Steve McKeithen

The case involved Janet Harrelson, a public official, who was convicted by a jury of abuse of official capacity, forgery, and two counts of tampering with a governmental record stemming from her role in obtaining and executing an unauthorized bench warrant to transfer her son from a state prison unit to the Liberty County Jail. The trial court imposed concurrent sentences including jail time, probation, fines, and restitution. On appeal, the court reviewed the legal sufficiency of the evidence and found it insufficient to support the abuse of official capacity conviction because there was no proof that government property, services, or funds were misused as alleged in the indictment, and insufficient for one tampering count. The court reversed those convictions and entered acquittals, while affirming the forgery conviction and the remaining tampering conviction based on the evidence presented at trial.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned the Texas Department of Public Safety's denial of William Chris Satterfield's application to renew his concealed handgun license, based on a 1962 misdemeanor conviction for aggravated assault that the Department treated as a disqualifying felony under the licensing statute. After a justice of the peace overturned the denial, the county court-at-law affirmed the Department's decision following a de novo review. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the 2003 amendment to the concealed handgun licensing statute defines a felony by reference to the offense's status or elements at the time of the license application rather than at the time of conviction. Because the record lacked sufficient evidence to establish that the 1962 offense met the current statutory criteria for a felony, the court remanded for a new evidentiary hearing.

gunscriminal lawprocedure

In Louis v. State, Harry Henry Louis III appealed his jury conviction for aggravated robbery, arguing that the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to prove his identity as a perpetrator, the use of a deadly weapon, that the victim was threatened or placed in fear, and his participation as a party to the offense. The evidence against him was entirely circumstantial, as no witnesses could identify the masked robbers who stole cash and checks from a Domino's Pizza location while wearing blue jumpsuits and carrying apparent firearms. The Texas Court of Appeals applied the standards from Jackson v. Virginia for legal sufficiency and Zuniga v. State for factual sufficiency, reviewing all evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict or in a neutral light, respectively, and ultimately affirmed the conviction based on the circumstantial evidence linking Louis to the crime.

criminal law

In this case, employee Amy Maida sued her employer RLS Legal Solutions and a supervisor over claims arising from her employment, and RLS sought to compel arbitration under a clause in the December 2001 employment agreement. The trial court denied the motion to compel after an evidentiary hearing, finding that Maida had raised a valid defense of economic duress specifically targeting the arbitration provision. On RLS's petition for writ of mandamus under the Federal Arbitration Act, the court of appeals held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to compel arbitration or in declining to deem certain requests for admission admitted as a discovery sanction, because the duress allegations focused on the arbitration clause itself rather than the contract as a whole and because the trial judge could reasonably credit Maida's evidence that a required payment had been withheld. The appellate court therefore denied the petition, allowing the case to proceed in court.

labor & employmentprocedure

The case involved Scott Davis Adams, who was convicted by a jury of driving while intoxicated after being stopped for speeding, subjected to field sobriety tests showing multiple clues of impairment, and later registering breath alcohol levels of .09 and .094 on an Intoxilyzer test. The trial court sentenced him to 180 days in jail (suspended), one year of probation, forty hours of community service, and a $1,500 fine. Adams challenged the factual sufficiency of the evidence to prove intoxication at the time of driving, the admission of the Intoxilyzer results, and an increase in his fine after he declined to waive his right to appeal. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that the evidence—including officer observations, test results, and the jury's ability to weigh the videotape and testimony—was sufficient under the applicable standard, that the breath test results were admissible and probative, and that there was no record evidence the sentence was increased due to the appeal waiver refusal.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a challenge to a trial court's order admitting a will to probate and appointing an executor under Texas Probate Code sections 31 and 93. Appellants, other nieces and nephews of the deceased, filed a bill of review and a will contest seeking to set aside the probate order on grounds including lack of proper citation, insufficient proof for a codicil, lack of testamentary capacity, and undue influence. The trial court denied the bill of review but did not sever it from the ongoing will contest or resolve all related issues. The appellate court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the denial order was interlocutory and not final because the proceedings involved overlapping issues that had not been fully resolved and no severance had been ordered. Under the Crowson test for probate orders, the ruling did not terminate a discrete phase of the estate administration.

procedureproperty

John Summers sued Entergy Gulf States for injuries sustained while working at its plant as an employee of subcontractor International Machine Corporation. Entergy moved for summary judgment, arguing that under Texas Labor Code sections 406.123 and 408.001 it qualified as a statutory employer entitled to workers' compensation immunity because it had provided coverage to IMC's employees. The trial court granted the motion, but the appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held that Entergy, as the plant owner rather than a general contractor that had undertaken to perform work and then subcontracted part of it, did not meet the statutory definition of general contractor under section 406.121 and therefore could not invoke the exclusive-remedy bar.

labor & employmentprocedure

This case arose from disputes over the estates of H.J. Lutcher Stark, his wife Nita Hill Stark, and his second wife Nelda C. Stark, in which the appellants (heirs of William H. Stark II) sought to reopen prior estate settlements by alleging fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and concealment of community property interests. After a 1991 settlement and release in earlier litigation, the appellees (executors of Nelda's estate and related parties) brought a declaratory judgment action to establish the release's validity and bar further claims; the appellants responded with counterclaims seeking an accounting, constructive trust, and damages. The trial court granted summary judgment to the appellees on grounds of release, res judicata, ratification, and restitution, and awarded attorney fees. The appellate court affirmed, ruling that the Declaratory Judgments Act properly allowed adjudication of the release's effect, that res judicata precluded relitigation of adjudicated issues, and that fees were authorized.

propertyprocedure

The case concerned a dispute over a $60,000 promissory note secured by a deed of trust on Dixon's business property, where Bramble sold a stream of 60 payments to First National but indorsed the full note to it before foreclosing after default. The trial court found no consideration for the note, treated the transfer as a partial assignment, held First National subject to Dixon's defenses, set aside the foreclosure sale, and voided the note and lien. First National appealed, arguing it had acquired full rights as an indorsee. The appellate court reversed and remanded, ruling that the attached indorsement transferred the entire instrument rather than creating a partial assignment, so the trial court had erred in its characterization of the transaction and the resulting remedies.

propertybusiness & regulatory

In Durham v. State, the defendant was convicted by a jury of aggravated sexual assault of a child and sentenced to sixty years in prison plus a fine. On appeal, Durham argued that the trial court erred by denying his request for a 'no adverse inference' jury instruction at the punishment phase concerning his decision not to testify. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court did err in refusing the instruction because the defendant has a constitutional right to it at the punishment stage and the request was properly preserved on the record. However, the court further concluded that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.2(a) because Durham had already testified during the guilt phase, the punishment evidence involved no new factual assertions requiring rebuttal, the jury did not impose the maximum sentence, and other mitigating factors were presented.

criminal lawprocedure

In Brooks v. State, the defendant, who had been placed on shock probation for engaging in organized criminal activity, appealed the trial court's revocation of his community supervision after finding violations of conditions requiring no new offenses, payment of monthly supervision fees, and obtaining a GED. The appellate court first clarified that the applicable standard of review is abuse of discretion rather than factual sufficiency under Clewis, because revocation proceedings are administrative in nature. It then held that the State met its burden of proving violations by a preponderance of the evidence, as the record supported findings on at least some of the alleged breaches, making it unnecessary to address all issues such as inability to pay. The court affirmed the revocation and the seven-year prison sentence, noting that proof of a single violation suffices and that challenges to the original probation conditions were not timely.

criminal lawprocedure

Billy Don Smart was convicted of a misdemeanor and placed on community supervision; the State later sought revocation based on alleged violations including failure to report and make payments. At the revocation hearing, the trial court admitted probation department business records over Smart's objection that their admission violated the Confrontation Clause under Crawford v. Washington. The court found some violations proven, revoked supervision, and imposed a jail sentence. On appeal, the court affirmed, reasoning that revocation proceedings are administrative rather than criminal prosecutions, so Crawford does not apply and due process standards from Morrissey v. Brewer govern instead.

criminal lawprocedure

In Downing v. Mark D. Larson, M.D., P.A., the plaintiff sued the defendant doctor and his practice for medical malpractice, alleging negligence in two surgeries to repair a left orbital blow-out fracture that failed to properly address muscle entrapment. The trial court struck the plaintiff's expert testimony and granted a no-evidence summary judgment in favor of the defendants. On appeal, the Court of Appeals of Texas reversed the judgment, holding that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding the expert evidence because the plastic surgeon's opinions adequately addressed the standard of care, its breach, and causation, and the expert met the qualifications for admissibility under Texas law. The case was remanded for further proceedings.

healthcareproceduretorts & liability

In Moore v. Zeller, an inmate in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice filed a civil rights lawsuit against several prison employees alleging violations related to his confinement. The trial court dismissed the suit without prejudice after finding that the plaintiff failed to comply with the procedural mandates of Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Chapter 14, which governs inmate litigation filed in forma pauperis. Specifically, Moore did not provide the required affidavit or copies of written grievance decisions from the prison administrative system, nor did he demonstrate that he filed the lawsuit within the 31-day deadline following receipt of a grievance decision. On appeal, the court affirmed the dismissal, holding that the trial court acted within its discretion under the statute and that Moore's filings in both the current and a prior related suit showed noncompliance with the exhaustion and documentation rules. The decision rested on the requirement that inmates must fully document their grievance process to allow courts to verify timely filing.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

The State of Texas petitioned to civilly commit Travis Jerome Johnson as a sexually violent predator under Chapter 841 of the Health and Safety Code, and a jury found that he suffers from a behavioral abnormality making him likely to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence. Johnson appealed the resulting commitment order, raising three issues: that the statute's venue provision violated the Texas Constitution's ban on local or special laws, that a transfer-of-jurisdiction provision was unconstitutionally vague, and that the commitment requirements violated due process by being overly broad and vague. The court of appeals affirmed the judgment, holding that the venue challenge did not implicate subject-matter jurisdiction and was waived by failure to object at trial, that the vagueness argument had already been rejected in prior precedent, and that the due-process claims were either not preserved or not properly presented on appeal.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved an interlocutory appeal challenging a trial court's order certifying a nationwide class of Compaq product purchasers who received a limited warranty that allegedly violated the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act by disclaiming implied warranties. The plaintiff sought declaratory relief and other equitable or legal remedies short of damages under the Act and Texas declaratory judgment law. The appellate court reversed the certification under Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 42(b)(1)(A) and 42(b)(2), holding that the class lacked sufficient cohesiveness. Core reasoning focused on potential conflicts between class members with working versus defective products, variations in state law remedies that could affect outcomes, and the impropriety of a mandatory class selecting non-damages remedies while abandoning damage claims.

business & regulatoryprocedure

In Savage v. Doyle, buyers who entered into a contract for deed for real property sued the sellers for breach of contract, deceptive trade practices, and fraud after the sellers allegedly failed to timely file an insurance claim for water damage to the property as required by the contract. The trial court granted summary judgment to the sellers, finding that a quitclaim deed executed by one buyer canceled the contract and released all claims. The Court of Appeals reversed the summary judgment on the breach of contract claim, reasoning that the quitclaim deed did not clearly mention or release the specific claims regarding the insurance dispute and was ambiguous as to the parties' intent, creating a material fact issue.

propertyprocedure

The case arose from a fatal single-vehicle accident on Interstate 10 caused by water pooling across the roadway after a rainstorm, with the survivors alleging that TxDOT failed to address a premises or special defect and that contractor Deavers negligently omitted required warning signs in the advance warning zone of a nearby construction project. A jury found both defendants liable, apportioning 55% fault to TxDOT, 30% to Deavers, and 15% to the deceased driver. On appeal, Deavers argued it owed no duty to warn of hazards outside the actual work zone and beyond its contractual obligations for advance construction warnings, while TxDOT contested the sufficiency of evidence regarding its knowledge of the recurring ponding condition. The court examined the construction contract terms, the Texas Tort Claims Act definitions of special defects, and the scope of duties in work zones marked by signs, ultimately addressing whether the trial evidence supported the verdicts and whether any evidentiary errors required reversal.

torts & liability

Kenneth Aust sued Conroe Independent School District for retaliation under the workers' compensation laws after he filed a claim for a knee injury sustained on the job, alleging the district eliminated his position, transferred him to another department, and reduced his salary, leading to his resignation and a constructive discharge claim. The trial court granted the district's no-evidence motion for summary judgment without a hearing. On appeal, the Court of Appeals of Texas reversed and remanded, holding that Aust produced more than a scintilla of evidence, including a supervisor's recorded statement referencing workers' compensation as a reason not to rehire him, creating a genuine issue of material fact on retaliatory intent that defeated summary judgment on the retaliation claim.

labor & employmentprocedure

The State of Texas petitioned to civilly commit George Lowe as a sexually violent predator under the Texas Health and Safety Code, and a jury found that he has a behavioral abnormality making him likely to engage in predatory sexual violence with serious difficulty controlling his behavior. The trial court entered a final judgment and order of civil commitment. On appeal, Lowe challenged the SVP statute as punitive, unconstitutionally vague in certain provisions including jurisdiction transfer under section 841.082(d), and argued that he had a Fifth Amendment right to refuse to answer deposition questions. The appellate court overruled all issues and affirmed the commitment, relying on prior precedent rejecting similar claims, finding the statutory language not vague when read in context, and holding that blanket assertions of the privilege against self-incrimination are not permitted in this civil proceeding.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure