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Brown v. NAGELHOUT
Supreme Court of Florida · 2012-03-15 · cited 17×
This case concerned the proper venue for a tort lawsuit filed in Broward County by the Browns against an individual defendant and two corporate defendants, where the defendants resided in different counties and the accident occurred in Pasco County. The Florida Supreme Court addressed a conflict over the judicially created "joint residency rule" from Enfinger v. Baxley, which had restricted venue to a county shared by all defendants when an individual and corporation were sued together. The court decided to recede from Enfinger, holding that the rule misread the governing statutes, and quashed the Fourth District's affirmance of a venue transfer to Pasco County. The core reasoning was that the plain language of sections 47.011, 47.021, and 47.051, Florida Statutes, permits a plaintiff to select venue in any county where any one defendant resides, without requiring a common residence among all defendants. As a result, the complaint could properly proceed in Broward County based on one corporate defendant's residency there.
procedure
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Menendez
Supreme Court of Florida · 2011-08-25 · cited 69×
The case involved a dispute over the scope of a household exclusion in an automobile liability insurance policy issued by State Farm to named insured Gilda Menendez. Menendez's granddaughter, a permissive driver living separately with her parents, caused an accident injuring herself, her parents, and Menendez; the parents sought coverage for their injuries, but State Farm denied it based on the exclusion for bodily injury to any insured or member of an insured's household. The Florida Supreme Court held that the exclusion was unambiguous and barred coverage for the parents' claims, reasoning that the policy's broad definition of "insured" (including permissive drivers) and the exclusion's reference to "an insured's" household plainly encompassed family members of such drivers. The court quashed the Third District Court of Appeal's decision finding ambiguity and approved the contrary holding of the Fourth District in Linehan v. Alkhabbaz.
business & regulatorytorts & liability
State v. Hankerson
Supreme Court of Florida · 2011-06-30 · cited 34×
This case concerned whether evidence of cocaine obtained from a search of Anthony Hankerson should have been suppressed in his trial for possession with intent to sell. The Florida Supreme Court reviewed a Fourth District decision that reversed Hankerson's conviction on grounds that officers lacked probable cause for the search and refused to consider the State's alternative appellate argument that the stop was a valid investigatory detention. The Court held that the district court erred by not allowing the State, as appellee, to raise new legal theories supporting affirmance of the trial court's denial of the suppression motion, consistent with prior precedent. It further ruled that the totality of circumstances—including the officer's observation of a brief hand-to-hand exchange for cash in a suspected drug area and Hankerson's evasive behavior during the stop—established probable cause for the search. Accordingly, the Court quashed the Fourth District's decision and reinstated the conviction.
criminal lawprocedure
Wonder v. State
Supreme Court of Florida · 2011-05-26 · cited 3×
The case concerned whether a defendant asserting immunity from prosecution under Florida's Stand Your Ground law, section 776.032, is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on that claim before trial. The Fourth District Court of Appeal had denied certiorari relief, holding that the trial court did not err by refusing such a hearing. Following its earlier decision in Dennis v. State, the Florida Supreme Court determined that a trial court must resolve the factual question of statutory immunity applicability when a motion to dismiss is filed on that basis. The Court therefore quashed the decision under review and remanded the matter to the Fourth District for reconsideration consistent with Dennis.
criminal law
State v. Fleming
Supreme Court of Florida · 2011-02-03 · cited 50×
The case concerned whether the constitutional requirements from Apprendi v. New Jersey and Blakely v. Washington—that a jury must find facts essential to imposing a sentence above the guidelines range—apply during resentencing proceedings. Fleming was originally convicted in 1997 of aggravated battery and related charges and received an upward departure sentence based on judicial findings; after a successful postconviction challenge, he was resentenced in 2003, again with judicial findings supporting departure. The Florida Supreme Court held that Apprendi and Blakely apply to resentencings conducted after those decisions issued, even if the original conviction and sentence became final beforehand. The core reasoning was that resentencing constitutes a de novo proceeding in which the decisional law in effect at the time of resentencing governs. The court approved the First District's reversal of Fleming's sentence on that basis and resolved a conflict among district courts.
criminal lawprocedure
Osborne v. Dumoulin
Supreme Court of Florida · 2011-02-03 · cited 19×
The case concerns the interpretation of Florida Statute section 222.25(4), which provides a $4000 personal property exemption to debtors who do not claim or receive the benefits of the state constitutional homestead exemption. Debtor Denise Dumoulin filed for chapter 7 bankruptcy, initially claimed her home as exempt under the homestead provision but later amended to surrender the property and instead claim the personal property exemption; the bankruptcy trustee objected, arguing that ownership of homestead property barred the additional exemption. The Florida Supreme Court rephrased the Eleventh Circuit's certified question and answered it in the negative, holding that a debtor who elects not to claim the homestead exemption and whose actions do not otherwise obstruct the trustee's administration of the estate does not receive the benefits of the homestead exemption. The court's reasoning focused on the plain language of the statute, construing the phrase "claim or receive the benefits" narrowly to allow the broadest reasonable application of the personal property exemption when the constitutional protection is not asserted or operative in the bankruptcy proceeding.
propertyprocedure