This case concerns attorney discipline proceedings against William J. Pudlo for his representation of client Albert Barbuto. The petition alleged multiple violations including negligent misuse of client funds advanced for fees and expenses (with deprivation), failure to diligently pursue a malpractice claim, charging excessive fees, inadequate recordkeeping, and failure to maintain required IOLTA records. A hearing committee found violations on all counts and recommended a three-month suspension, distinguishing misuse of advance retainer funds from classic client funds, while bar counsel sought a suspension of one year and one day. The board adopted the findings of fact and law, and the full court was tasked with determining the appropriate sanction based on precedents treating negligent misuse of such funds less severely than intentional conversion.
The case concerned whether annual certifications and diagnostic records confirming the proper functioning of a breathalyzer machine could be introduced in a criminal prosecution for operating under the influence without testimony from the certifying technician. The court held that the records were admissible as business records under G. L. c. 233, § 78 and did not violate the confrontation clause because they were created as part of a routine regulatory maintenance program rather than for litigation purposes. The defendant had been convicted after breathalyzer results showed a blood alcohol content above the legal limit, and the trial judge admitted the certifications over objection. The court reasoned that the records were generated independently of any particular case to ensure standardized equipment compliance, making them nontestimonial. The conviction was therefore affirmed.
This case involved the divorce of Nancy W. Adams and Nicholas C. Adams, focusing on the equitable division of their marital estate under Massachusetts law, particularly the valuation and inclusion of the husband's partnership interest in Wellington Management Company, which generated ongoing profit distributions. The Supreme Judicial Court held that a probate judge properly could include the present value of such a partnership interest in the divisible marital estate, as it produces a consistent profit stream. However, the court found specific methodological errors in the valuation process used by the special master and trial judge, including improper projections of future distributions and growth rates, and therefore remanded the case for recalculation of the interest's value. In all other respects, including findings on the parties' contributions to the marriage and child care, the divorce judgment was affirmed. The decision rested on the authority granted by G. L. c. 208, § 34, to equitably distribute assets with ascertainable present value.
The case involved a defendant who pleaded guilty to two counts of indecent assault and battery on a child under fourteen and received probation that included a mandatory GPS monitoring condition under G. L. c. 265, § 47. After release, the defendant, who was indigent and living in a homeless shelter without reliable electrical access for the device, was found in violation of the GPS condition despite his efforts and cooperation with the probation department. The court vacated the finding of a probation violation, holding that the Commonwealth proved noncompliance but the defendant showed his failure was not his fault given the shelter's limitations and the probation department's technology requirements. The opinion notes broader tensions between the GPS mandate for sex offenders and the practical challenges of homelessness but resolves the matter on the specific facts of excusable noncompliance.
The case concerned whether the statute of limitations under G. L. c. 277, § 63 barred prosecution for aggravated rape and rape when indictments were returned against a "John Doe" suspect identified primarily by a DNA profile, with the defendant's actual name added by amendment after the limitations period had expired. The court held that the prosecution of Jerry Dixon was not time-barred. It reasoned that the indictments' description of the perpetrator by genetic identity and physical characteristics satisfied the particularity requirements of art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, and that the timely return of such indictments tolled the fifteen-year limitations period. The court further noted that amending the indictments to include the defendant's name was permissible and did not revive an already-tolled limitations period.
In Drumgold v. Commonwealth, Shawn Drumgold sued the Commonwealth under the Massachusetts Erroneous Convictions Law (G. L. c. 258D) after his 1989 first-degree murder conviction was vacated in 2003 following nearly 14 years of imprisonment, with the Commonwealth later filing a nolle prosequi. The Commonwealth moved for summary judgment, arguing that Drumgold could not show his conviction was overturned on grounds tending to establish his innocence as required by the statute, but the Superior Court denied the motion. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed that denial and directed partial summary judgment for Drumgold on the eligibility issue, holding that the new-trial ruling—based on the Commonwealth's withholding of evidence about inducements to a key witness—satisfied the statutory threshold. The case was remanded for trial, where Drumgold must prove his actual innocence by clear and convincing evidence.