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Rippy v. Shepard
Supreme Court of Florida · 2012-01-19 · cited 10×
James Earl Rippy sued James Shepard under Florida's dangerous instrumentality doctrine after sustaining injuries from Shepard's farm tractor in 2004. The trial court dismissed the complaint, and the First District Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that a farm tractor is not a dangerous instrumentality as a matter of law. The Florida Supreme Court quashed the district court's decision, concluding that a farm tractor qualifies as a dangerous instrumentality. The court reasoned that, under precedents such as Meister v. Fisher and Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, the doctrine applies to motor vehicles other than automobiles that have the size, weight, and mechanism to pose a peculiar danger when operated, including on public highways.
torts & liability
Burgos v. State
Supreme Court of Florida · 2011-10-27
This case involves review of a Second District Court of Appeal decision affirming a second-degree murder conviction, which had relied on Zeigler v. State and was in conflict with a First District decision in Montgomery v. State. The Florida Supreme Court had previously held in State v. Montgomery that the standard jury instruction on the lesser-included offense of manslaughter by act was fundamentally erroneous, as it incorrectly required the jury to find the defendant intentionally caused the victim's death. Because the decision below was inconsistent with that holding, the Court quashed the Second District's ruling and remanded for reconsideration under Montgomery.
criminal lawprocedure
Hill v. Davis
Supreme Court of Florida · 2011-09-01 · cited 27×
This case concerned whether an objection to the qualifications of a nonresident personal representative appointed in a Florida probate proceeding is barred by the three-month filing deadline in section 733.212(3) of the Florida Probate Code. After Douglas Davis was appointed personal representative of Katherine Davis's estate and notice was served, Solveig Hill filed an untimely motion challenging his qualifications under section 733.304(3). The Florida Supreme Court held that the statutory deadline bars such objections, including claims that the representative was never qualified to serve, unless fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct not apparent on the face of the petition is involved. The Court approved the First District's decision affirming denial of Hill's motion and disapproved the Third District's contrary holding in Angelus to the extent it broadly exempted qualification challenges from the time bar.
procedureproperty
Chemrock Corp. v. Tampa Electric Co.
Supreme Court of Florida · 2011-06-30 · cited 38×
In Chemrock Corporation v. Tampa Electric Co., a Delaware company sued a gas supplier in Florida circuit court for damages after claiming that contaminated natural gas damaged its industrial furnaces, with the case involving prolonged discovery disputes but no motion to reset trial after a continuance. The Florida Supreme Court addressed whether the action should be dismissed for lack of prosecution under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.420(e), which allows dismissal if no record activity occurs for ten months before notice and within a subsequent sixty-day grace period. The Court decided that Chemrock's February 2007 motion opposing dismissal, filed during the grace period, satisfied the rule's record activity requirement and precluded dismissal. It therefore quashed the First District Court of Appeal's affirmance of dismissal and resolved a conflict with other district courts by applying a bright-line test focused on any filing in the record rather than its substantive effect.
procedure
Florida Insurance Guaranty Ass'n v. Devon Neighborhood Ass'n
Supreme Court of Florida · 2011-06-30 · cited 51×
This case concerned a dispute between the Florida Insurance Guaranty Association (FIGA) and Devon Neighborhood Association over claims under a 2004 insurance policy after the original insurer became insolvent; specifically, whether a 2005 statutory amendment imposing a mediation notice requirement on insurers could be applied retroactively to bar enforcement of the policy's appraisal provision. The trial court denied FIGA's motion to compel appraisal, the Fourth District affirmed, and the Florida Supreme Court accepted review due to conflict with prior decisions on retroactivity. The Court concluded that the district court misapplied the two-part test for determining retroactive application of statutes to contracts and therefore quashed the decision below, holding that the statute in effect when the policy was issued governs substantive issues and that the amendment did not clearly express an intent for retroactive effect.
business & regulatoryprocedure
Kaaa v. Kaaa
Supreme Court of Florida · 2011-03-31 · cited 24×
The case Kaaa v. Kaaa involved a dispute over whether the passive appreciation in value of a home purchased by one spouse before marriage, but paid down with marital funds during the marriage, should be considered a marital asset for equitable distribution in divorce proceedings. The Florida Supreme Court held that such passive appreciation is subject to equitable distribution under section 61.075(5)(a)(2), Florida Statutes (2007), when marital funds service the mortgage. The court reasoned that the statute includes enhancement in value and appreciation of nonmarital assets resulting from contributions or expenditures of marital funds, and approved a method from a prior case to calculate the marital portion based on the fraction of the asset financed by marital funds. It quashed the lower court's decision denying distribution of the appreciation and remanded for further proceedings.
family lawproperty