The case involved the City of Richmond appealing a circuit court judgment that corrected property tax assessments on eight non-contiguous parcels owned by Jackson Ward Partners, L.P., operated as affordable housing subject to long-term regulatory restrictions from HUD and VHDA programs. The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the judgment in favor of the taxpayer. The court held that JWP failed to carry its burden under Code § 58.1-3984 to prove the fair market value of the parcels for tax years 2005-2008. The core reasoning was that the taxpayer's appraisal, which determined highest and best use as a single 18-unit multifamily property due to sale and use restrictions, did not establish the correct fair market value.
In this case, the administratrix of a deceased resident's estate sued an assisted living facility and related defendants for wrongful death based on alleged negligence. After a 2000 order removed the action from the docket due to a bankruptcy stay and stated it would be discontinued after three years of inactivity under Code § 8.01-335(B), the trial court in 2009 treated the case as discontinued and dismissed the claim against one defendant with prejudice for failure to refile timely. The Supreme Court of Virginia held that the statute does not authorize self-executing prospective dismissals, so the 2000 order only removed the case from the docket without discontinuing it, and the 2009 order was not final and appealable because it resolved only one defendant whose interests were not severable from the others. The appeal was therefore dismissed without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction.
The case involved David McNeal's conviction in a bench trial for violating Code § 18.2-118 by failing to return rented personal property (an aluminum brake valued over $200) within ten days after the rental period expired. The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that conflicting testimony from the rental store manager about the rental and return dates rendered the evidence insufficient as a matter of law to prove the elements beyond a reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed that judgment and reinstated the conviction, reasoning that the circuit court as factfinder was entitled to resolve inconsistencies in the single witness's testimony, credit the portions indicating the equipment was held for two to three months, and find the evidence sufficient to support guilt.
The case concerned a dispute over whether compensation received from a partial eminent domain taking of real property held in an inter vivos trust should be allocated to the income beneficiary (the grantor) or to the remainder beneficiary (Riverside Healthcare), and whether the remainder beneficiary could obtain an equitable accounting. The circuit court granted partial summary judgment to the trustee, allocating the funds to income, and sustained a demurrer to the accounting claim. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the allocation ruling because the trust instrument defined "net income" to include "proceeds from the Trust property," and the Uniform Principal and Income Act expressly provides that trust terms control over its default rules allocating eminent domain proceeds to principal. It reversed the demurrer ruling because the lower court had improperly relied on an accounting that was not part of the pleadings or record when assessing whether a cause of action under Code § 8.01-31 had been stated.
The case involved a marina owner with riparian rights challenging a county board's denial of a special exception permit to expand mooring slips and piers beyond the mean low-water mark in a tidal navigable creek, claiming that only the Virginia Marine Resources Commission had jurisdiction over such areas and that the county's zoning ordinance lacked adequate standards to guide permit decisions. The circuit court denied declaratory relief, concluding that the county's general zoning authority over upland marina uses extended to the related piers and slips, and that the ordinance was valid when the board exercised legislative judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, reasoning that zoning authority necessarily includes regulation of such structures as part of the same use and that specific standards are not required for local governing bodies acting in their legislative capacity.
The case concerned Chesterfield County's assessment of Business, Professional and Occupation License (BPOL) taxes on Ford Motor Credit Company (FMCC) for tax years 2001-2004, specifically whether the County could tax all gross receipts from loans originated at FMCC's Richmond Branch or whether those receipts had to be apportioned to reflect contributions from other FMCC offices. FMCC sought a refund, arguing that the assessments violated state attribution and deduction rules as well as the Commerce Clause's fair apportionment requirement. The circuit court upheld the County's full assessment of the receipts to the branch location. The Virginia Supreme Court reversed, holding that the County had failed to limit the taxable measure to only those gross receipts attributable to the licensed privilege exercised at the definite place of business within the County, and that FMCC could use a payroll-based apportionment method to allocate receipts among multiple locations that contributed to their realization.