Peggy A. Quince

This Florida Supreme Court case reviewed a Fourth District decision on the appointment of appellate counsel for an indigent defendant convicted of robbery with a firearm and carjacking, where the public defender sought to withdraw due to a conflict from also representing a codefendant. The court addressed whether the public defender's conflict certification alone suffices to shift representation to the Office of Criminal Conflict and Civil Regional Counsel (RCC) without court inquiry, and whether RCC has standing to object to the withdrawal motion. The Court approved in part and quashed in part the district court's ruling, concluding based on the plain language of sections 27.511(8) and 27.5303(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2008), that RCC lacks standing to challenge such motions and that no factual inquiry into the conflict is required at the appellate level when the public defender certifies it. The decision turned on statutory interpretation of indigent defense procedures and the repeal of prior provisions granting standing to other entities.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned a 2007 Florida law (chapter 2007-62) that amended statutes to classify the new Offices of Criminal Conflict and Civil Regional Counsel (RCC) as "public defenders’ offices," thereby requiring counties to cover certain overhead and facility costs for these offices that provide conflict counsel to indigent defendants. Counties and their association sued for a declaratory judgment, arguing the provision violated the state constitution's funding rules. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts' rulings that section 19 of the Act was unconstitutional under article V, section 14, which limits county funding obligations to specifically enumerated judicial offices and requires the state to fund all others. The core reasoning was that RCC offices are distinct from constitutional public defenders, perform different functions, and cannot be statutorily redefined to shift costs to counties without voter-approved constitutional change.

criminal lawprocedure

In DJ v. State, a juvenile was charged with trespassing on school grounds under Florida Statute § 810.097(2) after a security guard twice directed him to leave a middle school campus and he returned the second time, leading to his arrest. The trial court and Third District Court of Appeal upheld the delinquency adjudication, holding that the State did not need to prove the security guard's identity or authority as the principal's designee. The Florida Supreme Court reviewed the case due to conflict with its prior decision in State v. Dye and concluded that the statute's plain language makes the warning by the principal or a designee an essential element that must be charged and proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Because the State presented no evidence of the guard's authority, the Court quashed the Third District's decision and vacated the conviction, remanding for further proceedings.

criminal lawprocedure

In Corona v. State, the defendant was convicted of capital sexual battery against his minor daughter based primarily on the victim's hearsay statements to police, which were admitted at trial after the victim became unavailable; the defendant had taken a discovery deposition of the victim but had no other opportunity to cross-examine her. The Florida Supreme Court reviewed the Fifth District Court of Appeal's ruling that the deposition satisfied the Confrontation Clause under Crawford v. Washington. Relying on its prior holdings in State v. Lopez and Blanton v. State, the Court determined that a discovery deposition does not provide the required prior opportunity for cross-examination of testimonial statements, that the admission of the statements violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights, and that the error was harmful, warranting reversal. The Court therefore quashed the district court's decision and remanded for a new trial.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

The case involved a dispute over the allocation of attorney fees under Florida's Wrongful Death Act in a matter that settled before suit was filed, where the personal representative retained KLG while two survivors separately retained the Wagner firm. The probate court awarded all contingency fees from the settlement to KLG, a decision affirmed by the Second District Court of Appeal. The Florida Supreme Court approved the holding that fees may be awarded even in pre-suit settlements but quashed the full award to KLG, remanding for a determination of reasonable compensation for the Wagner firm's work. The core reasoning, drawn from precedent in Wiggins v. Estate of Wright, was that a single attorney's fee from the total recovery is appropriate only when survivors share a commonality of interest; otherwise, fees must be apportioned based on the work each attorney performed in securing the recovery.

proceduretorts & liability

The case involved Aniceto Jaimes, who was charged by information with aggravated battery using a deadly weapon but was convicted after the jury was instructed on and found him guilty of the uncharged alternative of causing great bodily harm. The Second District Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction, holding that the unpreserved error was not fundamental under State v. Weaver. The Florida Supreme Court quashed that ruling, concluding that convicting a defendant of a specific uncharged offense constitutes fundamental error regardless of the lack of objection at trial. The court reasoned that the information and evidence supported only the lesser included offense of simple battery, so it remanded for entry of a verdict on that charge instead.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned whether a police officer's reading of Miranda warnings during an otherwise consensual encounter with Eric Caldwell transformed the interaction into an unconstitutional seizure under the Fourth Amendment, requiring suppression of his confessions to auto burglaries. Caldwell had voluntarily approached the officer, agreed to speak, accepted a ride to view security footage, and was frisked without objection before confessing. The Florida Supreme Court held that no seizure occurred, as the warnings did not render the encounter coercive and Caldwell never attempted to end the interaction or invoke rights. It approved the Second District's ruling denying suppression and disapproved conflicting precedent from the Fourth District to the extent it suggested otherwise. The core reasoning focused on the totality of circumstances showing continued voluntariness despite the Miranda advisement.

criminal lawcivil rights

This case involves the Florida Supreme Court's review of proposed amendments to the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure and the Florida Rules for Certified and Court-Appointed Mediators, submitted by the Committee on Alternative Dispute Resolution Rules and Policy. The proposals introduced new appellate mediation rules (9.700 through 9.740) modeled on trial court procedures and made related changes to mediator certification, qualifications, and ethics rules. The court adopted the amendments with modifications, including allowing parties to delay mediation until after briefs are filed, permitting electronic mediation attendance, and requiring certified appellate mediators to be licensed attorneys unless the parties agree otherwise. These changes recognize the distinct posture of cases on appeal compared to initial proceedings and aim to facilitate effective mediation at the appellate level. The amendments took effect immediately upon the opinion's release.

procedure

This case involves the Florida Supreme Court's annual constitutional duty to assess and certify the state's need for additional judges in Fiscal Year 2010-2011. The court certified the need for more judicial resources, citing increased caseloads from the mortgage foreclosure crisis, a ten percent budget reduction since 2007, and the resulting elimination of 290.5 support positions such as case managers and magistrates. The core reasoning focused on how these losses have forced judges to absorb administrative work, leading to slower case processing times, backlogs, and delays in resolving matters across trial courts, particularly impacting families and children. The opinion also noted the recent creation of the State Courts Revenue Trust Fund as a step toward funding stability but concluded it had not yet offset the strains on the system.

procedure

The case involved an attorney's petition for reinstatement to The Florida Bar following a period of suspension. The Florida Supreme Court disapproved the referee's report recommending reinstatement, rejected the parties' stipulation, and denied the petition. The court also ordered the respondent to pay costs of $1,307.65 to the Bar. The decision appears to stem from the respondent's failure to make required restitution payments to former clients and cover prior costs, despite evidence of financial hardship presented in the proceedings.

business & regulatory

The case concerned a challenge to a proposed Sarasota County charter amendment sponsored by the Sarasota Alliance for Fair Elections, which would have required voter-verified paper ballots, mandatory independent audits of election results, and delayed certification until audits were complete. The Florida Supreme Court reviewed a certified question from the Second District Court of Appeal on whether the state Election Code preempts local laws on counting, auditing, canvassing, and certifying votes. The Court held that the Election Code does not preempt the field of elections law, answering the certified question in the negative, and therefore quashed the district court's preemption ruling. However, it approved the district court's finding that specific provisions of the amendment conflict with state statutes on audit procedures, timing, and certification requirements, rendering those provisions unenforceable. The core reasoning focused on the lack of a sufficiently pervasive legislative scheme for field preemption while identifying direct conflicts that prevent local rules from operating alongside the Code.

electionsprocedure

In Tedder v. State, the Florida Supreme Court addressed whether it possessed discretionary conflict jurisdiction to review a Second District Court of Appeal ruling on a license-retention issue arising from a motion to suppress statements in a criminal case. The court held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the matter. Its reasoning rested on prior precedent requiring that any reviewable "decision" under article V of the Florida Constitution be endorsed by a majority of the district court panel; here, the license-retention analysis came from only a single judge and did not constitute a majority or plurality opinion, so the trial court's order was presumed affirmed on its own grounds without creating appellate precedent.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involves the Florida Supreme Court's constitutional duty to assess and certify the need for additional judges in the state's trial and appellate courts for Fiscal Year 2009-2010. The Court decided to certify a need for more judgeships, citing sustained net judicial need calculated through a weighted caseload methodology that accounts for case filings, available judge time, and resource constraints. The reasoning emphasized increased caseloads in areas such as family divisions (including custody, dependency, and domestic violence) and mortgage foreclosures, alongside prior budget reductions that eliminated hundreds of support positions, while noting the judiciary's role in resolving disputes and the ongoing fiscal pressures on the court system. The opinion stressed that further resource cuts risk impairing timely justice but fulfilled the mandatory certification obligation based on empirical workload data.

procedurefamily law

The case concerned whether a defendant's nolo contendere plea to robbery with a firearm could waive defects in the charging information, which alleged only possession or carrying of a firearm but not discharge, for purposes of imposing a 20-year mandatory minimum sentence under Florida's section 775.087(2). Ricky Bradley entered such a plea pursuant to an agreement specifying the 20-year term, stipulated to facts in the charging affidavit showing he discharged the firearm, and received the enhanced sentence; he later challenged it via a rule 3.800 motion. The Florida Supreme Court approved the Fifth District's decision affirming denial of relief, holding that the explicit plea and factual stipulation constituted an express waiver of the missing element in the information. It disapproved conflicting rulings from the Fourth and First Districts that a plea could not waive such defects. The core reasoning was that Bradley's voluntary agreement to the discharge-based sentence, combined with his stipulation to the supporting facts, showed he understood the nature and consequences of the plea, satisfying due process without prejudice.

criminal lawprocedure

This case concerned whether Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.525's thirty-day deadline for serving a motion for attorneys' fees and costs applies when a final judgment has already determined a party's entitlement to those fees and costs but reserved jurisdiction only to fix the amount. After a non-jury trial, the trial court entered judgment for AmerUs Life Insurance Company against Michael Lait and reserved the amounts of prejudgment interest, costs, and fees; AmerUs filed its motion eight months later, the trial court initially awarded the amounts, but later vacated the awards on Lait's motion citing the rule's time limit, and the Fifth District affirmed. The Florida Supreme Court quashed that decision, holding that the thirty-day requirement does not apply once entitlement has been established. The Court reasoned that the rule's purpose of preventing prejudice and surprise to the opposing party is fulfilled by the prior determination of entitlement, eliminating any need for the strict deadline.

procedure

The case involved whether Miranda warnings given to Kevin Powell before police questioning were constitutionally adequate under the Fifth Amendment. Powell was arrested on a gun possession charge as a felon, advised using a standard form that stated the right to talk to a lawyer before answering questions and the right to use rights at any time, but omitted explicit notice of the right to counsel's presence during questioning; he then made incriminating statements admitted at trial, leading to his conviction. The Florida Supreme Court answered the certified question affirmatively, holding that the warnings were deficient because they failed to clearly inform the suspect of the right to have an attorney present during interrogation. The court reasoned that the pre-questioning advice and general "at any time" language did not equate to the required Miranda advisement of continuous access to counsel, and therefore reversed the conviction.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved whether a parent could sign a pre-injury liability waiver on behalf of a minor child to allow participation in ATV riding at a commercial motorsports park, thereby releasing the park owners and operators from negligence claims if the child was injured or killed. The Florida Supreme Court answered the certified question in the negative and held that a parent lacks authority to execute such a pre-injury release binding the minor child's estate when it involves commercial activity. The court reasoned that the release affects the minor's property rights and estate interests, and absent authorization from statute or common law, parents cannot waive these rights on behalf of the child. It reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the defendants based on the release signed by the father.

torts & liabilityfamily law

The case involved Herbert Price, who was convicted of sexual battery on a physically incapacitated person under Florida law based on an information that described the offense as unlawful sexual battery by oral or vaginal penetration without the victim's consent while the victim was physically incapacitated. Price later challenged the conviction via habeas corpus, arguing the information was fundamentally defective for omitting an essential element and that this defect could be raised at any time under prior precedent; he also contested the dismissal of his direct appeal after he voluntarily withdrew it. The Florida Supreme Court held that the information sufficiently alleged all essential elements of the crime, so the earlier Gray decision did not apply and the challenge could not be raised post-conviction in this manner. The court further ruled that the district court properly dismissed the direct appeal under appellate rules once Price voluntarily dismissed the proceeding, and that any related issues about counsel withdrawal or pro se representation did not constitute reversible error. The decision approved the lower court's outcome to the extent it was consistent with this analysis.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned whether registry attorneys appointed to represent death row inmates in Florida postconviction proceedings could receive compensation exceeding the statutory caps in sections 27.710 and 27.711 after the legislature enacted section 27.7002, which explicitly barred excess fees and authorized removal of attorneys seeking them. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's declaration that, in capital collateral cases involving extraordinary circumstances, attorneys may request and receive judicially approved compensation above the statutory schedule. The court's reasoning centered on the inherent authority of trial courts under article V of the Florida Constitution to ensure adequate representation for defendants in such proceedings, which permits exceeding legislative fee limits.

criminal lawprocedure

In Morgan v. State, the Florida Supreme Court reviewed a postconviction claim by a defendant convicted of aggravated assault after rejecting a five-year plea offer on his counsel's advice that he would likely win at trial or be convicted of a lesser offense, resulting in a ten-year habitual offender sentence. The trial court summarily denied the defendant's Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, and the Fourth District affirmed, creating a conflict with Third District decisions that required evidentiary hearings on similar claims. The Court approved the denial of relief in this case because the allegations failed to state a facially sufficient claim under Strickland v. Washington, but it held that defendants may receive an evidentiary hearing if they properly allege that counsel's deficient performance in advising rejection of a plea offer caused prejudice by forgoing a more favorable outcome. The decision resolved the inter-district conflict by clarifying the pleading requirements for such ineffective assistance claims without mandating hearings on conclusory assertions.

criminal lawprocedure