mary's separate property because they vested after the parties separated in 2007. The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed, holding that the stock awards constituted deferred compensation acquired during the marriage and were therefore presumed marital property under Code § 20-107.3(A)(2). The Court reasoned that the vesting date is not dispositive, as the statute expressly includes both vested and nonvested deferred compensation, and such awards should be treated like pensions by calculating the marital share based on when they were earned.
