Ricky Polston

The case involved Esperanza de Saad, former vice-president of Banco Industrial de Venezuela's Miami agency, who sought statutory indemnification for attorney fees from her criminal defense on money laundering charges and past wages under her employment contract after being suspended without pay. The trial court granted summary judgment in her favor on both claims, which the Third District affirmed. The Florida Supreme Court quashed that decision, holding that Florida's corporate indemnification statute under section 607.0850 does not apply to foreign corporations and that de Saad could not meet the statutory requirements for indemnification even if it applied. The Court also ruled that the bank did not breach the employment contract because the charges were not clarified until de Saad's guilty plea to money structuring, allowing her continued suspension without pay.

business & regulatorylabor & employmentcriminal law

In State v. McFadden, the Florida Supreme Court addressed whether Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.220(b)(1)(B) requires the prosecution to disclose an oral, unrecorded witness statement to the defense when the statement does not materially differ from a prior recorded statement already provided. The case arose from a felony armed robbery prosecution in which the State introduced rebuttal testimony from a deputy about an inconsistent oral statement made by the defendant's sister, which had not been disclosed before trial; the trial court allowed the testimony, leading to conviction, but the Fourth District reversed on appeal for a discovery violation. The Supreme Court held that the rule does not apply to such unrecorded oral statements, quashing the district court's decision and reinstating the convictions. The Court's reasoning relied on the plain language of the rule, which defines "statement" to include only written or recorded statements, and on its prior decision in State v. Evans confirming that oral, unrecorded statements fall outside the disclosure requirement.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned whether an employee’s claim against a state-related employer for retaliatory discharge under Florida’s workers’ compensation statute (section 440.205) required presuit notice to the state under section 768.28(6). The trial court had dismissed the claim for lack of notice, following earlier district court decisions that treated the claim as a tort subject to those requirements. The Florida Supreme Court held that presuit notice is not required. It reasoned that chapter 440 independently waives sovereign immunity by expressly defining “employer” to include the state and its subdivisions and by authorizing such claims without any reference to section 768.28, unlike other statutes that explicitly impose the notice rules.

labor & employmentprocedure

This case involved class action lawsuits by borrowers against mortgage lenders seeking to recover document preparation fees charged for services allegedly performed by nonlawyers, on theories of unjust enrichment and money had and received. The Florida Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs had standing to bring private civil actions for such fees under the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar, but affirmed dismissal of the complaints without prejudice for failure to state a cause of action. The core reasoning was that, under the Florida Constitution's grant of exclusive jurisdiction over the practice of law to the Supreme Court, any claim premised on unauthorized practice of law must plead as an essential element that the Court has already determined the specific conduct at issue constitutes unauthorized practice; plaintiffs may seek a stay or advisory opinion to satisfy this requirement.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

The case involved a dispute between former business partners and co-owners of a Miami Beach home, Mara Rankin and Vannessa Van Vorgue, after Van Vorgue sued Rankin over allegedly invalid quitclaim deeds and stock transfers related to their joint corporation and property. To allow the home sale to close despite a lis pendens filing, the parties entered an escrow agreement requiring the sale proceeds to be held by a third party until their claims were resolved or authorized disbursement occurred. Rankin later sought release of half the escrowed funds, which the trial court denied, but the Third District reversed on grounds that the denial order functioned as an improper injunction. The Florida Supreme Court quashed the appellate decision, holding that the funds were already restricted by the parties' escrow agreement and thus not subject to injunctive analysis, so the trial court properly required adherence to the escrow terms before any release.

propertyprocedure

The case involved whether an insurance policy's coverage for "advertising injury," defined to include injury from publication of material violating a person's right of privacy, extended to damages from sending unsolicited fax advertisements in violation of the federal TCPA. The Florida Supreme Court answered a certified question from the Eleventh Circuit in the affirmative, holding that the policy provided such coverage. The court applied a plain meaning analysis to the policy language and concluded that TCPA violations involve the type of privacy invasion contemplated by the provision, without requiring revelation of private information or content-based violations.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case concerns Florida's Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan (NICA), a no-fault system for compensating certain birth-related neurological injuries, and specifically the pre-delivery notice requirements under section 766.316, Florida Statutes (1997). Two consolidated appeals arose from incidents where infants suffered compensable injuries, the delivering physicians provided notice of their NICA participation, but the hospitals did not. The certified question asked whether the physicians' notices alone satisfied the statute when hospitals gave no notice. The Florida Supreme Court answered in the negative, holding that both participating physicians and hospitals with such physicians on staff must independently provide the required notice to invoke NICA's exclusivity and immunity provisions. The court reasoned that the statute's plain language uses mandatory terms requiring notice from each entity, and the legislative purpose is to ensure patients receive information about their rights and limitations before delivery.

healthcaretorts & liability

The case involved a facial challenge to a 2005 Florida law (codified at sections 11.045 and 112.3215) that restricts lobbyists and principals from making, and officials from accepting, expenditures for lobbying purposes while also imposing quarterly disclosure requirements on lobbying firms regarding compensation from clients. After the Eleventh Circuit upheld the law under federal constitutional standards, it certified questions to the Florida Supreme Court on whether the Act violates the state separation of powers doctrine, was validly enacted under the Florida Constitution, and infringes on the Court's exclusive authority to regulate lawyers and the practice of law. The Court held that the Act does not violate separation of powers because its enforcement and penalty provisions do not encroach on judicial or executive functions, that the legislation was properly passed by the Legislature, and that lobbying as defined is distinct from the practice of law so the Act does not interfere with the Court's regulatory jurisdiction over attorneys.

business & regulatory

In State v. Meshell, the Florida Supreme Court addressed whether a defendant's convictions for two counts of lewd and lascivious battery under section 800.04(4)—one for vaginal penetration or union and one for oral sex with a minor—violated double jeopardy when the acts occurred during the same episode without a temporal break. The Court held that the convictions did not violate double jeopardy and quashed the Fifth District Court of Appeal's decision that had reversed one conviction. The core reasoning was that the proscribed sex acts are distinct criminal acts of separate character and type, each requiring different elements of proof, as established in prior cases interpreting the analogous sexual battery statute under section 794.011, whose identical definitions support the same analysis. The Court therefore reinstated the original convictions and sentences.

criminal law