Cynthia D. Kinser

The case involved the City of Richmond appealing a circuit court judgment that corrected property tax assessments on eight non-contiguous parcels owned by Jackson Ward Partners, L.P., operated as affordable housing subject to long-term regulatory restrictions from HUD and VHDA programs. The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the judgment in favor of the taxpayer. The court held that JWP failed to carry its burden under Code § 58.1-3984 to prove the fair market value of the parcels for tax years 2005-2008. The core reasoning was that the taxpayer's appraisal, which determined highest and best use as a single 18-unit multifamily property due to sale and use restrictions, did not establish the correct fair market value.

taxesproperty

In this case, the administratrix of a deceased resident's estate sued an assisted living facility and related defendants for wrongful death based on alleged negligence. After a 2000 order removed the action from the docket due to a bankruptcy stay and stated it would be discontinued after three years of inactivity under Code § 8.01-335(B), the trial court in 2009 treated the case as discontinued and dismissed the claim against one defendant with prejudice for failure to refile timely. The Supreme Court of Virginia held that the statute does not authorize self-executing prospective dismissals, so the 2000 order only removed the case from the docket without discontinuing it, and the 2009 order was not final and appealable because it resolved only one defendant whose interests were not severable from the others. The appeal was therefore dismissed without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction.

proceduretorts & liability

The case involved David McNeal's conviction in a bench trial for violating Code § 18.2-118 by failing to return rented personal property (an aluminum brake valued over $200) within ten days after the rental period expired. The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that conflicting testimony from the rental store manager about the rental and return dates rendered the evidence insufficient as a matter of law to prove the elements beyond a reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed that judgment and reinstated the conviction, reasoning that the circuit court as factfinder was entitled to resolve inconsistencies in the single witness's testimony, credit the portions indicating the equipment was held for two to three months, and find the evidence sufficient to support guilt.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned a dispute over whether compensation received from a partial eminent domain taking of real property held in an inter vivos trust should be allocated to the income beneficiary (the grantor) or to the remainder beneficiary (Riverside Healthcare), and whether the remainder beneficiary could obtain an equitable accounting. The circuit court granted partial summary judgment to the trustee, allocating the funds to income, and sustained a demurrer to the accounting claim. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the allocation ruling because the trust instrument defined "net income" to include "proceeds from the Trust property," and the Uniform Principal and Income Act expressly provides that trust terms control over its default rules allocating eminent domain proceeds to principal. It reversed the demurrer ruling because the lower court had improperly relied on an accounting that was not part of the pleadings or record when assessing whether a cause of action under Code § 8.01-31 had been stated.

propertyprocedure

The case involved a marina owner with riparian rights challenging a county board's denial of a special exception permit to expand mooring slips and piers beyond the mean low-water mark in a tidal navigable creek, claiming that only the Virginia Marine Resources Commission had jurisdiction over such areas and that the county's zoning ordinance lacked adequate standards to guide permit decisions. The circuit court denied declaratory relief, concluding that the county's general zoning authority over upland marina uses extended to the related piers and slips, and that the ordinance was valid when the board exercised legislative judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, reasoning that zoning authority necessarily includes regulation of such structures as part of the same use and that specific standards are not required for local governing bodies acting in their legislative capacity.

propertybusiness & regulatory

The case concerned Chesterfield County's assessment of Business, Professional and Occupation License (BPOL) taxes on Ford Motor Credit Company (FMCC) for tax years 2001-2004, specifically whether the County could tax all gross receipts from loans originated at FMCC's Richmond Branch or whether those receipts had to be apportioned to reflect contributions from other FMCC offices. FMCC sought a refund, arguing that the assessments violated state attribution and deduction rules as well as the Commerce Clause's fair apportionment requirement. The circuit court upheld the County's full assessment of the receipts to the branch location. The Virginia Supreme Court reversed, holding that the County had failed to limit the taxable measure to only those gross receipts attributable to the licensed privilege exercised at the definite place of business within the County, and that FMCC could use a payroll-based apportionment method to allocate receipts among multiple locations that contributed to their realization.

taxesbusiness & regulatory

Troy Lamont Preston was convicted at a bench trial of possessing a firearm after having been adjudicated delinquent as a juvenile for an act that would constitute a violent felony if committed by an adult, in violation of Code § 18.2-308.2(A)(iii). The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the conviction on the ground that the evidence was insufficient, as the juvenile court records did not contain explicit findings establishing that Preston had been adjudicated delinquent of breaking and entering. Instead, the documents showed only a disposition of guilt and probation without detailing the plea or specific findings under the relevant case number. The Court held that the fact finder could not rely on conjecture to determine the nature of the prior adjudication. Because the Commonwealth had also proved a prior non-violent felony conviction for grand larceny, the case was remanded for a new sentencing proceeding on the lesser offense.

criminal lawguns

This case arose when Fairfax County officials sought to enforce local ordinances on drainage systems and impervious surfaces against property owners through a consent injunction, then moved for contempt after noncompliance. The trial court refused to hold the owners in civil contempt, determining that their failure to comply was not willful. The Supreme Court of Virginia dismissed the appeal, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction because neither the common law nor applicable statutes, including Code § 8.01-670(A)(3) and Code § 19.2-318, authorize review of a trial court's refusal to find civil contempt.

environmentpropertyprocedure

The case involved TB Venture, LLC challenging Arlington County's tax assessments on 21 condominium units designated for low-income rental under a community benefit agreement, claiming the assessments exceeded fair market value for 2007 and 2008. TB Venture petitioned to correct the assessments under Virginia law requiring property to be assessed at 100% of fair market value. The circuit court struck TB Venture's evidence, and the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed, holding that the taxpayer failed to meet its burden by not providing evidence of the fair market value for each individual condominium unit separately, instead appraising the units collectively and allocating values based on income.

taxesproperty

The case involved Antoine Lanier Hall, who was convicted in a bench trial of felonious escape by force or violence under Virginia Code § 18.2-478 after officers arrived at his home with arrest warrants, he stepped onto the porch, an officer grabbed his wrist and told him he was under arrest while attempting to handcuff him, and Hall then struggled and fled. The circuit court denied Hall's motions to strike and found him guilty, the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, and the Supreme Court of Virginia granted review on the sufficiency of the evidence regarding custody. The court held that the evidence was sufficient because the officer's words and physical contact effected an arrest, placing Hall in custody, and affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

criminal law

In this case, Miguel Angel Aguilar was convicted of robbery, rape, and related offenses based in part on DNA evidence from a sexual assault. The U.S. Supreme Court vacated an earlier Virginia ruling and remanded for reconsideration under Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts regarding the Confrontation Clause. On remand, the Virginia Supreme Court addressed whether admitting certificates of analysis without testimony from two forensic scientists who performed preliminary DNA screening and robotic processing steps violated Aguilar's rights. The court affirmed the convictions, holding that no violation occurred because those scientists did not author the certificates or provide any testimonial statements against Aguilar, and the primary examiner who did author and testify about them was available for cross-examination.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Elizabeth Noakes, a child care provider convicted of involuntary manslaughter after a 15-month-old child in her care died from asphyxiation. Noakes had placed a collapsed dog crate and cardboard over the child's crib to prevent him from standing and crying during a nap, then left him unattended for over two hours while monitoring only audibly. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the conviction, finding sufficient evidence that Noakes acted with criminal negligence by creating a foreseeable risk of harm and that her actions were the proximate cause of the death, as the child's movements under the covering were not an unforeseeable intervening cause.

criminal law

This case concerns two defendants convicted of cocaine possession and distribution offenses in Virginia circuit courts, where certificates of analysis identifying the substances as cocaine were introduced into evidence under former Code §§ 19.2-187 and -187.1 without testimony from the forensic analysts who prepared them. On remand from the U.S. Supreme Court after Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, the Virginia Supreme Court considered whether that procedure violated the Confrontation Clause. The court held that admission of the certificates did violate the defendants' confrontation rights because the certificates were testimonial statements requiring live testimony or a valid waiver. Cypress's conviction was reversed and remanded for a new trial, while Briscoe's convictions were affirmed on the ground that other admissible evidence rendered the constitutional error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

criminal lawprocedure

In Smith v. Mountjoy, the dispute centered on whether Evelyn Smith, acting as attorney-in-fact for her husband Theodore under a durable power of attorney that authorized various property transactions but contained no express gift-making power, validly created two inter vivos revocable trusts and conveyed the couple's jointly held real estate into those trusts via deeds of gift, thereby severing their tenancies by the entirety. After Evelyn's death, Theodore terminated his trust, demanded distributions from Evelyn's trust, and sued to have the transfers declared unauthorized and to reclaim ownership of the property interests. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Theodore, and the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed, holding that the transactions were unauthorized gifts and that Theodore's post-discovery actions did not constitute ratification because he promptly disavowed the acts rather than accepting their benefits.

propertyfamily law

This case concerned whether the trustees of Columbia Baptist Church could consolidate seven lots into one under the City of Falls Church's zoning ordinances, after a zoning administrator issued a letter interpreting the rules as permitting the consolidation but the Planning Commission denied the application. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the circuit court's ruling upholding the denial, holding that Code § 15.2-2311(C) did not bind the Planning Commission to the zoning administrator's interpretation because the commission is not an 'administrative officer' and the letter was not a final 'written order, requirement, decision or determination.' The court reasoned that the Planning Commission possesses independent authority under state and local law to interpret and apply zoning ordinances when reviewing subdivision plats, and its decision was neither arbitrary nor capricious.

propertyprocedure

In Scialdone v. Commonwealth, attorneys and a law student were summarily held in contempt by a circuit court during a felony trial after attempting to introduce documents purporting to be Yahoo chat room rules that appeared altered or fabricated. The Supreme Court of Virginia held that the defendants preserved their due process argument on appeal and that summary contempt was inappropriate because not all essential elements of the alleged conduct occurred in the court's presence. The court reasoned that the proceeding involved extensive questioning of witnesses and the defendants outside the jury's view, which exceeded the narrow scope of summary contempt and required instead the notice, counsel, and opportunity to present evidence associated with a plenary proceeding. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals' judgment was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

This case involved a challenge to the City of Hampton's 2008 zoning ordinance amendments that added lands designated under the federal Coastal Barrier Resources System as a criterion for including property in Resource Protection Areas under the state Chesapeake Bay Preservation Act. The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the circuit court's judgment upholding the amendments. The court held that localities are required to use only the criteria developed by the Chesapeake Bay Local Assistance Board for designating such areas, and those criteria do not include the federal designation. Because the General Assembly did not expressly or impliedly authorize localities to incorporate the federal Coastal Barrier Resources System as a factor, the relevant portions of the City's amendments were void.

environmentfederal power

In Roberts v. CSX Transportation, Inc., Scott Roberts sued his employer CSX under the Federal Employers' Liability Act for personal injuries sustained at work. After a jury found Roberts 95% at fault and awarded him $14,000, he appealed on the ground that the trial court erred by refusing to strike for cause a potential juror who had been a CSX stockholder for 30 years, forcing Roberts to use one of his peremptory strikes. The Virginia Supreme Court reversed the judgment and remanded for a new trial. The court reasoned that litigants are entitled to an impartial jury and that a stockholder has an interest in the cause that requires disqualification for cause under Virginia law, a procedural rule that applies to FELA claims because it does not control the ultimate disposition or substantive rights.

proceduretorts & liabilitylabor & employment

The case involved Kelis Allen Hamilton, who was convicted by a jury in the Circuit Court of Augusta County of three counts of assault and battery by a mob and one count of participating in a criminal street gang known as the Nine Trey Bloods, stemming from incidents at a large party in August 2006. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed these convictions, finding the evidence sufficient to support them. The court reasoned that Hamilton's actions, including wearing gang-associated colors, making statements indicating affiliation, associating with known gang members, and participating in the assaults, demonstrated both his active participation in the gang and his involvement in the mob assaults as predicate acts for the gang participation charge.

criminal law

The case involved the Commonwealth of Virginia petitioning under the Civil Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators Act to classify Gordon H. Harris as a sexually violent predator and subject him to involuntary secure inpatient treatment based on his prior convictions. Harris moved to dismiss the petition, claiming he was wrongfully included in the Department of Corrections database because his sentence for attempted forcible sodomy (the initial predicate offense) was suspended and he was incarcerated for abduction instead. The circuit court permitted the Commonwealth to amend its petition to designate the abduction conviction as the predicate sexually violent offense, found by clear and convincing evidence that Harris met the criteria for commitment, and rejected his procedural challenges. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed, reasoning that the Act's database and notice provisions are procedural rather than jurisdictional, substantial compliance applied absent gross negligence or willful misconduct, and the record established that Harris's abduction conviction involved intent to defile and thus qualified as a predicate offense.

criminal lawprocedure