Donald W. Lemons

The case centered on a lawsuit brought by MT Technology Enterprises, LLC, a Delaware company holding intellectual property rights in display technology, against Cristol, LLC and several of its board members and employees. MT alleged statutory conspiracy and related claims arising from a lease agreement for equipment, interference with MT's licensing obligations, and actions at Cristol board meetings that allegedly pressured one member and disrupted business relationships. The trial court found MT had met Virginia registration requirements under Code § 13.1-1057(A) and imposed sanctions on the defendants under Rule 4:12(b) for litigation conduct. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia considered whether those rulings were erroneous and examined the scope of the right to cross-examine witnesses in the proceedings.

business & regulatoryprocedure

In this case, Kesha Napper, an employee of Kastle Systems, sued ABM Janitorial Services and Monday Properties Services for negligence after she slipped and fell in a building lobby while walking to the restroom during work hours. The defendants filed a plea in bar, arguing that Napper's claims were barred by the workers' compensation exclusivity provision because the defendants were statutory co-employees performing work that was part of Kastle's trade, business, or occupation. The trial court sustained the plea in bar and dismissed the suit, but the Supreme Court of Virginia reversed, holding that the defendants were strangers to Kastle's business of operating a call center because there was no evidence that cleaning or maintenance was an essential part of Kastle's operations or that Kastle employees performed any such tasks in the common areas. The court distinguished the case from Fowler v. International Cleaning Service, noting that Kastle's offices were not a retail space dependent on cleanliness for customer service, and thus the exclusivity bar did not apply.

labor & employmenttorts & liabilityprocedure

This case arose from Perot Systems Government Services' lawsuit against former employees and 21st Century Systems, Inc., alleging they conspired to misappropriate Perot's Navy consulting business by breaching fiduciary duties, non-disclosure and non-compete agreements, violating trade secret and computer crimes statutes, and engaging in statutory and common-law conspiracy. Perot sought compensatory damages, including for lost goodwill, which the trial court awarded following a jury verdict after admitting expert testimony on the valuation. The Virginia Supreme Court addressed whether that expert testimony on goodwill damages was admissible and legally sufficient, applying precedents such as Advanced Marine Enterprises v. PRC Inc. that require a reasonable basis for calculating the intangible asset's loss.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

The case concerned Dennis Barson's misdemeanor conviction for harassment by computer under Virginia Code § 18.2-152.7:1, based on emails he sent to his estranged wife and others containing vulgar accusations of sexual misconduct and other acts. A divided Court of Appeals panel initially reversed, but the en banc court overruled its prior precedent in Allman v. Commonwealth, adopted a broader dictionary-based definition of obscenity, and affirmed the conviction. The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed, ruling that Barson's language did not qualify as obscene under the legal standard in effect when the emails were sent, and that applying a new, broader definition retroactively violated due process.

criminal law

The case involved two plaintiffs who filed personal injury lawsuits arising from a 2007 motor vehicle accident, took nonsuits in their original actions in early 2010, and then filed identical second lawsuits before the nonsuit orders were actually entered by the circuit court. The defendants and their insurers moved to dismiss the second suits as time-barred under the two-year statute of limitations, arguing that the tolling provision in Code § 8.01-229(E)(3) did not apply because the new actions were filed before the nonsuit orders. The circuit court granted the motions and dismissed the cases with prejudice. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia reversed, holding that the plain language and purpose of the tolling statute allowed the second actions to proceed when filed within six months of the nonsuit, even if before formal entry of the nonsuit orders.

proceduretorts & liability

This case concerned whether a title insurance company could recover from a surety on a bond required under Virginia's Consumer Real Estate Settlement Protection Act (CRESPA) after a settlement agent diverted refinance funds, leaving the lender's interest unsecured. The Virginia Supreme Court answered three certified questions from the Fourth Circuit by holding that CRESPA itself does not create a private right of action against the surety bond, but that common-law claims such as breach of contract remain available. It further held that the title insurer lacked standing to sue in its own right but could proceed as subrogee of its insured lender, because the bond was intended to protect parties with an interest in the settlement transaction and subrogation allows the insurer to step into the insured's shoes. The decision rested on statutory interpretation of CRESPA's text and the common-law principles of subrogation.

business & regulatorypropertyprocedure

The case involved Geographic Services, Inc. (GSI) suing former employee Anthony Collelo, Boeing, and Autometric for breach of contract, tortious interference with contract, and violations of the Virginia Uniform Trade Secrets Act after Collelo left GSI and began performing similar geonames mapping work at Boeing using GSI's confidential Geographic Names Procedure, including its QC and edge-matching tools. The Circuit Court of Fairfax County granted the defendants' motion to strike and dismissed all claims, while denying Collelo's motion for attorneys' fees. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed whether GSI presented sufficient evidence of damages on its trade secrets claims to submit the matter to a jury. The Court held that, although the trial court applied an incorrect legal standard requiring direct competition, GSI failed to prove damages with reasonable certainty under theories of lost profits, unjust enrichment, or reasonable royalty, so the motion to strike was properly granted.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

Calvin Lamont Bowman was convicted by a jury of robbery, abduction, and firearm offenses arising from a 2006 bank robbery and sentenced to 28 years in prison. After his direct appeals were denied, he filed a habeas corpus petition in the Circuit Court of Fairfax County alleging four claims of ineffective assistance of counsel related to the handling of fingerprint evidence, DNA testing, red-dye analysis, and expert testimony. The habeas court ruled one claim procedurally defaulted and rejected the others under the Strickland v. Washington standard, finding counsel's performance neither deficient nor prejudicial. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed, holding that Bowman failed to demonstrate prejudice from the alleged errors because the evidence at trial, including matching fingerprints and boot prints, remained sufficient to support the convictions.

criminal lawprocedure

In this medical malpractice case, plaintiff Kasey Landrum sued Chippenham and Johnston-Willis Hospitals and a doctor after her out-of-state counsel failed to timely and properly designate expert witnesses in response to discovery requests and a court scheduling order, violating Virginia Rules on disclosure of expert opinions and the requirement for local counsel signature. The circuit court gave counsel additional time to cure the deficiencies but ultimately excluded the experts when compliance still did not occur, leading to summary judgment for the defendants. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the sanction after repeated violations of discovery rules and pretrial orders. The core reasoning focused on the plaintiff's counsel's admitted failures to meet deadlines and procedural requirements despite warnings and opportunities to correct the issues.

proceduretorts & liability

This case concerned the distribution of the estate of Collette Lynn Lockard, who was murdered by her son Clayton Devoy Lynn in 2005; Lynn was later convicted of second-degree murder. Lockard's will named Lynn as sole beneficiary, and the dispute was between Lockard's granddaughters (Lynn's minor daughters) and Lockard's mother over who inherited under Virginia's Slayer Statute. The granddaughters argued that the 2008 amended version of the statute applied, allowing them to inherit directly from Lockard rather than through Lynn, while Lockard's mother contended that the 2005 version in effect at the time of death controlled and barred claims through the slayer. The trial court and Supreme Court of Virginia held that the 2005 version governed because it was in effect on the date of Lockard's death, with the later conviction merely designating Lynn as the slayer, so the estate passed to Lockard's mother under intestate succession rules as modified by that statute. The court also rejected arguments that the 2005 statute implicated prohibitions on corruption of blood or forfeiture of estate.

criminal lawfamily lawproperty

This case involves Dustin Allen Turner's appeal from the dismissal of his petition for a writ of actual innocence based on non-biological evidence, after his convictions for the 1995 murder and abduction with intent to defile of Jennifer Evans. Turner and co-defendant Billy Joe Brown had been convicted under a felony-murder theory, with the abduction serving as the predicate felony. The Virginia Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' dismissal, holding that Brown's recantation of his testimony about the events was not material under Code § 19.2-327.11(A)(vii) because it did not address Turner's involvement in the abduction and thus would not prove that no rational trier of fact could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The court reasoned that the new evidence left the record on the abduction issue essentially unchanged and did not undermine the continuous-transaction link between the felony and the homicide.

criminal law

In this case, the Michael E. Siska Revocable Trust brought a derivative action on behalf of Motel Investments of Christiansburg, LLC (MIC) against other members and Milestone Development, LLC, alleging breaches of fiduciary duty and other claims related to the unauthorized transfer of MIC's assets, but did not join MIC as a party. The circuit court dismissed the action on the ground that the Trust lacked standing because it did not fairly and adequately represent the interests of MIC's members. The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed, holding that an LLC that is the subject of a derivative action is a necessary party that must be joined because the LLC is the real party in interest and any recovery belongs to it. The Court reasoned that, as with corporate derivative suits, the claims and judgment in an LLC derivative action belong to the entity itself, which must be bound by the result.

business & regulatoryprocedure

In Bank of the Commonwealth v. Hudspeth, former employee Roger Hudspeth sued the Bank for $225,000 in unpaid compensation after his termination, prompting the Bank to seek a stay and compel arbitration under FINRA's Customer Code of Arbitration Procedure. The circuit court denied the motion, ruling that the Bank was neither a FINRA member nor a customer of a member firm and that no express arbitration agreement existed between the parties. The Virginia Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the Customer Code's definition of customer—excluding only a broker or dealer—is ambiguous and that federal arbitration law requires resolving such doubts in favor of arbitration. The court concluded that the Bank qualified as a customer because it was not a broker or dealer and had entered a brokerage agreement with a FINRA member firm, making the dispute arbitrable between a customer and an associated person.

business & regulatorylabor & employmentprocedure

This case involved a petition by Lucretia Copeland to adopt a child without the consent of the birth mother, Leslie Todd, who had relinquished temporary custody of the infant while incarcerated and later had minimal contact with the child. The circuit court granted the adoption under Virginia Code provisions allowing it without consent due to lack of contact and contrary to the child's best interests, but the Court of Appeals reversed on due process grounds. The Supreme Court of Virginia held that the statutory ground for non-consent based on six months of no contact did not apply, but the best-interests analysis under Code §§ 63.2-1203 and -1205 was constitutional and supported by sufficient evidence, as Todd had voluntarily placed the child with Copeland rather than having rights terminated by the state. The Court rejected equal protection and due process challenges, finding Todd not similarly situated to parents in state-initiated foster care cases. It therefore reinstated the adoption decree.

family lawcivil rights

The case concerned whether the Fairfax County Circuit Court had subject matter jurisdiction over a petition to declare Dolores Davis an unfit pet owner. The petition originated in general district court, was appealed and nonsuited in circuit court, refiled in general district court (which dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction), and then appealed back to circuit court, which ruled on the merits. The Supreme Court of Virginia held that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction because its appellate jurisdiction is derivative of the general district court's, which had none after the nonsuit. The court reasoned that a nonsuit nullifies the original case, so an appeal from a court without jurisdiction confers none on the appellate court, even if the circuit court could have exercised original jurisdiction over a properly refiled petition. It reversed the Court of Appeals and entered final judgment for Davis.

procedure

The case concerned whether Victory Nissan violated Virginia's adoption of UCC Article Nine by repossessing and disposing of a vehicle sold to Britt without prior notice of disposition, after financing for the conditional sale fell through and the dealership canceled the deal. The trial court ruled that the transaction created a secured interest under Article Nine, that Victory Nissan was obligated to provide the statutory notice before selling the car, and awarded Britt the maximum statutory damages of $15,000. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed, holding that the contract documents as a whole treated Britt as the owner and debtor, that the parties' agreement permitted repossession upon financing failure, and that repossession by a secured party triggered the non-waivable notice requirements of Code §§ 8.9A-611 through -614 regardless of whether a formal default had occurred. The Court reasoned that the notice obligation could not be altered by the conditional-sale terms and that Britt retained a redemption interest in the collateral.

business & regulatoryproperty

In Ford Motor Co. v. Gordon, the case concerned whether a worker's 2006 change-in-condition application for workers' compensation benefits, following a 2000 compensable injury and multiple awards, was time-barred under the two-year statute of limitations in Code § 65.2-708(A). The Workers' Compensation Commission rejected the claim as untimely, but the Court of Appeals reversed, and the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed. The court held that the statute of limitations runs anew under each successive award of compensation for the injury and is triggered by the last payment date, with the tolling provision in Code § 65.2-708(C) treating qualifying light-duty wages as compensation applying to each award. Here, wages paid from April 2003 through April 2005 were deemed compensation, tolling the limitations period through April 2005 and rendering the September 2006 application timely.

labor & employment

In this condemnation case, Prince William County sought to acquire the Deans' 0.6-acre property, formerly used as a gas station, for expanding a bus maintenance facility and building a commuter parking lot after failed purchase negotiations. The trial court granted the County's motion in limine to exclude evidence of a prior sale to the County of nearby property owned by Sultan Aman, which the Deans sought to use as a comparable sale to support a higher valuation. The jury awarded $488,750 based on the remaining evidence, and the trial court upheld the verdict. On appeal, the Virginia Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion because evidence showed the Aman sale was influenced by the County's need to complete a road-widening project and its willingness to compromise to avoid condemnation proceedings. The Court reasoned that such sales lack the voluntariness required to qualify as comparable under Virginia precedent.

propertyprocedure

The case involved a Virginia law firm, Dunn, suing Gerald Connolly, a county board chairman, for tortious interference with its at-will contract to provide legal services to the Fairfax County Redevelopment and Housing Authority; Dunn alleged that Connolly had persuaded the Authority to terminate the relationship solely out of personal malice after a verbal clash. The circuit court sustained Connolly's demurrer to the amended complaint and dismissed the action with prejudice. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed, holding that the complaint failed to allege facts showing "improper methods" of interference as required for the tort when the contract is terminable at will, because actions motivated only by spite or ill will do not suffice. The Court further concluded that the ruling rested on the failure to state a prima facie claim rather than on any First Amendment or Noerr-Pennington privilege defense.

torts & liabilityfree speechprocedure

The case concerned whether a Commonwealth's Attorney could prosecute a first-offense refusal to take a breath test under Code § 18.2-268.3, which is classified as a civil offense, or whether only the Attorney General had that authority. The defendant moved to disqualify the Commonwealth's Attorney before her circuit court trial, arguing lack of statutory power under Code § 15.2-1627. The trial court denied the motion and found the defendant guilty, and the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed. The court held that Code § 18.2-268.4(B) requires the procedure for appeal and trial of a first-offense refusal to be the same as for misdemeanors, which Commonwealth's Attorneys are authorized to prosecute under Code § 15.2-1627(B).

criminal lawprocedure