Robert J. Cordy

This case concerns attorney discipline proceedings against William J. Pudlo for his representation of client Albert Barbuto. The petition alleged multiple violations including negligent misuse of client funds advanced for fees and expenses (with deprivation), failure to diligently pursue a malpractice claim, charging excessive fees, inadequate recordkeeping, and failure to maintain required IOLTA records. A hearing committee found violations on all counts and recommended a three-month suspension, distinguishing misuse of advance retainer funds from classic client funds, while bar counsel sought a suspension of one year and one day. The board adopted the findings of fact and law, and the full court was tasked with determining the appropriate sanction based on precedents treating negligent misuse of such funds less severely than intentional conversion.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned whether annual certifications and diagnostic records confirming the proper functioning of a breathalyzer machine could be introduced in a criminal prosecution for operating under the influence without testimony from the certifying technician. The court held that the records were admissible as business records under G. L. c. 233, § 78 and did not violate the confrontation clause because they were created as part of a routine regulatory maintenance program rather than for litigation purposes. The defendant had been convicted after breathalyzer results showed a blood alcohol content above the legal limit, and the trial judge admitted the certifications over objection. The court reasoned that the records were generated independently of any particular case to ensure standardized equipment compliance, making them nontestimonial. The conviction was therefore affirmed.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved the divorce of Nancy W. Adams and Nicholas C. Adams, focusing on the equitable division of their marital estate under Massachusetts law, particularly the valuation and inclusion of the husband's partnership interest in Wellington Management Company, which generated ongoing profit distributions. The Supreme Judicial Court held that a probate judge properly could include the present value of such a partnership interest in the divisible marital estate, as it produces a consistent profit stream. However, the court found specific methodological errors in the valuation process used by the special master and trial judge, including improper projections of future distributions and growth rates, and therefore remanded the case for recalculation of the interest's value. In all other respects, including findings on the parties' contributions to the marriage and child care, the divorce judgment was affirmed. The decision rested on the authority granted by G. L. c. 208, § 34, to equitably distribute assets with ascertainable present value.

family lawproperty

The case involved a defendant who pleaded guilty to two counts of indecent assault and battery on a child under fourteen and received probation that included a mandatory GPS monitoring condition under G. L. c. 265, § 47. After release, the defendant, who was indigent and living in a homeless shelter without reliable electrical access for the device, was found in violation of the GPS condition despite his efforts and cooperation with the probation department. The court vacated the finding of a probation violation, holding that the Commonwealth proved noncompliance but the defendant showed his failure was not his fault given the shelter's limitations and the probation department's technology requirements. The opinion notes broader tensions between the GPS mandate for sex offenders and the practical challenges of homelessness but resolves the matter on the specific facts of excusable noncompliance.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned whether the statute of limitations under G. L. c. 277, § 63 barred prosecution for aggravated rape and rape when indictments were returned against a "John Doe" suspect identified primarily by a DNA profile, with the defendant's actual name added by amendment after the limitations period had expired. The court held that the prosecution of Jerry Dixon was not time-barred. It reasoned that the indictments' description of the perpetrator by genetic identity and physical characteristics satisfied the particularity requirements of art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, and that the timely return of such indictments tolled the fifteen-year limitations period. The court further noted that amending the indictments to include the defendant's name was permissible and did not revive an already-tolled limitations period.

criminal lawprocedure

In Drumgold v. Commonwealth, Shawn Drumgold sued the Commonwealth under the Massachusetts Erroneous Convictions Law (G. L. c. 258D) after his 1989 first-degree murder conviction was vacated in 2003 following nearly 14 years of imprisonment, with the Commonwealth later filing a nolle prosequi. The Commonwealth moved for summary judgment, arguing that Drumgold could not show his conviction was overturned on grounds tending to establish his innocence as required by the statute, but the Superior Court denied the motion. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed that denial and directed partial summary judgment for Drumgold on the eligibility issue, holding that the new-trial ruling—based on the Commonwealth's withholding of evidence about inducements to a key witness—satisfied the statutory threshold. The case was remanded for trial, where Drumgold must prove his actual innocence by clear and convincing evidence.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned Humberto Guzman's eligibility for compensation under the Massachusetts Erroneous Convictions Law (G.L. c. 258D) after his felony drug convictions were vacated following nearly four years of imprisonment. The Commonwealth moved to dismiss, arguing Guzman did not qualify because his new trial was granted on ineffective assistance of counsel grounds rather than directly establishing innocence, and the trial court agreed; the Appeals Court reversed, and the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed that reversal. The court interpreted the statute's eligibility provision requiring judicial relief 'on grounds which tend to establish the [claimant's] innocence' to include cases where counsel's ineffectiveness prevented introduction of exculpatory evidence, supported by legislative history and the facts showing the motion judge's focus on misidentification. It directed entry of partial summary judgment for Guzman on eligibility while noting that actual innocence must still be proven by clear and convincing evidence at trial.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved two Boston College students indicted on charges of trafficking in cocaine and possessing psilocybin and marijuana with intent to distribute after Boston College police officers conducted a warrantless search of their dormitory room and seized the drugs. The defendants moved to suppress the evidence, and the trial judge granted the motions after finding that the students had not voluntarily consented to the search. On further appellate review, the court affirmed the suppression order, holding that the Commonwealth failed to prove voluntary consent based on the totality of the circumstances, including the late hour, the uniformed and armed officers' presence, the defendants' signing only the Miranda waiver portion of the form without signing the consent section, and inconsistent officer testimony regarding any verbal agreement to search.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Jims Beneche, who was tried separately from his then-current girlfriend and convicted by a Superior Court jury of first-degree murder of his former girlfriend Kayla Ravenell and their two-year-old son, on theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty as a joint venturer. Beneche appealed on multiple grounds, including insufficient evidence, violation of his right to silence through admission of police testimony, erroneous jury instructions regarding his co-defendant's conviction and his presence at the scene, failure to voir dire a sleeping juror, and ineffective assistance of counsel related to prior bad acts evidence. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed both convictions, holding that the evidence was sufficient, that the various evidentiary and instructional claims did not warrant reversal, and that there was no basis to exercise its powers under G.L. c. 278, § 33E to reduce the verdicts or order a new trial.

criminal law

This case involved the revocation of John Thissell's probation after GPS monitoring showed he had submerged his tracking device in water and entered court-ordered exclusion zones near his wife's home and workplace, in violation of probation conditions stemming from prior assault convictions. The court affirmed the revocation, finding that the GPS records met the reliability standards for probation revocation hearings established in Commonwealth v. Durling. The core reasoning was that GPS technology is accurate and legislatively authorized for probation monitoring, the records included detailed maps and time-stamped activity logs demonstrating the violations, and the evidence was substantially trustworthy even if hearsay. The court also rejected a Sixth Amendment confrontation claim, noting that probation revocation proceedings are not criminal trials.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Mark Narcisse, who was charged with carrying a firearm without a license and possessing ammunition without a firearms identification card after police officers pat frisked him during a consensual field interrogation observation in a high-crime area. The trial court denied his motion to suppress the evidence, finding the pat frisk justified by the circumstances, and he was convicted; the Appeals Court affirmed. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding that officers may not conduct a pat frisk during a consensual encounter without first establishing reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify a seizure under art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.

criminal lawgunscivil rights

In Commonwealth v. Fluellen, the defendant was convicted of distributing cocaine and distributing cocaine within a school zone after a joint trial with a codefendant who was acquitted on the same charges based on joint venture liability. The court considered claims regarding inconsistent verdicts between codefendants, the sufficiency of evidence showing intent to distribute rather than personal use, and the admission of drug analysis certificates. It held that the doctrine of verdict consistency does not apply to joint venture cases in this manner, that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions, and that the certificates violated the confrontation clause under Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts. Because the certificate error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, the court reversed the convictions and remanded for a new trial.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved the defendant Vuthy Seng, who was charged with the first-degree murders of three children and armed assault with intent to murder a fourth child after shooting them in their home in 1995. Following a retrial due to issues with Miranda warnings in the initial proceeding, a jury convicted the defendant on all counts based on theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the convictions, concluding that the trial judge did not err in the order of peremptory challenges during voir dire, in evidentiary rulings regarding the surviving victim's statements, or in instructing the jury on the police investigation.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involves a dispute over provisions in a commercial lease between a medical office tenant and the landlord of an office park, following a patient's slip-and-fall injury on common area property that led to a negligence lawsuit against both parties. The tenant's insurer sought a declaratory judgment that the lease's liability provision (allocating responsibility for injuries to the tenant except for the landlord's sole negligence) and insurance provision (requiring the tenant to obtain liability coverage naming the landlord as an additional insured) were void under G. L. c. 186, § 15, which prohibits lease terms requiring tenants to indemnify landlords for the landlord's own negligence. The Superior Court granted summary judgment to the insurer on the insurance provision but not the liability provision. On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court held that the liability provision is void only to the extent it requires indemnification for the landlord's negligence, while the insurance provision is valid and does not violate the statute because it allocates risk through insurance rather than direct indemnification. The court reasoned that the statute targets indemnification agreements but does not bar requirements to procure insurance for the benefit of another party, as confirmed by legislative history and comparisons to similar statutes.

propertybusiness & regulatorytorts & liability

This case concerns a consolidated appeal over an award of attorney’s fees and costs to the defendants in a business dispute arising from a limited partnership formed to own and manage a commercial property. After a jury-waived trial, a Superior Court judge granted the defendants’ motion for fees under G. L. c. 231, § 6F, concluding that substantially all of the plaintiffs’ claims were wholly insubstantial, frivolous, and not advanced in good faith; a single justice of the Appeals Court vacated the award. The court determined that the plaintiffs’ claims regarding the defendants’ acquisition of adjacent properties and alleged breach of fiduciary duties or failure to offer a business opportunity were frivolous and insubstantial, as the partnership agreement explicitly permitted the general partners to engage in other real estate ventures and any related claims belonged to the partnership rather than individual limited partners. Consequently, the court reinstated the trial judge’s award of fees and costs and remanded the matter to the Appeals Court to exercise discretion regarding appellate fees and costs under G. L. c. 211A, § 15, and Mass. R. A. P. 25.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case concerned James Howell, former superintendent of Abington's sewer department, who sued The Enterprise Publishing Company and its reporters for defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and invasion of privacy after the newspaper published articles reporting his placement on administrative leave and eventual firing due to inappropriate images found on town computers. The articles described the images as pornography, linked the incident to a similar case in a neighboring town, and covered related official actions. The Superior Court denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment, and the Appeals Court largely affirmed that denial. On further review, the Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding that summary judgment should be granted to the Enterprise because the challenged reporting constituted fair and accurate accounts of official proceedings protected by the fair report privilege under Massachusetts law, and no material falsehoods were shown.

free speechtorts & liabilityprocedure