Jorge Labarga

James Earl Rippy sued James Shepard under Florida's dangerous instrumentality doctrine after sustaining injuries from Shepard's farm tractor in 2004. The trial court dismissed the complaint, and the First District Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that a farm tractor is not a dangerous instrumentality as a matter of law. The Florida Supreme Court quashed the district court's decision, concluding that a farm tractor qualifies as a dangerous instrumentality. The court reasoned that, under precedents such as Meister v. Fisher and Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, the doctrine applies to motor vehicles other than automobiles that have the size, weight, and mechanism to pose a peculiar danger when operated, including on public highways.

torts & liability

This case involves review of a Second District Court of Appeal decision affirming a second-degree murder conviction, which had relied on Zeigler v. State and was in conflict with a First District decision in Montgomery v. State. The Florida Supreme Court had previously held in State v. Montgomery that the standard jury instruction on the lesser-included offense of manslaughter by act was fundamentally erroneous, as it incorrectly required the jury to find the defendant intentionally caused the victim's death. Because the decision below was inconsistent with that holding, the Court quashed the Second District's ruling and remanded for reconsideration under Montgomery.

criminal lawprocedure

This case concerned whether an objection to the qualifications of a nonresident personal representative appointed in a Florida probate proceeding is barred by the three-month filing deadline in section 733.212(3) of the Florida Probate Code. After Douglas Davis was appointed personal representative of Katherine Davis's estate and notice was served, Solveig Hill filed an untimely motion challenging his qualifications under section 733.304(3). The Florida Supreme Court held that the statutory deadline bars such objections, including claims that the representative was never qualified to serve, unless fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct not apparent on the face of the petition is involved. The Court approved the First District's decision affirming denial of Hill's motion and disapproved the Third District's contrary holding in Angelus to the extent it broadly exempted qualification challenges from the time bar.

procedureproperty

In Chemrock Corporation v. Tampa Electric Co., a Delaware company sued a gas supplier in Florida circuit court for damages after claiming that contaminated natural gas damaged its industrial furnaces, with the case involving prolonged discovery disputes but no motion to reset trial after a continuance. The Florida Supreme Court addressed whether the action should be dismissed for lack of prosecution under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.420(e), which allows dismissal if no record activity occurs for ten months before notice and within a subsequent sixty-day grace period. The Court decided that Chemrock's February 2007 motion opposing dismissal, filed during the grace period, satisfied the rule's record activity requirement and precluded dismissal. It therefore quashed the First District Court of Appeal's affirmance of dismissal and resolved a conflict with other district courts by applying a bright-line test focused on any filing in the record rather than its substantive effect.

procedure

This case concerned a dispute between the Florida Insurance Guaranty Association (FIGA) and Devon Neighborhood Association over claims under a 2004 insurance policy after the original insurer became insolvent; specifically, whether a 2005 statutory amendment imposing a mediation notice requirement on insurers could be applied retroactively to bar enforcement of the policy's appraisal provision. The trial court denied FIGA's motion to compel appraisal, the Fourth District affirmed, and the Florida Supreme Court accepted review due to conflict with prior decisions on retroactivity. The Court concluded that the district court misapplied the two-part test for determining retroactive application of statutes to contracts and therefore quashed the decision below, holding that the statute in effect when the policy was issued governs substantive issues and that the amendment did not clearly express an intent for retroactive effect.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case Kaaa v. Kaaa involved a dispute over whether the passive appreciation in value of a home purchased by one spouse before marriage, but paid down with marital funds during the marriage, should be considered a marital asset for equitable distribution in divorce proceedings. The Florida Supreme Court held that such passive appreciation is subject to equitable distribution under section 61.075(5)(a)(2), Florida Statutes (2007), when marital funds service the mortgage. The court reasoned that the statute includes enhancement in value and appreciation of nonmarital assets resulting from contributions or expenditures of marital funds, and approved a method from a prior case to calculate the marital portion based on the fraction of the asset financed by marital funds. It quashed the lower court's decision denying distribution of the appreciation and remanded for further proceedings.

family lawproperty

This case addressed a conflict between Florida district courts on the applicability of the safe harbor provision in section 57.105(4), Florida Statutes, which requires a party seeking sanctions for frivolous claims to serve a motion on the opposing party at least 21 days before filing it with the court. The underlying dispute involved tort claims filed in 2001 by Kenniasty's clients against Bionetics, with Bionetics later moving for attorney fees under the statute after the safe harbor provision took effect on July 1, 2002. The Florida Supreme Court held that the safe harbor provision does not apply where the frivolous claims were originally filed before its effective date, because the provision effects a substantive change in the law that does not operate retroactively. The Court therefore quashed the Fifth District's decision applying the provision and approved the First District's contrary view.

proceduretorts & liability

This case concerned whether the federal supplemental jurisdiction tolling statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d), paused the running of Florida's statute of limitations on state-law claims after a bankruptcy court dismissed those claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Petitioners had filed an adversary proceeding in bankruptcy court seeking a constructive trust on funds allegedly transferred to Textron, but after the federal district court ruled the bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction, they refiled in state court more than four years later. The Florida Supreme Court held that section 1367(d) tolled the limitations period because the claims had been properly asserted in federal court under the "related to" jurisdiction provision, even though jurisdiction ultimately failed. The court therefore quashed the Second District Court of Appeal's contrary decision and approved the Fourth District's reasoning in Scarfo v. Ginsberg to the extent it was consistent. The ruling focused solely on the operation of the federal tolling provision and did not address the merits of the constructive-trust claim.

procedurefederal power

This case involved a wrongful death lawsuit brought by the estate of Shea Daniels against a doctor and hospital for alleged medical negligence leading to his suicide. The dispute centered on whether J.D., a minor alleged to be Daniels's biological son, could pursue survivor claims for noneconomic damages, even though J.D.'s mother was married to another man at the time of J.D.'s birth, creating a presumption of legitimacy. The trial court granted partial summary judgment excluding J.D.'s claims, ruling that paternity must be established in family court rather than civil court. The Fourth District reversed, and the Florida Supreme Court approved that decision, holding that survivor status under the wrongful death statute can be determined in the wrongful death action itself based on facts like biological paternity and support, without requiring a separate paternity proceeding or divesting the legal father's rights.

family lawtorts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved Joseph Spaziano, an inmate serving a life sentence, who filed a petition for writ of mandamus challenging the Florida Parole Commission's calculation of his presumptive parole release date (PPRD) as April 28, 2060. The circuit court denied the petition and imposed a lien on Spaziano's inmate trust account for court filing fees under section 57.085, Florida Statutes, rejecting his claim of exemption. On appeal, the First District Court of Appeal reversed the lien order, and the Florida Supreme Court approved that decision after rephrasing and answering a certified question in the affirmative. The Court held that such a challenge qualifies as a collateral criminal proceeding under section 57.085(10), exempting it from the fee and lien provisions. The reasoning centered on the principle from Schmidt v. Crusoe that actions directly affecting the length of an inmate's prison time, like PPRD determinations, are analogous to gain-time challenges and thus exempt.

criminal lawprocedure

The Florida Supreme Court reviewed proposals from its Committee on Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases to update existing instructions and add new ones for various offenses. The court authorized new instructions on discharging a firearm from a vehicle within 1,000 feet of a person, multiple offenses against computer users under section 815.06, tampering with or fabricating physical evidence, and a revision to the criminal mischief instruction, incorporating modifications such as definitions for 'knowingly' and an updated definition of 'property.' It declined to authorize the proposed amendment to the insanity instruction. The core reasoning for the denial was the proposal's controversial nature within the Committee and the absence of any new basis not previously considered in earlier amendments to that instruction from 1986, 1994, and 2006.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Montgomery, the defendant was convicted of second-degree murder following a trial in which the jury received instructions on first-degree premeditated murder and the lesser included offenses of second-degree murder and manslaughter. The Florida Supreme Court reviewed a certified question from the First District Court of Appeal on whether the state must prove intent to kill to establish manslaughter by act. The court held that manslaughter by act does not require proof of intent to kill the victim, as the offense is an unlawful killing without the premeditated or depraved-mind elements of murder, and that the standard jury instruction imposing such a requirement was fundamentally erroneous in this case because it misstated the state's burden. The court therefore approved reversal of the conviction and remand for a new trial.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Florida residents John and Gail Rando, who sought to combine or "stack" uninsured motorist benefits from two separate GEICO auto insurance policies after sustaining injuries in a Florida accident caused by an underinsured driver. One policy covered Florida-registered vehicles, while the other (the Delaware policy) covered a vehicle registered and garaged in Delaware; both policies were issued and delivered in Florida to the Florida-resident insureds. The Supreme Court of Florida answered a certified question from the Eleventh Circuit by holding that the Delaware policy's anti-stacking provision was unenforceable under Florida law. The core reasoning was that the policy was governed by Florida statutes pursuant to the lex loci contractus rule, and the insurer had not obtained the informed consent required by section 627.727(9) to limit stacking of uninsured motorist coverage.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

In Aills v. Boemi, a patient sued a plastic surgeon for medical malpractice after complications from elective breast reconstruction surgery, asserting claims including negligence, battery, lack of informed consent, and fraud. The jury found the surgeon liable only on negligence and awarded damages that the trial court partially remitted, leading to further proceedings on damages. The Second District reversed for a new trial on all issues, concluding that the patient's closing argument improperly addressed postoperative negligence that had not been pled or tried by consent. The Florida Supreme Court quashed the district court's decision, ruling that the surgeon's trial objection addressed only the lack of evidentiary support and did not preserve the specific ground of improper pleading or consent for appellate review.

torts & liabilityprocedurehealthcare

This case involved the Florida Supreme Court's sua sponte review of amendments to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.111(d)(3) on waiver of counsel, prompted by the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Indiana v. Edwards. The Court amended the rule to provide that a trial court shall not deny a defendant's request for self-representation if the defendant has made a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel and does not suffer from severe mental illness rendering the defendant incompetent to conduct trial proceedings alone. The amendment implements the narrow exception recognized in Edwards, which permits states to insist on counsel for defendants who are competent to stand trial under Dusky but lack the mental capacity for self-representation due to severe mental illness, a determination distinct from trial competency. The Court made this change after reviewing comments, declining to further refine the standard beyond the language of Edwards, and the amendment took effect immediately.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved the Florida Supreme Court considering proposals from its Criminal Court Steering Committee to adopt a comprehensive set of specialized Florida Rules of Civil Procedure for Involuntary Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators under Chapter 394, Part V, Florida Statutes (the Jimmy Ryce Act), which governs civil commitment proceedings for individuals convicted of sexually violent offenses who are deemed likely to reoffend due to a mental abnormality or personality disorder. The court decided to adopt most of the proposed rules, modeled on the existing civil procedure rules, with modifications to rules such as 4.220 (adding an order of no probable cause upon failure to establish it), 4.260 (retaining the 120-day limit on continuances), 4.310 (explicitly permitting telephone depositions), 4.380 (clarifying sanctions for disobedient parties), 4.410 (including provisions for subpoenaing minors), and 4.460 (allowing a two-year filing period for certain habeas petitions), while declining to adopt rules 4.050 and 4.360. The core reasoning centered on ensuring the rules conform to statutory mandates, facilitate fair proceedings including jury trials and discovery, protect respondents' rights such as counsel and examinations, and address practical issues like venue and post-commitment reviews without unnecessary deviations from established civil procedures.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights