Terrie Livingston

Sheila Marie Carnley was convicted after a bench trial of felony tampering with physical evidence under Texas Penal Code § 37.09(a)(1) and sentenced to fifteen years in prison as a repeat offender. The charge arose when, after the driver fled police on foot following a high-speed chase, Carnley drove the abandoned Pontiac away from the scene; officers stopped her less than a mile away and arrested her for moving what they considered evidence of evading arrest. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals affirmed, holding the evidence legally sufficient because Carnley admitted she knew the vehicle was evidence at a crime scene where an investigation was underway, yet intentionally drove it away, thereby impairing its availability. The court rejected her claims that the lack of an explicit order not to move the car or her claimed safety motive negated the required mental state. A dissent argued that merely relocating the car a short distance could not have affected the State’s ability to prosecute the underlying offense.

criminal law

This case was a habeas corpus proceeding in which William J. Marks challenged a trial court contempt order that sentenced him to 180 days in jail for violating prior child support orders by failing to file a parenting class certificate and notify of an address change. Marks argued the order was void because he had not knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel at the enforcement hearing. The Court of Appeals denied relief, holding that Marks had validly waived counsel. The court reasoned that the trial judge had properly admonished Marks under Texas Family Code § 157.163 about his right to an attorney (including appointed counsel if indigent), that Marks confirmed he understood those rights and elected to proceed and testify, and that the record as a whole—including prior retained counsel and a signed appearance document—demonstrated a knowing and intelligent waiver under the totality of circumstances.

family lawcriminal lawprocedure

In this condemnation case, the State of Texas and Tarrant County sought to take a ten-foot strip of Ledrec, Inc.’s property along F.M. 1187 to widen the highway, leaving only the amount of damages to the remainder property in dispute after the parties agreed on compensation for the strip itself. Ledrec’s expert valued the remainder damages at $248,000 on the theory that the front buildings would become functionally obsolete and lose all income-producing value due to their proximity to the widened road and likely future annexation by the City of Mansfield, which would impose nonconforming zoning setbacks; the State’s expert calculated only about $58,740 in damages and challenged the higher figure as remote and speculative. The trial court denied the State’s motion for partial summary judgment seeking to exclude Ledrec’s expert testimony, and the court of appeals affirmed. The appellate court held that the expert’s analysis rested on the proper legal measure of remainder damages—market value as of the date of taking, considering factors a willing buyer would reasonably account for, including probable future annexation of property already in the city’s extraterritorial jurisdiction—and that questions about the opinion’s underlying assumptions went to its weight rather than its admissibility.

propertyprocedure

In Cook v. State, David Cook was convicted by a jury of manslaughter and initially received a punishment verdict of six years’ confinement with a recommendation of community supervision (probation), after the jury had found he used his car as a deadly weapon. Following the jury’s discharge, the trial court reconvened the jurors upon learning of possible confusion over the verdict form; four jurors stated the original verdict was not what they had intended, and after further deliberation the jury returned a new verdict of six years without probation, which the court accepted and imposed. Cook appealed, arguing that the trial court lacked authority to reconvene the discharged jury and that the second verdict was invalid. The Court of Appeals of Texas reversed the punishment portion of the judgment and remanded for a new punishment trial, holding that once a jury has been discharged and dispersed, it cannot lawfully be reassembled to alter its verdict.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned whether a 1977 oil-and-gas lease encumbering land in both Tarrant and Wise Counties remained valid against the appellants, who bought the Tarrant County portion in 2001 for residential development and later sued Devon (the leaseholder’s successor) for trespass, conversion, and a declaration that the lease was unenforceable because it had not been recorded in Tarrant County at the time of purchase. The trial court granted Devon summary judgment on all claims; the court of appeals affirmed. The appellate court held that Texas Property Code § 11.001(a) permits an instrument affecting property located in more than one county to be recorded in any county where part of the land lies, and that such recording provides constructive notice to all persons as to the entire property; therefore the appellants had constructive notice of the lease and could not qualify as bona fide purchasers. The court rejected the appellants’ argument that the statute requires recording in every affected county, noting both the statutory text and long-standing case law treat recording in one qualifying county as sufficient.

propertybusiness & regulatorytorts & liability

Michael Greene pled guilty to methamphetamine possession under a plea bargain but appealed the denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized from his mobile home, arguing that the search warrant was facially defective because it omitted the address and items to be seized (incorporating them only by reference to an unprovided affidavit) and that the trial court erred by failing to issue written findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Court of Appeals of Texas affirmed the trial court's judgment. It first held that written findings were unnecessary because the trial court had made sufficient oral findings on the record at the suppression hearing, satisfying due process requirements under precedent. On the warrant issue, the court reasoned that incorporation of the affidavit satisfied the Fourth Amendment's particularity requirement, the officers' failure to provide a copy of the affidavit did not undermine the warrant's purposes or prejudice Greene, and there was no evidence the search exceeded its authorized scope.

criminal lawprocedure

In Price v. State, a Texas jury convicted Willie Charles Price, Jr. of aggravated robbery after a convenience store clerk identified him as the man who entered the store carrying a crowbar, wearing a towel over his head, and demanded money from the register. The sole issue on appeal was whether the trial court erred by admitting testimony from three victims of similar robberies, each of whom also identified Price as the perpetrator. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion under Texas Rule of Evidence 404(b). The court reasoned that defense counsel's cross-examination of the State's witnesses had raised identity as a disputed issue by challenging the reliability of the identifications, and that the extraneous offenses shared distinctive common features—such as the perpetrator's appearance, the use of a towel and weapon, the type of store, and the timing—making them admissible to prove identity rather than character conformity. The trial court had also provided a limiting instruction restricting the jury's consideration of the evidence to the issue of identity.

criminal lawprocedure

This appeal stems from a breach-of-contract suit filed by Robert Cunningham after a medical-malpractice judgment against two insured defendants. Cunningham claimed that Zurich American Insurance Company and the Texas Medical Liability Insurance Underwriting Association had entered into a binding settlement by accepting his “take-it-or-leave-it” demand for $650,000 plus funds already deposited in the court registry, in exchange for a release of claims. The insurers countered that no enforceable agreement existed because the parties never reached a meeting of the minds on whether the release would include a third doctor, Dr. Haroona, against whom Cunningham’s claims had been rejected at trial. The trial court granted summary judgment for the insurers and denied Cunningham’s cross-motion; the court of appeals affirmed, holding that the email exchanges and subsequent correspondence demonstrated a material disagreement on the scope of the release that prevented contract formation. Because the evidence conclusively negated the existence of a valid contract, summary judgment was proper.

proceduretorts & liabilityhealthcare

The case concerned a dispute between neighboring homeowners in the Sunny Meadows Addition over alleged violations of recorded deed restrictions. The Leakes, acting individually and as members of the Architectural Control Committee, sued the Campbells after the latter built a storage shed, spa cabana, and RV shelter without prior ACC approval and in ways that appeared to conflict with covenants limiting structures, prohibiting moved-in buildings, and requiring committee sign-off. The trial court granted summary judgment to the Campbells and awarded them attorney’s fees, but the Court of Appeals reversed. It held that the covenants contained an enforceable “no waiver” clause and that evidence showed the ACC’s denial of a variance was not arbitrary, capricious, or discriminatory, creating fact issues that precluded judgment for the Campbells; at the same time, the Leakes had not conclusively proven violations as to every structure, so their own summary-judgment motion was properly denied. The court therefore reversed the fee award and remanded for further proceedings.

propertyprocedure

This case involved a father's challenge to enforcement of unpaid child support by the Texas Office of the Attorney General (OAG), acting as assignee of the mother's rights under a 1994 California divorce decree. The father had signed and returned an affidavit of voluntary relinquishment of parental rights in 2000 after receiving correspondence from the mother's attorney, then stopped payments, but the termination proceeding was never completed. Nine years later the OAG sought to confirm an arrearage, and the trial court ruled that the defense of estoppel was unavailable as a matter of law. The court of appeals reversed, holding that estoppel is available against the OAG when it sues solely in its capacity as assignee rather than performing a governmental function, and remanded for a new hearing on the defense.

family lawprocedure

In Newell v. Newell, a Texas Court of Appeals case arising from a divorce, the parties agreed to joint managing conservatorship of their daughter with the mother as primary caregiver, but disputed whether the father should be subject to random alcohol testing in addition to drug testing as a condition of his possession rights. The trial court ordered both random drug and alcohol tests for up to five years, with possession restrictions if tests were failed or missed. The appellate court modified the decree to eliminate the alcohol testing requirement while upholding the drug testing, reasoning that evidence of the father's prior drug abuse supported drug testing to serve the child's best interests, but the alcohol testing exceeded what was necessary given the evidence presented.

family law

The case concerned a dispute between the University of North Texas (a state university) and the City of Denton’s municipally owned electric utility over whether UNT remained entitled to a 20% discount on base electric rates under Utilities Code section 36.351 after the September 1, 2007 expiration of a related uncodified provision in Senate Bill 7. The City sued for declaratory relief and to recover withheld payments after it stopped applying the discount, and the trial court granted summary judgment in the City’s favor. On appeal, UNT argued that sovereign immunity barred the suit because the City lacked legislative consent to sue the state. The court held that governmental immunity applied to the City’s claims for retrospective monetary relief and that the University had not waived immunity by conduct or agreement, reversing the judgment and remanding to allow the City to amend its pleadings.

business & regulatoryprocedure

In Bohannan v. State, appellant Michael Bohannan sought to appeal a trial court's order dismissing criminal charges filed against him. The appellate court notified the parties that it appeared to lack jurisdiction, as an order dismissing charges is not appealable by a defendant, and invited a response showing grounds to proceed. After Bohannan's counsel withdrew and he filed a pro se response, the court reviewed it and found no cited authority granting jurisdiction. The court dismissed the appeal, explaining that while the state may appeal dismissal of an indictment by statute, Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 25.2(a)(2) does not extend that right to defendants, so review must await the outcome of a trial.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Ernest Henry Pacheco appealing the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress blood evidence in a driving while intoxicated prosecution enhanced by prior convictions and a deadly weapon finding. After the denial, Pacheco pleaded guilty and received a 35-year sentence. The court of appeals affirmed, applying the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals' decision in State v. Johnston and holding that the blood draw was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment because a qualified medical technologist performed it using accepted hospital procedures and equipment with no evidence of unreasonable risk of harm.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned the administration of Doris Rose Preston's intestate estate following her 2005 death, with disputes centering on bank accounts that siblings Scherry Levi and Michael Preston claimed were entrusted to them for the sole benefit of Deartis Preston, her adopted son and sole heir. After years of contentious litigation involving discovery failures by Scherry and Michael, the trial court imposed death penalty sanctions, entered default judgments awarding damages and other relief to Deartis and the successor administrator, and removed Scherry as administratrix. On appeal, the Court of Appeals modified the judgments in minor respects and affirmed them as modified, holding that the sanctions were warranted after lesser measures failed, that standing and liability were properly established through deemed admissions, and that the record supported the relief granted.

family lawpropertyprocedure

The case involved a dispute over the redemption of shares in two bank holding companies, Throckmorton Bancshares and Olney Bancshares, following the death of shareholder Nan Daws. Lindley, as executor of Daws's estate, challenged the corporations' actions under shareholders' agreements that restricted stock transfers, including involuntary transfers upon death, to preserve S corporation status and limit the number of shareholders. The trial court granted summary judgment to McKnight and the corporations on Lindley's claims, including those related to breach of contract and fiduciary duty, and awarded over $200,000 in attorney's fees. The appellate court affirmed, holding that the agreements validly authorized the redemption at book value and that the estate was bound by their terms, including through its prior conduct and tax filings. The court also upheld the fee award as related to successful defenses under the agreements.

business & regulatoryproperty

In In re Aslam, Emily Aslam sought mandamus relief from a trial court order holding her in contempt for violating an agreed divorce decree that required her, as joint managing conservator, to execute HIPAA releases allowing her ex-husband Jamil access to their child's medical information. The enforcement motion alleged only that Emily had failed to execute the releases, but the trial court found her in contempt for not delivering a release to Jamil and imposed suspended confinement. The Court of Appeals of Texas held the contempt order void because it punished conduct not charged in the motion, violating due-process notice requirements, and because the decree's plain terms required only execution of the form rather than delivery. The court therefore conditionally granted mandamus relief to vacate the order.

family lawprocedure

The case involved Jeffrey William Roden, who was convicted by a jury of burglary of a habitation and sentenced to sixty years in prison after evidence showed he and another man entered an unoccupied home, stole items, and later set the house on fire. Roden appealed, arguing that the trial court should have provided an accomplice-witness instruction regarding witness Gerald Smith and that a portion of the voir dire was conducted without him present. The Court of Appeals of Texas, Fort Worth, held that Smith was not an accomplice witness requiring such an instruction because the evidence did not show he participated in the crime, and that any error from the voir dire absence was cured by subsequent proceedings in Roden's presence under article 33.03 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. Therefore, the court affirmed the trial court's judgment.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a negligence lawsuit by Pamela and John Martin against Baylor All Saints Medical Center, claiming Pamela was sexually assaulted in her hospital room after surgery. The trial court found that the plaintiffs' expert report complied with Texas law requirements for healthcare liability claims, denying the hospital's motion to dismiss. On appeal, the court reversed, holding that the expert report was deficient because it did not sufficiently describe the applicable standard of care for the hospital or how it was breached. The case was remanded to allow the plaintiffs an opportunity to cure the deficiencies in the report.

healthcareproceduretorts & liability

In Alford v. State, the defendant appealed the denial of his motion to suppress statements identifying a flash drive found in a patrol car as his property, which were made during jail intake after his arrest on drug possession charges. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision to admit the statements, ruling that they were elicited by routine booking questions rather than custodial interrogation. The core reasoning was that administrative questions to secure biographical or property information during booking fall outside Miranda requirements under both federal and state precedents, so articles 38.22 and 38.23 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure were not violated.

criminal lawprocedure