In Evans v. Allen, Ollie L. Evans filed a will contest more than two years after the probate court admitted William Vinson’s December 22, 2006 will to probate, seeking to set it aside in favor of an earlier will on grounds that included lack of testamentary capacity due to an ongoing guardianship and alleged fraud or forgery. The trial court granted a directed verdict for executor Betty J. Allen on the basis that the contest was untimely. The appellate court affirmed, holding that Probate Code section 93 imposes a two-year limitations period that begins to run upon admission to probate, that interested parties like Evans receive constructive notice at that time, and that neither the discovery rule nor exceptions for forgery or extrinsic fraud applied to toll the deadline in this case.
The case involved former Tyco employees who sued the company for breach of contract after Tyco sold their unit, alleging they were entitled to severance pay under Retention Incentive Agreements that referenced "standard Severance" and the "severance schedule associated with the closure of this facility." The trial court ruled for the employees following a bench trial, but the Court of Appeals of Texas reversed and rendered a take-nothing judgment. The appeals court held that the state-law contract claims were preempted by the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) because the agreements expressly tied the promised benefits to an existing ERISA-governed severance plan, the amounts awarded matched those payable under the plan, and any recovery would require reference to and administration under that plan.
In Harris v. State, Karl Christopher Harris was convicted by a jury of the second-degree felony of failing to comply with sex offender registration requirements after missing a required quarterly verification with the Houston Police Department following his 1992 convictions for aggravated kidnapping and aggravated sexual assault; the trial court then enhanced his punishment to twenty years’ confinement. Harris appealed, arguing insufficient evidence that he intentionally or knowingly failed to verify his information on time, that the trial court vindictively imposed a harsher sentence because he exercised his right to trial, and that he was entitled to a new trial due to an unavailable transcript of a pretrial hearing. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction and sentence. It held that the evidence was sufficient because Harris had been repeatedly informed of his lifelong quarterly verification duty and the August 2008 deadline, and the State had notified him of the registration office’s relocation through mailings, posted signs, and desk instructions. The court further concluded that the vindictiveness claim was not preserved by objection and that the North Carolina v. Pearce presumption did not apply, as there had been no retrial after a successful appeal.
The case involved a premises-liability claim by postal worker Thomas Farrar, who slipped and fell on a wheelchair ramp at a building managed by Sabine Management Corporation and Northwest Building, Ltd. Farrar alleged the ramp had been painted with a contrasting “safety paint” mixed with sand on the recommendation of an ADA consultant, creating an unreasonably slippery surface when wet, and that the defendants knew or should have known of the danger after another person slipped on the same ramp earlier the same day. The trial court granted the defendants’ no-evidence motion for summary judgment on the ground that Farrar had failed to produce evidence on the required elements of his claim. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding that the evidence—including the circumstances of the painting, the prior slip, Farrar’s own fall while wearing slip-resistant shoes, and subsequent remedial measures—raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the ramp posed an unreasonable risk of harm.
This case involved a workers' compensation dispute in which Continental Casualty Company sought judicial review of a Texas Division of Workers' Compensation decision finding that James Baker's 2000 on-the-job knee injury extended to a meniscus tear identified on an MRI in 2005. A jury found in Baker's favor and awarded attorney fees, leading to a trial court judgment for Baker. The appellate court reversed the judgment and remanded for further proceedings, holding that the jury charge contained reversible error in its definition of producing cause. Specifically, the instruction failed to require that the workplace accident be a substantial factor in causing the injury, contrary to the Texas Supreme Court's standard in Transcontinental Insurance Co. v. Crump, and this error was harmful because causation was the sole contested issue at trial.
This case involves an interlocutory appeal by Waterman Steamship Corporation and Maersk Line from the denial of their special appearances in Texas state court. Crewmembers sued the companies for negligence and unseaworthiness under the Jones Act and general maritime law, alleging injuries from a 2009 pirate hijacking of the M/V MAERSK ALABAMA off Somalia. The court granted rehearing but left the disposition unchanged, affirming in part and reversing and rendering in part. It held that the defendants, both foreign corporations with no principal places of business in Texas, lacked sufficient minimum contacts for general personal jurisdiction, and their prior actions in a related suit did not waive the jurisdictional challenge.
