Get above the noise
Log in for answers tailored to you — saved chats, your topics, and the full IJR suite.
Judge, Court of Appeals of Texas
Carnley v. State
Texas Court of Appeals, 2nd District (Fort Worth) · 2012-04-26 · cited 21×
Sheila Marie Carnley was convicted after a bench trial of felony tampering with physical evidence under Texas Penal Code § 37.09(a)(1) and sentenced to fifteen years in prison as a repeat offender. The charge arose when, after the driver fled police on foot following a high-speed chase, Carnley drove the abandoned Pontiac away from the scene; officers stopped her less than a mile away and arrested her for moving what they considered evidence of evading arrest. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals affirmed, holding the evidence legally sufficient because Carnley admitted she knew the vehicle was evidence at a crime scene where an investigation was underway, yet intentionally drove it away, thereby impairing its availability. The court rejected her claims that the lack of an explicit order not to move the car or her claimed safety motive negated the required mental state. A dissent argued that merely relocating the car a short distance could not have affected the State’s ability to prosecute the underlying offense.
criminal law
In Re Marks
Texas Court of Appeals, 2nd District (Fort Worth) · 2012-04-19 · cited 6×
This case was a habeas corpus proceeding in which William J. Marks challenged a trial court contempt order that sentenced him to 180 days in jail for violating prior child support orders by failing to file a parenting class certificate and notify of an address change. Marks argued the order was void because he had not knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel at the enforcement hearing. The Court of Appeals denied relief, holding that Marks had validly waived counsel. The court reasoned that the trial judge had properly admonished Marks under Texas Family Code § 157.163 about his right to an attorney (including appointed counsel if indigent), that Marks confirmed he understood those rights and elected to proceed and testify, and that the record as a whole—including prior retained counsel and a signed appearance document—demonstrated a knowing and intelligent waiver under the totality of circumstances.
family lawcriminal lawprocedure
State v. LEDREC, INC.
Texas Court of Appeals, 2nd District (Fort Worth) · 2012-04-12 · cited 7×
In this condemnation case, the State of Texas and Tarrant County sought to take a ten-foot strip of Ledrec, Inc.’s property along F.M. 1187 to widen the highway, leaving only the amount of damages to the remainder property in dispute after the parties agreed on compensation for the strip itself. Ledrec’s expert valued the remainder damages at $248,000 on the theory that the front buildings would become functionally obsolete and lose all income-producing value due to their proximity to the widened road and likely future annexation by the City of Mansfield, which would impose nonconforming zoning setbacks; the State’s expert calculated only about $58,740 in damages and challenged the higher figure as remote and speculative. The trial court denied the State’s motion for partial summary judgment seeking to exclude Ledrec’s expert testimony, and the court of appeals affirmed. The appellate court held that the expert’s analysis rested on the proper legal measure of remainder damages—market value as of the date of taking, considering factors a willing buyer would reasonably account for, including probable future annexation of property already in the city’s extraterritorial jurisdiction—and that questions about the opinion’s underlying assumptions went to its weight rather than its admissibility.
propertyprocedure
Cook v. State
Texas Court of Appeals, 2nd District (Fort Worth) · 2012-02-09 · cited 8×
In Cook v. State, David Cook was convicted by a jury of manslaughter and initially received a punishment verdict of six years’ confinement with a recommendation of community supervision (probation), after the jury had found he used his car as a deadly weapon. Following the jury’s discharge, the trial court reconvened the jurors upon learning of possible confusion over the verdict form; four jurors stated the original verdict was not what they had intended, and after further deliberation the jury returned a new verdict of six years without probation, which the court accepted and imposed. Cook appealed, arguing that the trial court lacked authority to reconvene the discharged jury and that the second verdict was invalid. The Court of Appeals of Texas reversed the punishment portion of the judgment and remanded for a new punishment trial, holding that once a jury has been discharged and dispersed, it cannot lawfully be reassembled to alter its verdict.
criminal lawprocedure
Aston Meadows, Ltd. v. Devon Energy Production Co.
Texas Court of Appeals, 2nd District (Fort Worth) · 2012-01-26 · cited 12×
The case concerned whether a 1977 oil-and-gas lease encumbering land in both Tarrant and Wise Counties remained valid against the appellants, who bought the Tarrant County portion in 2001 for residential development and later sued Devon (the leaseholder’s successor) for trespass, conversion, and a declaration that the lease was unenforceable because it had not been recorded in Tarrant County at the time of purchase. The trial court granted Devon summary judgment on all claims; the court of appeals affirmed. The appellate court held that Texas Property Code § 11.001(a) permits an instrument affecting property located in more than one county to be recorded in any county where part of the land lies, and that such recording provides constructive notice to all persons as to the entire property; therefore the appellants had constructive notice of the lease and could not qualify as bona fide purchasers. The court rejected the appellants’ argument that the statute requires recording in every affected county, noting both the statutory text and long-standing case law treat recording in one qualifying county as sufficient.
propertybusiness & regulatorytorts & liability
Greene v. State
Texas Court of Appeals, 2nd District (Fort Worth) · 2011-11-17 · cited 7×
Michael Greene pled guilty to methamphetamine possession under a plea bargain but appealed the denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized from his mobile home, arguing that the search warrant was facially defective because it omitted the address and items to be seized (incorporating them only by reference to an unprovided affidavit) and that the trial court erred by failing to issue written findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Court of Appeals of Texas affirmed the trial court's judgment. It first held that written findings were unnecessary because the trial court had made sufficient oral findings on the record at the suppression hearing, satisfying due process requirements under precedent. On the warrant issue, the court reasoned that incorporation of the affidavit satisfied the Fourth Amendment's particularity requirement, the officers' failure to provide a copy of the affidavit did not undermine the warrant's purposes or prejudice Greene, and there was no evidence the search exceeded its authorized scope.
criminal lawprocedure