S. Bernard Goodwyn

This case concerned whether the doctrine of absolute judicial privilege applies to allegedly defamatory statements made in a draft complaint that was sent to interested parties as part of a pre-litigation settlement demand. Plaintiff James Mansfield sued the defendants for defamation after receiving the draft complaint, which related to an underlying employment discrimination claim filed by Michael Ford. The circuit court sustained the defendants' demurrers, and the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed that ruling. The court held that absolute privilege may attach to such communications if they are made preliminary to a proposed judicial proceeding contemplated in good faith and under serious consideration, are relevant to that proceeding, and are disclosed only to interested persons, adopting the approach of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved a plaintiff who suffered severe injuries when a dead or decaying tree fell from property owned by Dunlora South, LLC onto his vehicle while he was driving on a public highway. The plaintiff sued for negligence and nuisance, alleging that the landowner knew or should have known of the tree's dangerous condition given its visible decay and proximity to a busy road. The circuit court sustained the defendant's demurrer without leave to amend, and the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed that ruling. The court held that under longstanding Virginia common law, which follows English common law, a landowner owes no duty to persons outside the property regarding natural conditions such as trees, regardless of any danger they may pose. The decision turned on the absence of any statutory modification to this rule and the distinction between natural conditions and artificial hazards.

propertytorts & liability

The case concerned whether the Town of Leesburg could rezone a parcel owned by Cornerstone Chapel and amend the Town Plan to eliminate a planned road (Tolbert Lane) across that parcel without the consent of adjacent owner Long Lane Associates, which claimed vested rights based on proffers attached to the original 1988 rezoning of the undivided High Point property. The circuit court ruled in favor of Long Lane, holding that the town lacked authority to act without consent because Long Lane had a vested interest in the road's completion and the original zoning conditions. The Virginia Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the adoption and amendment of zoning ordinances and the Town Plan are legislative acts that the town could undertake without requiring agreement from all successors in title, that Long Lane had no vested right in an unbuilt road shown on the plan or in the neighboring property's zoning classification, and that the town's actions were reasonable and within its statutory authority under Code § 15.2-2303. The Court entered final judgment for the Town and Cornerstone.

propertybusiness & regulatory

This case involved PBM Nutritionals seeking insurance coverage from Lexington Insurance Company and others for the loss of infant formula batches contaminated by disintegrated water filter materials during manufacturing, which made the product unmarketable. The circuit court ruled that the insurers were not liable under the policies due to pollution exclusion endorsements. On appeal, the Virginia Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the exclusions applied broadly to the contamination, which was not limited to traditional environmental pollution, and evidence showed the formula was contaminated as defined in the policies.

business & regulatoryproperty

The case involved whether Steadfast Insurance Company was obligated to defend and indemnify AES Corporation under commercial general liability policies for claims in a lawsuit by the Native Village of Kivalina alleging that AES's greenhouse gas emissions contributed to global warming and caused damage to their village. The circuit court granted summary judgment to Steadfast, finding no coverage, and the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed. The court reasoned that the policies cover damages caused by an "occurrence," defined as an "accident," but the complaint alleged that AES intentionally emitted greenhouse gases knowing or should have known of the impacts, making the alleged harm not accidental and thus not an occurrence. Therefore, Steadfast had no duty to defend or provide coverage.

business & regulatoryenvironmenttorts & liability

The case concerned whether Virginia's 20-year statute of limitations on enforcing judgments under Code § 8.01-251(A) barred collection of child support arrearages from a 1966 divorce decree ordering weekly payments that ended in 1982. The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the Court of Appeals and circuit court rulings, holding that the limitations period applied and barred enforcement efforts begun in 2006. Each unpaid support installment became a judgment by operation of law on its due date, and all such judgments arose more than 20 years before the collection action. The court reasoned that the statute's plain language covers all judgments without exception for ongoing or unliquidated support obligations, and no extension had been obtained.

family lawprocedure

In this personal injury case, Jeffrey Ruhlin sued Mariam Samaan for damages after a car accident, with Samaan admitting negligence and the trial focusing on whether Ruhlin's shoulder injury resulted from the collision. The circuit court allowed Samaan to use a transcript of Ruhlin's recorded phone call with her insurer to refresh his recollection about statements made on the day of the accident, and it excluded testimony from Ruhlin's treating physician about prior consistent statements Ruhlin made regarding the onset of his shoulder pain. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed both rulings. It held that the transcript's use to refresh recollection did not violate Code § 8.01-404 because it was not offered as impeachment evidence and was not shown to the jury. The Court further reasoned that the prior consistent statements were inadmissible because Samaan had impeached Ruhlin only by showing inconsistencies in his accounts, not by alleging a recent fabrication at trial.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case involved a dispute over an easement agreement between adjoining property owners in Alexandria, Virginia, where McCarthy Holdings LLC, the dominant estate owner, claimed the right to exclude the servient estate owner, Burgher, from any use of the easement area based on language granting 'exclusive use' without specified purposes. The circuit court ruled that the agreement was unambiguous and did not transfer a fee interest or bar reasonable concurrent use by the servient owner. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed, holding that the grant of exclusive use without limiting language extending to all purposes created an easement rather than fee simple ownership, consistent with precedent distinguishing such conveyances, and dismissed as moot a counterclaim over unpaid taxes since they had been paid. The decision turned on interpreting the contract language de novo without adding unstated terms.

property

The case concerned whether Steadfast Insurance Company owed a duty to defend or indemnify AES Corporation under commercial general liability policies in a lawsuit brought by the Native Village of Kivalina alleging that AES's greenhouse gas emissions contributed to global warming and caused coastal erosion damaging the village. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the circuit court's grant of summary judgment to Steadfast, holding that the policies did not cover the claims because they did not allege an "occurrence." The court reasoned that the complaint described AES's emissions as intentional acts performed despite knowledge of their environmental impacts, making any resulting damage the natural and probable consequence rather than an accident as required by the policy definition of "occurrence."

environmentbusiness & regulatorytorts & liability

The case involved Level 3 Communications challenging the State Corporation Commission's (SCC) certifications of its gross receipts to the Virginia Department of Taxation, which included Internet-related revenues from the company's wholesale services. Level 3 argued that the federal Internet Tax Freedom Act required excluding those revenues to avoid prohibited taxation on Internet access. The SCC dismissed the applications, ruling it lacked statutory authority to create additional deductions beyond those in Code § 58.1-400.1. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed, holding that the SCC's role is strictly to certify gross receipts as defined by state law without imposing taxes itself, so the ITFA did not apply to its functions and it could not rewrite the statutes to allow the requested exclusions.

taxesbusiness & regulatoryfederal power

In this case, Condominium Services, Inc. (CSI) appealed a circuit court judgment favoring First Owners’ Association of Forty Six Hundred Condominium, Inc. (FOA) on claims that CSI breached a management agreement and converted FOA’s funds by continuing to collect assessments and retain fees after termination. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the judgment, ruling that FOA properly terminated the agreement under its terms and bylaws without requiring a unit owners’ vote, that CSI’s opening of an unauthorized bank account and retention of $91,125 constituted conversion, and that the jury’s $275,000 punitive damages award was reasonable and not excessive. The court reasoned that the management agreement incorporated the bylaws granting the board authority over such decisions, CSI’s actions were unauthorized, and the damages ratio to compensatory awards was proportionate without evidence of jury passion or prejudice.

business & regulatorypropertytorts & liability

The case involved homeowners suing a mortgage lender and related parties over allegations that the lender forged signatures on a new promissory note with altered terms after closing and then attempted to enforce those terms. The lender failed to file a timely and proper responsive pleading through licensed Virginia counsel, resulting in a default judgment, and the trial court denied multiple motions for relief from default under Rule 3:19(b). The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed, holding that the lender had received notice of the default proceedings, had been warned about the need for counsel, and offered no explanation for failing to appear at the hearing on the motion to strike its answer. The court also upheld the judgment on a cross-claim based on evidence at trial rather than the default, and found the pleadings sufficient to support the judgment.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

The case concerned Cordaro A. Rowland's conviction for use of a firearm in the commission of a burglary after he entered a restaurant at night and later displayed a gun while robbing employees. Rowland argued that the burglary was complete upon his entry with intent to commit a felony, before he used or displayed the firearm. The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the conviction, holding that the evidence was insufficient because Code § 18.2-53.1 requires the firearm to be used or displayed while committing the burglary, and burglary under Code §§ 18.2-90 and -91 is complete once the defendant enters with the requisite intent. The Court rejected the Commonwealth's arguments that the burglary continued until Rowland left the premises or that circumstantial evidence showed he had the gun upon entry, as neither witness observed the entry and the first sighting was after the elements were satisfied.

criminal lawguns

The case involved Rudolph DiGiacinto challenging a George Mason University regulation that prohibits the possession or carrying of weapons in academic buildings, administrative offices, student residences, dining facilities, and at certain events on campus. DiGiacinto argued that the regulation violated his rights under the Virginia Constitution and the Second and Fourteenth Amendments of the US Constitution, and that the university lacked authority to enact it. The circuit court upheld the regulation, finding it constitutional as applying to sensitive places under District of Columbia v. Heller, and the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed. The court reasoned that the university's buildings and events involve large numbers of people, including minors, making them sensitive places where firearm restrictions are permissible, and that the university had statutory authority from the General Assembly without violating constitutional provisions on self-government.

gunscivil rights

This case involved a workers' compensation claim by Matthew Simms, a restaurant server injured when co-employees threw ice at him in the kitchen during his shift, causing his shoulder to dislocate. The Virginia Workers' Compensation Commission and Court of Appeals denied benefits, finding that Hilton v. Martin required an additional causal link between the injury and employment conditions that was absent here. The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed, holding that the prior horseplay doctrine from Dublin Garment Co. v. Jones remains valid when the incident does not involve a common law assault or battery. The Court reasoned that the actual risk test is satisfied because the workplace itself creates opportunities for such pranks among employees, making the injury compensable under the Act without needing the stricter connection required for tortious acts.

labor & employment

FFW Enterprises, owner of commercial real property in Fairfax County, sued to recover taxes paid under Code §§ 58.1-3221.3 and 33.1-435, which authorize special assessments on commercial and industrial properties to fund transportation district improvements while exempting residential and other properties. The company argued that the statutes facially violate Article X, Section 1 of the Virginia Constitution’s uniformity requirement. The circuit courts granted summary judgment for the county and economic development authority, and the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed. It held that FFW failed to carry its burden of showing that no rational basis for the classification could be conceived, noting that the legislature could rationally conclude that commercial and industrial owners would benefit disproportionately from the improvements and could more readily pass on the costs.

taxesproperty

This case involved a legal malpractice claim by Wintergreen Partners, Inc., against its former law firm McGuireWoods, after the firm failed to timely file trial transcripts, resulting in dismissal of Wintergreen's appeal from an $8.3 million jury verdict against it in a personal injury suit stemming from a guest's skiing accident. The circuit court granted summary judgment to McGuireWoods, and the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed. The court reasoned that even if the appeal had proceeded, reversal was not required as a matter of law because jury instructions on premises liability permitted the jury to find Wintergreen independently liable for failing to keep the premises reasonably safe or warn of hazards, separate from any negligence by its employees. The verdict form and instructions, which were not objected to, thus became the law of the case and supported the jury's finding against Wintergreen alone.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case concerned the County of Albemarle's appeal of a circuit court decision reducing its assessment of the fair market value of real property owned by Keswick Club, L.P., a private recreational club, for the 2003 and 2004 tax years. The county had valued the approximately 153-acre property at $12,771,500 using the cost approach, while the taxpayer's expert valued it at $2.9 million primarily using income and sales comparison approaches. On remand after a prior appeal, the circuit court applied a less stringent standard requiring only that the taxpayer show the assessment was erroneous, rather than manifestly erroneous, and reduced the valuation based on evidence presented. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the reduction, holding that the taxpayer's evidence sufficiently demonstrated the county's assessment exceeded fair market value.

taxesproperty

The case involved Jack Edward Carter's conviction for grand larceny after he and an accomplice placed paint in a shopping cart at a store and had the accomplice attempt to obtain a refund by falsely claiming prior purchase. Carter argued the evidence was insufficient to prove intent to steal the paint itself, as the plan was to relinquish it upon receiving payment without removing it from the store. The circuit court convicted him and the Court of Appeals affirmed, but the Supreme Court of Virginia reversed, holding that the asportation and assertion of ownership did not establish intent to permanently deprive the store of the paint and that the conduct constituted attempted false pretenses rather than larceny of the paint. The court noted the Commonwealth failed to prove all elements of the charged offense and could not retroactively recharacterize it as larceny of money.

criminal law

This case involved Steven Lawrence, who had prior convictions for rape and sodomy and was facing civil commitment proceedings under Virginia's Sexually Violent Predator Act after the Commonwealth petitioned for his involuntary treatment. At trial, the circuit court allowed an expert psychologist to testify in detail about unadjudicated allegations of sexual misconduct drawn from police reports, which formed part of the basis for her diagnoses of paraphilia and antisocial personality disorder, as well as her opinion on Lawrence's risk of reoffending. Lawrence appealed, arguing that such testimony was inadmissible hearsay and lacked a proper foundation. The Supreme Court of Virginia held that expert opinions relying on the truth of unsubstantiated hearsay allegations from police reports were speculative and unreliable as a matter of law, reversing the commitment order and remanding the case. The Court reasoned that expert testimony in these proceedings must rest on an adequate factual foundation supported by evidence presented at trial.

criminal lawprocedure