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Johnson v. State
Supreme Court of Florida · 2012-01-05 · cited 26×
This Florida Supreme Court case reviewed a Fourth District decision on the appointment of appellate counsel for an indigent defendant convicted of robbery with a firearm and carjacking, where the public defender sought to withdraw due to a conflict from also representing a codefendant. The court addressed whether the public defender's conflict certification alone suffices to shift representation to the Office of Criminal Conflict and Civil Regional Counsel (RCC) without court inquiry, and whether RCC has standing to object to the withdrawal motion. The Court approved in part and quashed in part the district court's ruling, concluding based on the plain language of sections 27.511(8) and 27.5303(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2008), that RCC lacks standing to challenge such motions and that no factual inquiry into the conflict is required at the appellate level when the public defender certifies it. The decision turned on statutory interpretation of indigent defense procedures and the repeal of prior provisions granting standing to other entities.
criminal lawprocedure
Lewis v. Leon County
Supreme Court of Florida · 2011-09-22 · cited 18×
The case concerned a 2007 Florida law (chapter 2007-62) that amended statutes to classify the new Offices of Criminal Conflict and Civil Regional Counsel (RCC) as "public defenders’ offices," thereby requiring counties to cover certain overhead and facility costs for these offices that provide conflict counsel to indigent defendants. Counties and their association sued for a declaratory judgment, arguing the provision violated the state constitution's funding rules. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts' rulings that section 19 of the Act was unconstitutional under article V, section 14, which limits county funding obligations to specifically enumerated judicial offices and requires the state to fund all others. The core reasoning was that RCC offices are distinct from constitutional public defenders, perform different functions, and cannot be statutorily redefined to shift costs to counties without voter-approved constitutional change.
criminal lawprocedure
DJ v. State
Supreme Court of Florida · 2011-07-07
In DJ v. State, a juvenile was charged with trespassing on school grounds under Florida Statute § 810.097(2) after a security guard twice directed him to leave a middle school campus and he returned the second time, leading to his arrest. The trial court and Third District Court of Appeal upheld the delinquency adjudication, holding that the State did not need to prove the security guard's identity or authority as the principal's designee. The Florida Supreme Court reviewed the case due to conflict with its prior decision in State v. Dye and concluded that the statute's plain language makes the warning by the principal or a designee an essential element that must be charged and proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Because the State presented no evidence of the guard's authority, the Court quashed the Third District's decision and vacated the conviction, remanding for further proceedings.
criminal lawprocedure
Corona v. State
Supreme Court of Florida · 2011-06-09 · cited 28×
In Corona v. State, the defendant was convicted of capital sexual battery against his minor daughter based primarily on the victim's hearsay statements to police, which were admitted at trial after the victim became unavailable; the defendant had taken a discovery deposition of the victim but had no other opportunity to cross-examine her. The Florida Supreme Court reviewed the Fifth District Court of Appeal's ruling that the deposition satisfied the Confrontation Clause under Crawford v. Washington. Relying on its prior holdings in State v. Lopez and Blanton v. State, the Court determined that a discovery deposition does not provide the required prior opportunity for cross-examination of testimonial statements, that the admission of the statements violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights, and that the error was harmful, warranting reversal. The Court therefore quashed the district court's decision and remanded for a new trial.
criminal lawprocedurecivil rights
Wagner, Vaughan, McLaughlin & Brennan, P.A. v. Kennedy Law Group
Supreme Court of Florida · 2011-04-07 · cited 14×
The case involved a dispute over the allocation of attorney fees under Florida's Wrongful Death Act in a matter that settled before suit was filed, where the personal representative retained KLG while two survivors separately retained the Wagner firm. The probate court awarded all contingency fees from the settlement to KLG, a decision affirmed by the Second District Court of Appeal. The Florida Supreme Court approved the holding that fees may be awarded even in pre-suit settlements but quashed the full award to KLG, remanding for a determination of reasonable compensation for the Wagner firm's work. The core reasoning, drawn from precedent in Wiggins v. Estate of Wright, was that a single attorney's fee from the total recovery is appropriate only when survivors share a commonality of interest; otherwise, fees must be apportioned based on the work each attorney performed in securing the recovery.
proceduretorts & liability
Jaimes v. State
Supreme Court of Florida · 2010-12-09 · cited 54×
The case involved Aniceto Jaimes, who was charged by information with aggravated battery using a deadly weapon but was convicted after the jury was instructed on and found him guilty of the uncharged alternative of causing great bodily harm. The Second District Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction, holding that the unpreserved error was not fundamental under State v. Weaver. The Florida Supreme Court quashed that ruling, concluding that convicting a defendant of a specific uncharged offense constitutes fundamental error regardless of the lack of objection at trial. The court reasoned that the information and evidence supported only the lesser included offense of simple battery, so it remanded for entry of a verdict on that charge instead.
criminal lawprocedure