This case concerned whether the doctrine of absolute judicial privilege applies to allegedly defamatory statements made in a draft complaint that was sent to interested parties as part of a pre-litigation settlement demand. Plaintiff James Mansfield sued the defendants for defamation after receiving the draft complaint, which related to an underlying employment discrimination claim filed by Michael Ford. The circuit court sustained the defendants' demurrers, and the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed that ruling. The court held that absolute privilege may attach to such communications if they are made preliminary to a proposed judicial proceeding contemplated in good faith and under serious consideration, are relevant to that proceeding, and are disclosed only to interested persons, adopting the approach of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.
The case involved a plaintiff who suffered severe injuries when a dead or decaying tree fell from property owned by Dunlora South, LLC onto his vehicle while he was driving on a public highway. The plaintiff sued for negligence and nuisance, alleging that the landowner knew or should have known of the tree's dangerous condition given its visible decay and proximity to a busy road. The circuit court sustained the defendant's demurrer without leave to amend, and the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed that ruling. The court held that under longstanding Virginia common law, which follows English common law, a landowner owes no duty to persons outside the property regarding natural conditions such as trees, regardless of any danger they may pose. The decision turned on the absence of any statutory modification to this rule and the distinction between natural conditions and artificial hazards.
The case concerned whether the Town of Leesburg could rezone a parcel owned by Cornerstone Chapel and amend the Town Plan to eliminate a planned road (Tolbert Lane) across that parcel without the consent of adjacent owner Long Lane Associates, which claimed vested rights based on proffers attached to the original 1988 rezoning of the undivided High Point property. The circuit court ruled in favor of Long Lane, holding that the town lacked authority to act without consent because Long Lane had a vested interest in the road's completion and the original zoning conditions. The Virginia Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the adoption and amendment of zoning ordinances and the Town Plan are legislative acts that the town could undertake without requiring agreement from all successors in title, that Long Lane had no vested right in an unbuilt road shown on the plan or in the neighboring property's zoning classification, and that the town's actions were reasonable and within its statutory authority under Code § 15.2-2303. The Court entered final judgment for the Town and Cornerstone.
This case involved PBM Nutritionals seeking insurance coverage from Lexington Insurance Company and others for the loss of infant formula batches contaminated by disintegrated water filter materials during manufacturing, which made the product unmarketable. The circuit court ruled that the insurers were not liable under the policies due to pollution exclusion endorsements. On appeal, the Virginia Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the exclusions applied broadly to the contamination, which was not limited to traditional environmental pollution, and evidence showed the formula was contaminated as defined in the policies.
The case involved whether Steadfast Insurance Company was obligated to defend and indemnify AES Corporation under commercial general liability policies for claims in a lawsuit by the Native Village of Kivalina alleging that AES's greenhouse gas emissions contributed to global warming and caused damage to their village. The circuit court granted summary judgment to Steadfast, finding no coverage, and the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed. The court reasoned that the policies cover damages caused by an "occurrence," defined as an "accident," but the complaint alleged that AES intentionally emitted greenhouse gases knowing or should have known of the impacts, making the alleged harm not accidental and thus not an occurrence. Therefore, Steadfast had no duty to defend or provide coverage.
The case concerned whether Virginia's 20-year statute of limitations on enforcing judgments under Code § 8.01-251(A) barred collection of child support arrearages from a 1966 divorce decree ordering weekly payments that ended in 1982. The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the Court of Appeals and circuit court rulings, holding that the limitations period applied and barred enforcement efforts begun in 2006. Each unpaid support installment became a judgment by operation of law on its due date, and all such judgments arose more than 20 years before the collection action. The court reasoned that the statute's plain language covers all judgments without exception for ongoing or unliquidated support obligations, and no extension had been obtained.
