Margot Botsford

The case concerned whether the Boston City Council had authority under the city charter and Massachusetts law to adopt Rule 40A and use it to remove an elected councillor who had been convicted of federal crimes but not yet sentenced. The court held that the council could promulgate the rule but lacked authority to employ it to expel the councillor before his seat was vacated automatically upon sentencing under G. L. c. 279, § 30. The core reasoning was that state law and the charter do not confer removal power over elected municipal officials on the council itself, that restrictions on elected positions must be narrowly construed, and that the council's action implicated constituents' voting rights.

electionscriminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

The case concerned claims by a family severely injured in a 2002 car accident against primary and excess insurers for unfair claims settlement practices under G. L. c. 93A and c. 176D after the family obtained an $11.3 million tort judgment that the insurers failed to settle promptly. Following a bench trial, the Superior Court found no liability for the primary insurer but willful violations by the excess insurer's administrator both before and after the verdict; it awarded only post-judgment damages measured by lost use of funds. On further appellate review, the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed that the primary insurer was not liable and held that damages for the post-judgment violation must be based on the underlying tort judgment itself (subject to multiplication), not lost use of the eventual settlement amount; it declined to resolve whether pre-verdict violations caused compensable injury because any such recovery would duplicate the post-judgment award.

business & regulatorytorts & liabilityprocedure

The case concerned whether a 2008 amendment to the Massachusetts Wage Act (G. L. c. 149, § 150) that mandates treble damages for prevailing employees should apply retroactively to a lawsuit filed in 2007 by an employee seeking unpaid commissions from her former employer. The Superior Court judge had applied the amendment to award mandatory treble damages, but the Supreme Judicial Court held that the amendment applies only prospectively to claims arising on or after its effective date of July 12, 2008. The court reasoned that statutes are presumed to operate prospectively absent clear legislative intent for retroactivity, and this amendment affects substantive rights rather than merely remedies or procedures, as it changes the damages available for Wage Act violations. Because the lower court applied the amendment retrospectively, the case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.

labor & employmentprocedure

The case involved the first-degree murder conviction of a defendant who killed his former landlady by stabbing her nearly one hundred times. The defendant raised a lack of criminal responsibility defense, claiming he acted under auditory hallucinations stemming from bipolar disorder and other mental illnesses while also using drugs and alcohol. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the conviction and ordered a new trial, holding that the jury instructions on the interplay between voluntary intoxication and preexisting mental illness were flawed and incomplete. These instructions failed to clarify that drug use could not preclude the defense if the defendant already lacked substantial capacity due to mental disease, creating a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. The court also addressed but did not decide an evidentiary issue regarding testimony from a substitute medical examiner.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved the conviction of Lastarandre Bell for first-degree felony murder of Julie Ann Nieves, along with armed home invasion, arson, and violations of abuse prevention orders, stemming from an incident where he broke into a home, set a fire, and caused the victim's death. The defendant appealed, arguing issues like the merger doctrine for felony murder and ineffective assistance of counsel. The court reversed the first-degree murder conviction due to the lack of a jury instruction on second-degree felony murder with arson as the predicate felony, which could have allowed the jury to consider a lesser degree of culpability, and remanded for possible entry of a second-degree conviction or new trial, while affirming the other convictions.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerns PCG Trading, LLC's lawsuit against Seyfarth Shaw, LLP and associated attorneys for legal malpractice, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and unfair trade practices, stemming from the firm's alleged conflicts of interest in representing both PCG and another company in actions to enforce California judgments. The sole issue on appeal was the Superior Court's denial of PCG's motion for pro hac vice admission of two out-of-state attorneys. The court held that the motion should have been allowed, concluding that statements by one attorney in a public interview did not violate Massachusetts Rule of Professional Conduct 3.6 on trial publicity because they were not extrajudicial statements that a reasonable person would expect to be disseminated by means of public communication and that would have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing a proceeding. The decision turned on interpreting the scope of the rule and finding no violation that would justify denial of admission.

proceduretorts & liability

This case involved protracted disputes between Psy-Ed Corporation and its president Valenzano on one side and former employees Klein and Schive on the other, arising from Schive's disability discrimination charge with the MCAD, Klein's affidavits supporting her claim, a failed proxy contest by Klein, and a later settlement and buyout of Klein's shares. Cross-appeals followed consolidated Superior Court trials on claims including retaliation under G.L. c. 151B § 4(4) and (4A), tortious interference with contract, and abuse of process, with the core issue being whether post-termination conduct by an employer could violate the anti-retaliation and anti-interference provisions. The court held that an employer may be liable under those sections for retaliatory or interfering acts occurring after employment ends. It reasoned that the statutory text contains no temporal limit restricting coverage to current employees and that the purposes of protecting rights to file charges and participate in proceedings would be undermined by such a restriction.

labor & employmentcivil rights

The case involves a dispute over whether the real estate settlement and title insurance activities of National Real Estate Information Services (NREIS) amount to the unauthorized practice of law under Massachusetts statutes. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, responding to certified questions from the federal appeals court, determined that some of NREIS's settlement activities do not constitute unauthorized practice of law, while the record was insufficient to decide on others. The court further held that the closing of real estate mortgage transactions requires the substantive participation of a Massachusetts attorney representing the lender, and that certain services related to property conveyances qualify as the practice of law.

criminal lawpropertybusiness & regulatory

In this case, a Suffolk County jury convicted Melvin Martinez of aggravated rape and first-degree felony murder of Monica Mejia based on evidence that he and another man sexually assaulted and killed her after a party in 2002. On appeal, Martinez challenged the admission of his police statement on grounds of involuntariness and violation of the six-hour safe harbor rule for arraignment, the repeated use of his nickname "Pinocchio" at trial, the prosecutor's questions bolstering a cooperating witness's credibility, and potential jury bias from viewing a victim's memorial. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the convictions, holding that the statement was voluntary and not subject to the Rosario rule because Martinez was not in custody more than six hours before giving it, that references to the nickname were not prejudicial, that the prosecutor's questions were proper responses to defense attacks on the witness, and that the memorial view did not create impermissible bias.

criminal lawprocedure

In this case, defendant Philip Bunting pleaded guilty to unarmed burglary with assault and other charges, receiving a house of correction sentence followed by a ten-year probation term on the burglary conviction. While incarcerated on the initial sentence, Bunting committed new crimes in the house of correction, leading a judge to find a probation violation and extend the probation term by one year, even though the probation period had not yet begun. The defendant argued that the judge lacked authority to do so without prior notice that pre-probation conduct could result in revocation. Relying on its prior decision in Commonwealth v. Ruiz, the Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding that due process requires specific notice to a defendant that criminal conduct during incarceration could violate and lead to revocation of a yet-to-commence probation term. The court concluded that no such notice had been provided here.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a former female laborer for the Town of Somerset's highway department who alleged gender and sexual orientation discrimination, sexual harassment, and a hostile work environment leading to constructive discharge, after filing a complaint with the MCAD. A jury awarded her compensatory and punitive damages, which the trial judge reduced via remittitur, and the town appealed while the plaintiff cross-appealed. The court held that the scope of the MCAD investigation reasonably covered claims arising during supervisor Antone Cabral's tenure but not earlier separate incidents, so a significant amount of trial evidence was outside that scope, entitling the town to a new trial on liability and damages. The court also ruled that the town was not entitled to judgment notwithstanding the verdict and that the plaintiff could challenge the remittitur on cross-appeal after accepting it. The decision applied the scope of investigation rule to limit admissible evidence at retrial to matters within the MCAD complaint's reach during the relevant supervisory period.

civil rightslabor & employmentprocedure

The case involved Jerome McNulty's convictions for first-degree murder and two counts of assault and battery with dangerous weapons (knives) stemming from an incident in which he allegedly stabbed his girlfriend and injured two others in her apartment. McNulty appealed, arguing that the trial court should have suppressed his signed statement to police because officers violated his state constitutional rights by failing to inform him that his attorney was attempting to contact him during custodial interrogation. The Supreme Judicial Court held that this violated article 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, as established in Commonwealth v. Mavredakis, and that admission of the statement was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt with respect to the murder conviction. The court therefore reversed the murder conviction and remanded for a new trial, while affirming the assault convictions but remanding them for resentencing.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

This case concerns the limits of authority under Massachusetts' comprehensive permit act (G.L. c. 40B) for a local zoning board to attach conditions to approval of a permit for low- or moderate-income housing and the Housing Appeals Committee's power to review those conditions. A developer sought a permit for a 40-unit condominium project with affordable units in Amesbury; the zoning board granted it but imposed 94 conditions covering topics from standard zoning and construction rules to non-zoning matters such as allowable profit, land values, and marketing. The developer appealed to the HAC, which struck or modified several conditions as exceeding the board's power or interfering with state subsidizing agencies. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the Superior Court's upholding of the HAC decision, holding that a zoning board acting under § 21 may only impose conditions of the types that local boards could impose in areas such as building design, siting, zoning, health, safety, and environment, and that the HAC under § 23 may review and remove conditions outside that scope even if the project remains economic.

propertybusiness & regulatory

The case involved the conviction of Jesus Gambora for first-degree murder on theories of deliberate premeditation and felony-murder, along with armed robbery and firearm charges, arising from a 2003 robbery at a West Springfield hotel during which Jaya Desai was shot and killed. The defendant appealed on multiple grounds, including the reliability of fingerprint evidence linking him to the scene, the admission of shoe print evidence, the excusal of a juror for cause, the sufficiency of evidence for premeditation, and whether the indictment adequately notified him of felony-murder. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed the convictions, ruling that the fingerprint evidence was admissible with appropriate limitations on certainty of identification, the shoe print was relevant and properly admitted, the juror was correctly excused, sufficient evidence supported the verdicts, and the indictment provided adequate notice. The court also declined to grant relief under G.L. c. 278, § 33E by reducing the degree of guilt or ordering a new trial.

criminal lawprocedure

In Commonwealth v. Dargon, the defendant appealed his convictions for aggravated rape, indecent assault and battery, assault and battery, and assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon after a jury trial in Massachusetts superior court. The primary issues on appeal were the admission into evidence of a form from a sexual assault evidence collection kit that contained notations of the victim's statements, alleged improprieties in the prosecutor's closing argument, and a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the convictions, holding that the challenged form was properly admitted and that the remaining claims did not warrant reversal. The court's reasoning focused on evidentiary rules governing statements made during medical examinations and the context of the trial arguments presented by both sides.

criminal lawprocedure

In this case, Robert Foxworth was convicted of second-degree murder in 1992, with his conviction affirmed by the Massachusetts Appeals Court in 1996 after the rescript issued to the trial court. Years later, in 2000 and 2002, Foxworth filed late applications for further appellate review (FAR) with the Supreme Judicial Court, which denied the amended application in 2002 without recalling the rescript or taking other action on the 1996 decision. The First Circuit certified the question of whether this 2002 denial reopened the finality of Foxworth's conviction for purposes of federal habeas review under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The court answered no, reasoning that a late-filed FAR application denied after rescript issuance does not reopen finality under state law, as the court took no steps equivalent to granting review or recalling the mandate, distinguishing precedents like Hibbs v. Winn.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a dispute between the Department of State Police and MOSES over whether a collective bargaining agreement required arbitration of the termination of chemist Robert Pino, whom the colonel had fired for just cause under G.L. c. 22C, §9 after a predisciplinary hearing. MOSES filed a grievance alleging lack of just cause and retaliation for union activity, seeking reinstatement and other remedies, but the department argued the colonel's removal authority was exclusive and nondelegable. The Superior Court permanently stayed arbitration under G.L. c. 150C, §2(b), and the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed on direct review. The court held that the statute confers nondelegable managerial authority on the colonel that cannot be overridden by the arbitration clause in the agreement, distinguishing cases where labor laws limit employer power rather than attempting to delegate statutory removal authority.

labor & employmentprocedure

The case involved a defendant, a former Stoughton police sergeant and attorney, who was convicted by a Superior Court jury of attempted extortion, filing a false police report, and two counts of witness intimidation after using his police authority to pressure a debtor into repaying a friend's investment scam. The defendant appealed, arguing violations of his right to a public trial during jury empanelment, insufficient evidence on some charges, and an erroneous jury instruction. The court ruled that excluding the public from jury selection violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a public trial, entitling him to a new trial on all charges. It further held that the evidence was sufficient to support the witness intimidation and false report convictions, permitting retrial, and found no error in the challenged jury instruction on attempted extortion.

criminal lawprocedure

In Fustolo v. Hollander, a real estate developer sued a newspaper reporter for defamation based on five articles about his properties and development projects in Boston's North End. The defendant filed a special motion to dismiss under Massachusetts' anti-SLAPP statute, arguing that her reporting constituted protected petitioning activity. The court denied the motion, ruling that the reporter did not engage in petitioning activity because she wrote the articles in her professional capacity as a paid reporter for the newspaper rather than as a citizen advocating on her own behalf. The decision was affirmed on appeal, emphasizing that the statute protects the right of petition, which was not exercised here.

free speechproceduretorts & liabilityproperty