Charles T. Canady

This case concerned the proper venue for a tort lawsuit filed in Broward County by the Browns against an individual defendant and two corporate defendants, where the defendants resided in different counties and the accident occurred in Pasco County. The Florida Supreme Court addressed a conflict over the judicially created "joint residency rule" from Enfinger v. Baxley, which had restricted venue to a county shared by all defendants when an individual and corporation were sued together. The court decided to recede from Enfinger, holding that the rule misread the governing statutes, and quashed the Fourth District's affirmance of a venue transfer to Pasco County. The core reasoning was that the plain language of sections 47.011, 47.021, and 47.051, Florida Statutes, permits a plaintiff to select venue in any county where any one defendant resides, without requiring a common residence among all defendants. As a result, the complaint could properly proceed in Broward County based on one corporate defendant's residency there.

procedure

The case involved a dispute over the scope of a household exclusion in an automobile liability insurance policy issued by State Farm to named insured Gilda Menendez. Menendez's granddaughter, a permissive driver living separately with her parents, caused an accident injuring herself, her parents, and Menendez; the parents sought coverage for their injuries, but State Farm denied it based on the exclusion for bodily injury to any insured or member of an insured's household. The Florida Supreme Court held that the exclusion was unambiguous and barred coverage for the parents' claims, reasoning that the policy's broad definition of "insured" (including permissive drivers) and the exclusion's reference to "an insured's" household plainly encompassed family members of such drivers. The court quashed the Third District Court of Appeal's decision finding ambiguity and approved the contrary holding of the Fourth District in Linehan v. Alkhabbaz.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

This case concerned whether evidence of cocaine obtained from a search of Anthony Hankerson should have been suppressed in his trial for possession with intent to sell. The Florida Supreme Court reviewed a Fourth District decision that reversed Hankerson's conviction on grounds that officers lacked probable cause for the search and refused to consider the State's alternative appellate argument that the stop was a valid investigatory detention. The Court held that the district court erred by not allowing the State, as appellee, to raise new legal theories supporting affirmance of the trial court's denial of the suppression motion, consistent with prior precedent. It further ruled that the totality of circumstances—including the officer's observation of a brief hand-to-hand exchange for cash in a suspected drug area and Hankerson's evasive behavior during the stop—established probable cause for the search. Accordingly, the Court quashed the Fourth District's decision and reinstated the conviction.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned whether a defendant asserting immunity from prosecution under Florida's Stand Your Ground law, section 776.032, is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on that claim before trial. The Fourth District Court of Appeal had denied certiorari relief, holding that the trial court did not err by refusing such a hearing. Following its earlier decision in Dennis v. State, the Florida Supreme Court determined that a trial court must resolve the factual question of statutory immunity applicability when a motion to dismiss is filed on that basis. The Court therefore quashed the decision under review and remanded the matter to the Fourth District for reconsideration consistent with Dennis.

criminal law

The case concerned whether the constitutional requirements from Apprendi v. New Jersey and Blakely v. Washington—that a jury must find facts essential to imposing a sentence above the guidelines range—apply during resentencing proceedings. Fleming was originally convicted in 1997 of aggravated battery and related charges and received an upward departure sentence based on judicial findings; after a successful postconviction challenge, he was resentenced in 2003, again with judicial findings supporting departure. The Florida Supreme Court held that Apprendi and Blakely apply to resentencings conducted after those decisions issued, even if the original conviction and sentence became final beforehand. The core reasoning was that resentencing constitutes a de novo proceeding in which the decisional law in effect at the time of resentencing governs. The court approved the First District's reversal of Fleming's sentence on that basis and resolved a conflict among district courts.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerns the interpretation of Florida Statute section 222.25(4), which provides a $4000 personal property exemption to debtors who do not claim or receive the benefits of the state constitutional homestead exemption. Debtor Denise Dumoulin filed for chapter 7 bankruptcy, initially claimed her home as exempt under the homestead provision but later amended to surrender the property and instead claim the personal property exemption; the bankruptcy trustee objected, arguing that ownership of homestead property barred the additional exemption. The Florida Supreme Court rephrased the Eleventh Circuit's certified question and answered it in the negative, holding that a debtor who elects not to claim the homestead exemption and whose actions do not otherwise obstruct the trustee's administration of the estate does not receive the benefits of the homestead exemption. The court's reasoning focused on the plain language of the statute, construing the phrase "claim or receive the benefits" narrowly to allow the broadest reasonable application of the personal property exemption when the constitutional protection is not asserted or operative in the bankruptcy proceeding.

propertyprocedure

In Dennis v. State, the Florida Supreme Court addressed whether a trial court must hold a pretrial evidentiary hearing to resolve factual disputes when a defendant moves to dismiss criminal charges based on immunity under the Stand Your Ground statute, section 776.032. The defendant had been charged with attempted murder arising from a domestic incident and filed motions asserting justified use of force, but the trial court denied them without an evidentiary hearing due to disputed facts and proceeded to trial, resulting in a conviction for felony battery. The Fourth District affirmed, holding that factual disputes required denial of the motion, in conflict with the First District's Peterson decision. The Supreme Court held that trial courts should determine the applicability of statutory immunity as a factual matter before trial, treating such motions under rule 3.190(b) rather than rule 3.190(c)(4), but concluded that the error was harmless because the trial evidence supported the conviction and Dennis had a full opportunity to present his self-defense claim to the jury. The Court therefore disapproved the Fourth District's reasoning on the immunity procedure but affirmed the conviction and sentence.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned whether a judgment creditor, the Federal Trade Commission, could obtain an order requiring debtors Shaun Olmstead and Julie Connell to surrender all their ownership interests in single-member Florida LLCs to satisfy a multimillion-dollar judgment arising from an advance-fee credit card scam. The Florida Supreme Court rephrased and answered the Eleventh Circuit's certified question in the affirmative, holding that Florida law permits a court to compel such a full surrender and transfer. The majority reasoned that the statutory charging-order remedy under section 608.433(4) is not exclusive for single-member LLCs, that owners may freely transfer their entire interests, and that traditional creditor remedies such as levy and execution therefore remain available. A dissent argued that the LLC Act limits creditors to charging orders and related statutory steps, requiring legislative amendment for broader remedies.

business & regulatoryprocedure

In Sanders v. State, the Florida Supreme Court addressed whether a trial court could score offenses as "additional offenses" on a Criminal Punishment Code scoresheet when resentencing a defendant after revoking probation, even though the court no longer had jurisdiction over those offenses because the probation terms had expired. The defendant had originally been sentenced on five offenses and later violated probation on the remaining ones; the scoresheet used at resentencing included the expired third-degree felony offenses, which affected the calculated lowest permissible sentence. The court answered the certified question in the negative, holding that such offenses do not qualify as additional offenses under the statutory definition in section 921.0021, Florida Statutes (1999), because they were not pending before the court for sentencing. The decision quashed the Second District Court of Appeal's ruling and remanded for resentencing without scoring the expired offenses, noting that the error could have impacted the sentence imposed.

criminal lawprocedure

This case concerned the timing of the statute of limitations for a legal malpractice claim arising from a patent infringement lawsuit where sanctions were also awarded. The Florida Supreme Court held that the two-year limitations period for the malpractice claim related to the underlying judgment begins when that judgment becomes final, while the period for any claim related to sanctions begins when the sanctions judgment is final. The court reasoned that under prior precedent like Silvestrone v. Edell, the cause of action accrues when the last element occurs and judicial labor on the merits ends, but distinguished the sanctions aspect to avoid splitting claims improperly, ultimately aligning with the Fourth District's approach over the Second District's.

proceduretorts & liability

This case involved proposed amendments to Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.172 and 3.985, along with a parallel change to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.985. The court adopted an amendment to rule 3.172 requiring trial judges to confirm that defendants understand a guilty or nolo contendere plea for certain offenses will result in automatic driver's license suspension or revocation, following the holding in Bolware v. State. It also updated rules 3.985 and 1.985 to direct judges to standard jury instructions posted on the Florida Supreme Court's website rather than those published by The Florida Bar. The amendments took effect immediately upon the opinion's filing.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned the interpretation of Florida Statute section 39.801(3)(d), which provides that a parent's failure to personally appear at a termination of parental rights adjudicatory hearing constitutes consent to termination. The Florida Supreme Court reviewed a Second District decision holding that the Department of Children and Family Services need not present evidence supporting statutory grounds for termination when consent is entered by default for non-appearance, and addressed certified conflict with decisions from the Third and Fifth Districts. The Court agreed that no evidentiary showing on the grounds is required under the statute but disapproved portions of the Second District's reasoning, quashed its decision in part, and disapproved the conflicting holdings from the other districts. The decision rested on the statute's plain language regarding constructive consent and the procedural requirements for notice and appearance in dependency proceedings involving the mother P.E. and child H.E.

family lawprocedure

The case concerned whether Brevard County's ordinance requiring fireworks sellers to maintain minimum liability insurance as a permit condition conflicted with Florida Statutes chapter 791, which regulates fireworks sales and requires uniform application statewide. The Florida Supreme Court resolved a conflict between the Fifth and Second District Courts of Appeal, holding that the county's financial responsibility provision did not conflict with the state law. The court reasoned that chapter 791 is silent on insurance requirements, allowing businesses to comply with both the ordinance and the statute without violation, and that local additions on unregulated matters do not undermine the statute's uniformity. Accordingly, the Court quashed the Fifth District's decision to the extent it found a conflict and approved the Second District's contrary holding.

business & regulatory

In GTJ v. State, a juvenile appealed a probation order and withheld adjudication of delinquency for the acts of assault and battery arising from an altercation outside an apartment where he struck one man with a rod and swung a belt at two men. The Florida Second District Court of Appeal reversed the orders and remanded with instructions to dismiss the delinquency petition. The court held that the juvenile had presented a prima facie case of self-defense through unrebutted testimony that the men chased him while one brandished a knife and later choked him, and that the state's evidence failed to rebut this defense or prove the offenses beyond a reasonable doubt.

criminal law

In State v. Harris, the State appealed a trial court's order suppressing evidence of drugs and paraphernalia found on the defendant after her arrest. The appellate court reversed the order, holding that the arresting officer had probable cause based on overhearing a conversation in a high-drug area that indicated the defendant possessed a crack pipe, which she gave to a male companion, and then observing the companion with the pipe. The court reasoned that the specific words exchanged, combined with the limited number of individuals present and the immediate appearance of the pipe, raised the inference from mere suspicion to probable cause, justifying the arrest and subsequent search.

criminal lawprocedure

In Jimenez v. State, the defendant appealed the denial of his Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 motion for postconviction relief after pleading guilty to cocaine trafficking and receiving a fifteen-year minimum mandatory sentence. He claimed ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to pursue an entrapment defense based on actions by a confidential informant who was a friend and for not investigating or advising him on viable defenses before the plea. The District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District, affirmed the denial of most claims but reversed the summary denial of portions of two claims, holding that the allegations of government inducement through pleas based on friendship and the defendant's lack of predisposition or prior drug distribution history stated a facially sufficient claim for subjective entrapment under section 777.201(1). The court remanded for an evidentiary hearing or attachment of record portions refuting the claim and allowed the defendant an opportunity to amend the related ineffective assistance claim regarding investigation of defenses.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved C.E.L., a juvenile charged with resisting an officer without violence under section 843.02, Florida Statutes, after he ran from officers patrolling a high-crime area and disregarded their command to stop; he was later found to have an outstanding arrest warrant. The trial court denied his motion for judgment of dismissal and adjudicated him delinquent. On appeal, the en banc court affirmed, concluding that the officers' stop order was justified by reasonable suspicion under Illinois v. Wardlow due to the flight in a high-crime area, so the officers were engaged in the lawful execution of a legal duty and the knowing failure to stop constituted the offense. The court reasoned that this scenario satisfied the statutory elements and distinguished it from cases where no independent lawful basis for detention existed prior to the flight.

criminal lawprocedure

In Jackson v. State, the defendant appealed his convictions for possession of cocaine and MDMA, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal because the circumstantial evidence was insufficient to prove constructive possession or to rebut his reasonable hypothesis that other occupants had placed the drugs near him. The District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District, affirmed the convictions, holding that a rational jury could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Jackson knew of and had dominion and control over the drugs. The court reasoned that the drugs were found in a change purse that appeared to have spilled from a large purse located five feet from Jackson, combined with evidence that Jackson habitually carried such a purse and that a credit card in his name was nearby, which was inconsistent with his innocence theory given the absence of similar evidence linking the items to others present.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved the termination of city employee Brian Meaton by the City of St. Petersburg and subsequent proceedings before the City's Civil Service Board. After the original Board upheld the termination for just cause, the circuit court quashed that decision on certiorari review, finding the findings did not support just cause. A newly constituted Board then reviewed audio tapes of the original hearing, made supplemental findings, and again upheld the termination. The circuit court quashed this second order, ruling that the new Board could not properly assess witness credibility without observing live testimony. On the City's petition for second-tier certiorari, the District Court of Appeal denied relief, holding that the circuit court did not depart from the essential requirements of law because a fact-finder must personally observe witnesses to evaluate credibility.

labor & employmentprocedure

In Zinnerman v. State, the defendant was convicted after a bench trial and appealed on the ground that his oral waiver of a jury trial was invalid because it was not in writing and the trial court's colloquy was insufficient to establish a knowing and intelligent waiver. The en banc Florida Second District Court of Appeal affirmed the convictions, holding that the waiver was valid. The court reasoned that Florida precedent, including Tucker v. State, permits oral waivers when the trial judge conducts an on-the-record inquiry explaining the key differences between a jury trial and a bench trial, and that the colloquy here met that standard by informing Zinnerman that the judge rather than a jury would decide the facts. Although a written waiver is preferred, its absence does not invalidate an otherwise express and intelligent waiver, and the court receded from its earlier decisions requiring more detailed advisements.

criminal lawprocedure