The case involved Janet Harrelson, a public official, who was convicted by a jury of abuse of official capacity, forgery, and two counts of tampering with a governmental record stemming from her role in obtaining and executing an unauthorized bench warrant to transfer her son from a state prison unit to the Liberty County Jail. The trial court imposed concurrent sentences including jail time, probation, fines, and restitution. On appeal, the court reviewed the legal sufficiency of the evidence and found it insufficient to support the abuse of official capacity conviction because there was no proof that government property, services, or funds were misused as alleged in the indictment, and insufficient for one tampering count. The court reversed those convictions and entered acquittals, while affirming the forgery conviction and the remaining tampering conviction based on the evidence presented at trial.
The case concerned the Texas Department of Public Safety's denial of William Chris Satterfield's application to renew his concealed handgun license, based on a 1962 misdemeanor conviction for aggravated assault that the Department treated as a disqualifying felony under the licensing statute. After a justice of the peace overturned the denial, the county court-at-law affirmed the Department's decision following a de novo review. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the 2003 amendment to the concealed handgun licensing statute defines a felony by reference to the offense's status or elements at the time of the license application rather than at the time of conviction. Because the record lacked sufficient evidence to establish that the 1962 offense met the current statutory criteria for a felony, the court remanded for a new evidentiary hearing.
In Louis v. State, Harry Henry Louis III appealed his jury conviction for aggravated robbery, arguing that the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to prove his identity as a perpetrator, the use of a deadly weapon, that the victim was threatened or placed in fear, and his participation as a party to the offense. The evidence against him was entirely circumstantial, as no witnesses could identify the masked robbers who stole cash and checks from a Domino's Pizza location while wearing blue jumpsuits and carrying apparent firearms. The Texas Court of Appeals applied the standards from Jackson v. Virginia for legal sufficiency and Zuniga v. State for factual sufficiency, reviewing all evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict or in a neutral light, respectively, and ultimately affirmed the conviction based on the circumstantial evidence linking Louis to the crime.
In this case, employee Amy Maida sued her employer RLS Legal Solutions and a supervisor over claims arising from her employment, and RLS sought to compel arbitration under a clause in the December 2001 employment agreement. The trial court denied the motion to compel after an evidentiary hearing, finding that Maida had raised a valid defense of economic duress specifically targeting the arbitration provision. On RLS's petition for writ of mandamus under the Federal Arbitration Act, the court of appeals held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to compel arbitration or in declining to deem certain requests for admission admitted as a discovery sanction, because the duress allegations focused on the arbitration clause itself rather than the contract as a whole and because the trial judge could reasonably credit Maida's evidence that a required payment had been withheld. The appellate court therefore denied the petition, allowing the case to proceed in court.
The case involved Scott Davis Adams, who was convicted by a jury of driving while intoxicated after being stopped for speeding, subjected to field sobriety tests showing multiple clues of impairment, and later registering breath alcohol levels of .09 and .094 on an Intoxilyzer test. The trial court sentenced him to 180 days in jail (suspended), one year of probation, forty hours of community service, and a $1,500 fine. Adams challenged the factual sufficiency of the evidence to prove intoxication at the time of driving, the admission of the Intoxilyzer results, and an increase in his fine after he declined to waive his right to appeal. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that the evidence—including officer observations, test results, and the jury's ability to weigh the videotape and testimony—was sufficient under the applicable standard, that the breath test results were admissible and probative, and that there was no record evidence the sentence was increased due to the appeal waiver refusal.
This case involved a challenge to a trial court's order admitting a will to probate and appointing an executor under Texas Probate Code sections 31 and 93. Appellants, other nieces and nephews of the deceased, filed a bill of review and a will contest seeking to set aside the probate order on grounds including lack of proper citation, insufficient proof for a codicil, lack of testamentary capacity, and undue influence. The trial court denied the bill of review but did not sever it from the ongoing will contest or resolve all related issues. The appellate court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the denial order was interlocutory and not final because the proceedings involved overlapping issues that had not been fully resolved and no severance had been ordered. Under the Crowson test for probate orders, the ruling did not terminate a discrete phase of the estate administration.