The case involved Patricia Hamilton, who developed a drug-induced lupus-like syndrome after using Remicade, a medication manufactured by Centocor. Hamilton sued Centocor, alleging that a promotional video shown to her fraudulently emphasized the drug's benefits while omitting warnings about side effects. The court recognized an exception to the learned intermediary doctrine, holding that a drug manufacturer cannot rely solely on warnings given to physicians when it directly advertises to consumers in a misleading or fraudulent manner. It found legally and factually sufficient evidence to support the fraud claim and causation, upheld the jury's verdict on that basis, but reversed the award for future pain and mental anguish damages due to insufficient evidence and modified the judgment accordingly.
This case involved a petition for writ of mandamus filed by Columbia Valley Healthcare System, L.P. d/b/a Valley Regional Medical Center, seeking to overturn a trial court's denial of its motion to disqualify the law firm representing the real parties in interest in a pending lawsuit. The relator argued that a legal assistant formerly employed by its counsel had joined the opposing firm, creating a risk of confidential information disclosure. After reviewing the petition, response, reply, and hearing record, the court denied the mandamus petition. It concluded that the firm had implemented sufficient precautions to prevent any improper disclosure of confidences by the legal assistant. As a result, the relator failed to demonstrate a clear abuse of discretion or violation of legal duty by the trial court.
The case involved the conviction of Manuel Gonzalez Soto for aggravated sexual assault of a child, indecency with a child by contact, and indecency with a child by exposure, based on allegations by his ten-year-old niece. The Texas Court of Appeals reversed all three convictions and remanded for a new trial. The court found that the jury charge erroneously allowed for a non-unanimous verdict on the alternative manners and means alleged in the counts, causing egregious harm, and that the evidence was legally insufficient to support the allegation of digital penetration in one count. Additionally, due to the verdict issues, the court could not determine if the jury properly relied on distinct conduct for the exposure count.
The case involved Marie Lisette Garcia Vega, a juvenile tried as an adult in Texas for capital murder, aggravated kidnapping, and aggravated robbery after she and her boyfriend fled to Illinois following the crimes. Vega challenged the admission of her written statement given to Illinois police, arguing it was obtained without complying with Texas Family Code requirements for juveniles, such as warnings before a magistrate. On remand from the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, the court affirmed the convictions and the admission of the statement. The core reasoning was that Texas law governed admissibility, Title 3 of the Family Code applied but was not to be strictly construed, and the procedures used satisfied the fairness purpose in section 51.01 by recognizing the juvenile's constitutional and legal rights despite the lack of a magistrate.
Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company, as relator, sought a writ of mandamus after a trial court denied its amended plea to the jurisdiction in an underlying case brought by Raymond Nickelson. The court reviewed the petition, the full record and supplemental record, the response from the real party in interest, and the relator's reply. It concluded that the relator had not demonstrated entitlement to mandamus relief. Accordingly, the petition was denied under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 52.8(a).
In this case, the Texas Department of Transportation sued Crockett for conversion after mistakenly paying over $149,000 to the wrong company for landscaping services. Crockett responded with a counterclaim alleging underpayments on multiple mowing contracts and seeking declaratory relief regarding contract interpretations and an accounting. The trial court denied TxDOT's plea to the jurisdiction, but on appeal, the court reversed and dismissed the counterclaim, holding that it was not sufficiently related to TxDOT's original claim to waive sovereign immunity and that Crockett had failed to exhaust required administrative remedies under the Texas Transportation Code for contract disputes.