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O'BRIEN v. Borowski
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · 2012-01-31 · cited 102×
This case involved Robert O'Brien's challenge to a District Court harassment prevention order issued under G.L. c. 258E after Alan Borowski, a police officer, reported O'Brien making offensive middle-finger gestures toward him on three occasions. O'Brien petitioned under G.L. c. 211, § 3, claiming the statute was facially overbroad because it regulated protected speech and unconstitutional as applied to his conduct. The court first addressed procedural issues, noting the order had expired and the case was moot but reaching the merits due to the public importance of interpreting the new statute, and directing future appeals of such orders to the Appeals Court rather than a single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court. Interpreting the statute to require three willful and malicious acts intended to cause fear, intimidation, abuse, or property damage, and limiting its reach to fighting words and true threats, the court held that c. 258E was not unconstitutionally overbroad on its face. The court vacated the expired order on other grounds without deciding whether its application to O'Brien violated the First Amendment.
free speechcriminal lawprocedure
Commonwealth v. Beatrice
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · 2011-07-29 · cited 18×
In this case, the defendant was charged with assault and battery after his girlfriend called 911 reporting that he had just beaten her, and the recording of that call was admitted at trial even though the victim invoked her right not to testify. The trial court convicted the defendant on one count, and the Appeals Court affirmed. On further review, the Supreme Judicial Court held that the 911 statements were admissible as excited utterances under hearsay rules because they were made spontaneously while the victim was still upset and in distress. The court further concluded that the statements were nontestimonial under the Sixth Amendment confrontation clause because the victim's primary purpose was to seek immediate police assistance amid an ongoing emergency, as she indicated the defendant was still in the apartment and she needed help before he left. The court therefore affirmed the conviction.
criminal lawprocedure
Adoption of Daisy
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · 2011-06-20 · cited 31×
The Department of Children and Families petitioned under G. L. c. 119, § 24, to find Daisy a child in need of care and protection based on her reports of sexual abuse by her father, which her mother refused to believe; after a trial, the Juvenile Court judge found Daisy in need of care, dispensed with parental consent to adoption, and effectively terminated the parents' rights, with only the mother appealing. The Appeals Court affirmed, and the Supreme Judicial Court granted further review limited to whether G. L. c. 233, § 82 permits admission of a child's out-of-court statements describing sexual contact if the child was under age ten when making them but older at trial. The court held that the statute applies based on the child's age at the time the statements were made, so Daisy's statements were admissible as substantive evidence because she was nine when she made them, she was found unavailable due to likely trauma, and the statements met the reliability requirements under § 82(c). The ruling rests on the plain statutory language referring to statements of a child under ten, without regard to age at trial, supported by the statute's purpose and comparisons to other states' laws.
family lawprocedure
In Re Kiley
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · 2011-05-03 · cited 5×
The case involved a law firm that entered a contingent fee agreement to represent a client in a medical malpractice action but sought to withdraw after the handling attorney left the firm and the client could not retain successor counsel, leaving discovery behind schedule. The Superior Court judge denied withdrawal and ordered the named partner to file an appearance to ensure the case proceeded. On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court concluded that the judge did not abuse his discretion in requiring another attorney from the firm to appear, but could not designate the named partner specifically. The core reasoning rested on the limits of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.16 and Mass. R. Civ. P. 11(c), under which withdrawal is not permitted when it would have a material adverse effect on the client absent one of the enumerated grounds, particularly after suit has been filed on a contingent fee basis. The matter was remanded to affirm the order requiring firm representation while vacating the specification of the individual attorney.
proceduretorts & liability
Commonwealth v. Purdy
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · 2011-04-15 · cited 93×
The case involved a defendant convicted of deriving support from the earnings of a prostitute and maintaining a house of prostitution based on evidence that his salon offered sexual services during massages. The court vacated the conviction for maintaining a house of prostitution, finding that the jury instructions erroneously defined sexual intercourse in a way that created a substantial risk of miscarriage of justice and that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction. It affirmed the other conviction, concluding that email exchanges were properly authenticated for admission and that the failure to give a limiting instruction on out-of-court statements was not prejudicial. The reasoning centered on the requirements for each offense under Massachusetts law and the standards for authentication and instructional errors.
criminal lawprocedure
Commonwealth v. Caldwell
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · 2011-04-08 · cited 16×
A jury convicted the defendant of two counts of first-degree murder on theories of deliberate premeditation, extreme atrocity or cruelty, and felony murder, along with related charges of armed robbery while masked, assault, and firearm offenses, arising from a December 2006 masked armed robbery in Springfield during which two victims were shot and killed. On appeal, the defendant raised multiple claims of error, including the admission of testimony that he was a drug dealer, improper statements in the prosecutor's closing argument, the partial closure of the courtroom during sentencing by removing some family members and supporters, insufficient time to prepare closing argument, and issues with the admission of recorded calls, joint venture instructions, and the absence of a second-degree felony murder instruction. The Supreme Judicial Court concluded that any errors were not prejudicial, that the judge's rulings were proper, and that there was no basis under G. L. c. 278, § 33E to reduce the verdicts or order a new trial, and therefore affirmed the convictions.
criminal lawprocedure