The case involved Esperanza de Saad, former vice-president of Banco Industrial de Venezuela's Miami agency, who sought statutory indemnification for attorney fees from her criminal defense on money laundering charges and past wages under her employment contract after being suspended without pay. The trial court granted summary judgment in her favor on both claims, which the Third District affirmed. The Florida Supreme Court quashed that decision, holding that Florida's corporate indemnification statute under section 607.0850 does not apply to foreign corporations and that de Saad could not meet the statutory requirements for indemnification even if it applied. The Court also ruled that the bank did not breach the employment contract because the charges were not clarified until de Saad's guilty plea to money structuring, allowing her continued suspension without pay.
business & regulatorylabor & employmentcriminal law
In State v. McFadden, the Florida Supreme Court addressed whether Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.220(b)(1)(B) requires the prosecution to disclose an oral, unrecorded witness statement to the defense when the statement does not materially differ from a prior recorded statement already provided. The case arose from a felony armed robbery prosecution in which the State introduced rebuttal testimony from a deputy about an inconsistent oral statement made by the defendant's sister, which had not been disclosed before trial; the trial court allowed the testimony, leading to conviction, but the Fourth District reversed on appeal for a discovery violation. The Supreme Court held that the rule does not apply to such unrecorded oral statements, quashing the district court's decision and reinstating the convictions. The Court's reasoning relied on the plain language of the rule, which defines "statement" to include only written or recorded statements, and on its prior decision in State v. Evans confirming that oral, unrecorded statements fall outside the disclosure requirement.
The case concerned whether an employee’s claim against a state-related employer for retaliatory discharge under Florida’s workers’ compensation statute (section 440.205) required presuit notice to the state under section 768.28(6). The trial court had dismissed the claim for lack of notice, following earlier district court decisions that treated the claim as a tort subject to those requirements. The Florida Supreme Court held that presuit notice is not required. It reasoned that chapter 440 independently waives sovereign immunity by expressly defining “employer” to include the state and its subdivisions and by authorizing such claims without any reference to section 768.28, unlike other statutes that explicitly impose the notice rules.
This case involved class action lawsuits by borrowers against mortgage lenders seeking to recover document preparation fees charged for services allegedly performed by nonlawyers, on theories of unjust enrichment and money had and received. The Florida Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs had standing to bring private civil actions for such fees under the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar, but affirmed dismissal of the complaints without prejudice for failure to state a cause of action. The core reasoning was that, under the Florida Constitution's grant of exclusive jurisdiction over the practice of law to the Supreme Court, any claim premised on unauthorized practice of law must plead as an essential element that the Court has already determined the specific conduct at issue constitutes unauthorized practice; plaintiffs may seek a stay or advisory opinion to satisfy this requirement.
The case involved a dispute between former business partners and co-owners of a Miami Beach home, Mara Rankin and Vannessa Van Vorgue, after Van Vorgue sued Rankin over allegedly invalid quitclaim deeds and stock transfers related to their joint corporation and property. To allow the home sale to close despite a lis pendens filing, the parties entered an escrow agreement requiring the sale proceeds to be held by a third party until their claims were resolved or authorized disbursement occurred. Rankin later sought release of half the escrowed funds, which the trial court denied, but the Third District reversed on grounds that the denial order functioned as an improper injunction. The Florida Supreme Court quashed the appellate decision, holding that the funds were already restricted by the parties' escrow agreement and thus not subject to injunctive analysis, so the trial court properly required adherence to the escrow terms before any release.
The case involved whether an insurance policy's coverage for "advertising injury," defined to include injury from publication of material violating a person's right of privacy, extended to damages from sending unsolicited fax advertisements in violation of the federal TCPA. The Florida Supreme Court answered a certified question from the Eleventh Circuit in the affirmative, holding that the policy provided such coverage. The court applied a plain meaning analysis to the policy language and concluded that TCPA violations involve the type of privacy invasion contemplated by the provision, without requiring revelation of private information or content-based violations.
