The case concerned whether the Boston City Council had authority under the city charter and Massachusetts law to adopt Rule 40A and use it to remove an elected councillor who had been convicted of federal crimes but not yet sentenced. The court held that the council could promulgate the rule but lacked authority to employ it to expel the councillor before his seat was vacated automatically upon sentencing under G. L. c. 279, § 30. The core reasoning was that state law and the charter do not confer removal power over elected municipal officials on the council itself, that restrictions on elected positions must be narrowly construed, and that the council's action implicated constituents' voting rights.
The case concerned claims by a family severely injured in a 2002 car accident against primary and excess insurers for unfair claims settlement practices under G. L. c. 93A and c. 176D after the family obtained an $11.3 million tort judgment that the insurers failed to settle promptly. Following a bench trial, the Superior Court found no liability for the primary insurer but willful violations by the excess insurer's administrator both before and after the verdict; it awarded only post-judgment damages measured by lost use of funds. On further appellate review, the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed that the primary insurer was not liable and held that damages for the post-judgment violation must be based on the underlying tort judgment itself (subject to multiplication), not lost use of the eventual settlement amount; it declined to resolve whether pre-verdict violations caused compensable injury because any such recovery would duplicate the post-judgment award.
The case concerned whether a 2008 amendment to the Massachusetts Wage Act (G. L. c. 149, § 150) that mandates treble damages for prevailing employees should apply retroactively to a lawsuit filed in 2007 by an employee seeking unpaid commissions from her former employer. The Superior Court judge had applied the amendment to award mandatory treble damages, but the Supreme Judicial Court held that the amendment applies only prospectively to claims arising on or after its effective date of July 12, 2008. The court reasoned that statutes are presumed to operate prospectively absent clear legislative intent for retroactivity, and this amendment affects substantive rights rather than merely remedies or procedures, as it changes the damages available for Wage Act violations. Because the lower court applied the amendment retrospectively, the case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.
The case involved the first-degree murder conviction of a defendant who killed his former landlady by stabbing her nearly one hundred times. The defendant raised a lack of criminal responsibility defense, claiming he acted under auditory hallucinations stemming from bipolar disorder and other mental illnesses while also using drugs and alcohol. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the conviction and ordered a new trial, holding that the jury instructions on the interplay between voluntary intoxication and preexisting mental illness were flawed and incomplete. These instructions failed to clarify that drug use could not preclude the defense if the defendant already lacked substantial capacity due to mental disease, creating a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. The court also addressed but did not decide an evidentiary issue regarding testimony from a substitute medical examiner.
The case involved the conviction of Lastarandre Bell for first-degree felony murder of Julie Ann Nieves, along with armed home invasion, arson, and violations of abuse prevention orders, stemming from an incident where he broke into a home, set a fire, and caused the victim's death. The defendant appealed, arguing issues like the merger doctrine for felony murder and ineffective assistance of counsel. The court reversed the first-degree murder conviction due to the lack of a jury instruction on second-degree felony murder with arson as the predicate felony, which could have allowed the jury to consider a lesser degree of culpability, and remanded for possible entry of a second-degree conviction or new trial, while affirming the other convictions.
The case concerns PCG Trading, LLC's lawsuit against Seyfarth Shaw, LLP and associated attorneys for legal malpractice, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and unfair trade practices, stemming from the firm's alleged conflicts of interest in representing both PCG and another company in actions to enforce California judgments. The sole issue on appeal was the Superior Court's denial of PCG's motion for pro hac vice admission of two out-of-state attorneys. The court held that the motion should have been allowed, concluding that statements by one attorney in a public interview did not violate Massachusetts Rule of Professional Conduct 3.6 on trial publicity because they were not extrajudicial statements that a reasonable person would expect to be disseminated by means of public communication and that would have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing a proceeding. The decision turned on interpreting the scope of the rule and finding no violation that would justify denial of admission.
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