Frenande R.V. Duffly

Judge, Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Born 1949

BA, University of ConnecticutJD, Harvard University

Affiliations

On the bench with

⚖️ Roderick L. Ireland ⚖️ Margot Botsford ⚖️ Geraldine Hines ⚖️ Ralph D. Gants ⚖️ Francis X. Spina ⚖️ Robert J. Cordy

Decision record

Newest first · every case links to the full record

Sparrow v. Demonico
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · 2012-01-13 · cited 26×
In Sparrow v. Demonico, sisters disputed ownership of a family home in Woburn, leading to a lawsuit that the parties attempted to resolve through voluntary mediation resulting in a settlement agreement under which the Demonicos would sell the property and pay Sparrow $100,000. The Superior Court denied enforcement of the agreement after finding that Susan Demonico lacked capacity to contract due to mental impairment from emotional distress during the mediation. The Supreme Judicial Court concluded that proof of incapacity does not always require evidence of a long-standing or permanent mental illness, but the evidence presented was insufficient because it lacked medical evidence or expert testimony showing that any mental condition interfered with Susan's understanding of the transaction or her ability to act reasonably in relation to it. The court therefore vacated the order denying enforcement and remanded for entry of an order enforcing the settlement agreement.
family lawpropertyprocedure
Sisson v. Lhowe
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · 2011-10-06 · cited 23×
In Sisson v. Lhowe, the plaintiffs filed a timely medical malpractice complaint against a doctor and his employer alleging negligent treatment of Dawn Sisson that caused her injury including expected premature death; after Dawn died in 2007, they amended the complaint in 2008 to add wrongful death claims. The trial court dismissed the wrongful death claims as barred by the seven-year statute of repose in G. L. c. 260, § 4, which had expired in 2006. On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court held that the amendment was permissible because the original malpractice action was filed within the repose period, and the wrongful death claim is part of the same underlying action rather than a distinct cause of action that must independently satisfy the repose statute. The court reasoned from the statutory text that the repose period applies to the commencement of the malpractice action, not to each theory of recovery, while distinguishing the separate statute of limitations that governs wrongful death accrual at the time of death.
torts & liabilityprocedurehealthcare
Commonwealth v. Perez
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · 2011-09-23 · cited 47×
In Commonwealth v. Perez, the defendant was convicted by a jury of first-degree murder on theories of deliberate premeditation and felony-murder with armed robbery, as well as intimidation of a witness, in connection with the shooting death of Henry Guzman during what the Commonwealth alleged was a robbery involving marijuana. On appeal, the defendant challenged multiple trial rulings, including the judge's questioning of the jury venire regarding scientific evidence, the failure to give a Bowden instruction, the admission of opinion testimony and prior misconduct evidence, the introduction of a privileged spousal conversation and unauthenticated diary excerpts, the denial of a required finding on the witness intimidation charge, and claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the convictions, concluding that the trial judge committed no reversible error in any of the challenged rulings and that the evidence supported the jury's verdicts. The court also declined to exercise its extraordinary powers under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to order a new trial or reduce the degree of guilt.
criminal lawprocedure
Bank of New York v. Bailey
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · 2011-08-04 · cited 66×
The case concerned whether the Housing Court has jurisdiction to consider a former homeowner's challenge to the validity of a foreclosure sale as a defense in a summary process eviction action brought by a bank that acquired the property. The bank moved for summary judgment on the ground that its recorded deed established a prima facie right to possession and that the court could not address the defendant's claims of defective notice under the foreclosure statute. The Housing Court granted the motion, but the Supreme Judicial Court held that the Housing Court possesses jurisdiction over such title defenses in post-foreclosure summary process cases under G.L. c. 239, §1 and G.L. c. 185C, §3, vacated the judgment, and remanded for further proceedings.
propertyprocedure

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