The case centered on a lawsuit brought by MT Technology Enterprises, LLC, a Delaware company holding intellectual property rights in display technology, against Cristol, LLC and several of its board members and employees. MT alleged statutory conspiracy and related claims arising from a lease agreement for equipment, interference with MT's licensing obligations, and actions at Cristol board meetings that allegedly pressured one member and disrupted business relationships. The trial court found MT had met Virginia registration requirements under Code § 13.1-1057(A) and imposed sanctions on the defendants under Rule 4:12(b) for litigation conduct. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia considered whether those rulings were erroneous and examined the scope of the right to cross-examine witnesses in the proceedings.
In this case, Kesha Napper, an employee of Kastle Systems, sued ABM Janitorial Services and Monday Properties Services for negligence after she slipped and fell in a building lobby while walking to the restroom during work hours. The defendants filed a plea in bar, arguing that Napper's claims were barred by the workers' compensation exclusivity provision because the defendants were statutory co-employees performing work that was part of Kastle's trade, business, or occupation. The trial court sustained the plea in bar and dismissed the suit, but the Supreme Court of Virginia reversed, holding that the defendants were strangers to Kastle's business of operating a call center because there was no evidence that cleaning or maintenance was an essential part of Kastle's operations or that Kastle employees performed any such tasks in the common areas. The court distinguished the case from Fowler v. International Cleaning Service, noting that Kastle's offices were not a retail space dependent on cleanliness for customer service, and thus the exclusivity bar did not apply.
This case arose from Perot Systems Government Services' lawsuit against former employees and 21st Century Systems, Inc., alleging they conspired to misappropriate Perot's Navy consulting business by breaching fiduciary duties, non-disclosure and non-compete agreements, violating trade secret and computer crimes statutes, and engaging in statutory and common-law conspiracy. Perot sought compensatory damages, including for lost goodwill, which the trial court awarded following a jury verdict after admitting expert testimony on the valuation. The Virginia Supreme Court addressed whether that expert testimony on goodwill damages was admissible and legally sufficient, applying precedents such as Advanced Marine Enterprises v. PRC Inc. that require a reasonable basis for calculating the intangible asset's loss.
The case concerned Dennis Barson's misdemeanor conviction for harassment by computer under Virginia Code § 18.2-152.7:1, based on emails he sent to his estranged wife and others containing vulgar accusations of sexual misconduct and other acts. A divided Court of Appeals panel initially reversed, but the en banc court overruled its prior precedent in Allman v. Commonwealth, adopted a broader dictionary-based definition of obscenity, and affirmed the conviction. The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed, ruling that Barson's language did not qualify as obscene under the legal standard in effect when the emails were sent, and that applying a new, broader definition retroactively violated due process.
The case involved two plaintiffs who filed personal injury lawsuits arising from a 2007 motor vehicle accident, took nonsuits in their original actions in early 2010, and then filed identical second lawsuits before the nonsuit orders were actually entered by the circuit court. The defendants and their insurers moved to dismiss the second suits as time-barred under the two-year statute of limitations, arguing that the tolling provision in Code § 8.01-229(E)(3) did not apply because the new actions were filed before the nonsuit orders. The circuit court granted the motions and dismissed the cases with prejudice. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia reversed, holding that the plain language and purpose of the tolling statute allowed the second actions to proceed when filed within six months of the nonsuit, even if before formal entry of the nonsuit orders.
This case concerned whether a title insurance company could recover from a surety on a bond required under Virginia's Consumer Real Estate Settlement Protection Act (CRESPA) after a settlement agent diverted refinance funds, leaving the lender's interest unsecured. The Virginia Supreme Court answered three certified questions from the Fourth Circuit by holding that CRESPA itself does not create a private right of action against the surety bond, but that common-law claims such as breach of contract remain available. It further held that the title insurer lacked standing to sue in its own right but could proceed as subrogee of its insured lender, because the bond was intended to protect parties with an interest in the settlement transaction and subrogation allows the insurer to step into the insured's shoes. The decision rested on statutory interpretation of CRESPA's text and the common-law principles of subrogation.