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Evans v. Allen
Texas Court of Appeals, 1st District (Houston) · 2012-02-02 · cited 13×
In Evans v. Allen, Ollie L. Evans filed a will contest more than two years after the probate court admitted William Vinson’s December 22, 2006 will to probate, seeking to set it aside in favor of an earlier will on grounds that included lack of testamentary capacity due to an ongoing guardianship and alleged fraud or forgery. The trial court granted a directed verdict for executor Betty J. Allen on the basis that the contest was untimely. The appellate court affirmed, holding that Probate Code section 93 imposes a two-year limitations period that begins to run upon admission to probate, that interested parties like Evans receive constructive notice at that time, and that neither the discovery rule nor exceptions for forgery or extrinsic fraud applied to toll the deadline in this case.
family lawprocedure
Tyco Valves & Controls, L.P. v. Colorado
Texas Court of Appeals, 1st District (Houston) · 2012-01-19 · cited 15×
The case involved former Tyco employees who sued the company for breach of contract after Tyco sold their unit, alleging they were entitled to severance pay under Retention Incentive Agreements that referenced "standard Severance" and the "severance schedule associated with the closure of this facility." The trial court ruled for the employees following a bench trial, but the Court of Appeals of Texas reversed and rendered a take-nothing judgment. The appeals court held that the state-law contract claims were preempted by the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) because the agreements expressly tied the promised benefits to an existing ERISA-governed severance plan, the amounts awarded matched those payable under the plan, and any recovery would require reference to and administration under that plan.
labor & employmentfederal power
Harris v. State
Texas Court of Appeals, 1st District (Houston) · 2012-01-05 · cited 27×
In Harris v. State, Karl Christopher Harris was convicted by a jury of the second-degree felony of failing to comply with sex offender registration requirements after missing a required quarterly verification with the Houston Police Department following his 1992 convictions for aggravated kidnapping and aggravated sexual assault; the trial court then enhanced his punishment to twenty years’ confinement. Harris appealed, arguing insufficient evidence that he intentionally or knowingly failed to verify his information on time, that the trial court vindictively imposed a harsher sentence because he exercised his right to trial, and that he was entitled to a new trial due to an unavailable transcript of a pretrial hearing. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction and sentence. It held that the evidence was sufficient because Harris had been repeatedly informed of his lifelong quarterly verification duty and the August 2008 deadline, and the State had notified him of the registration office’s relocation through mailings, posted signs, and desk instructions. The court further concluded that the vindictiveness claim was not preserved by objection and that the North Carolina v. Pearce presumption did not apply, as there had been no retrial after a successful appeal.
criminal lawprocedure
Farrar v. SABINE MANAGEMENT CORP.
Texas Court of Appeals, 1st District (Houston) · 2011-10-31 · cited 18×
The case involved a premises-liability claim by postal worker Thomas Farrar, who slipped and fell on a wheelchair ramp at a building managed by Sabine Management Corporation and Northwest Building, Ltd. Farrar alleged the ramp had been painted with a contrasting “safety paint” mixed with sand on the recommendation of an ADA consultant, creating an unreasonably slippery surface when wet, and that the defendants knew or should have known of the danger after another person slipped on the same ramp earlier the same day. The trial court granted the defendants’ no-evidence motion for summary judgment on the ground that Farrar had failed to produce evidence on the required elements of his claim. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding that the evidence—including the circumstances of the painting, the prior slip, Farrar’s own fall while wearing slip-resistant shoes, and subsequent remedial measures—raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the ramp posed an unreasonable risk of harm.
propertyproceduretorts & liability
Continental Casualty Co. v. Baker
Texas Court of Appeals, 1st District (Houston) · 2011-08-25 · cited 27×
This case involved a workers' compensation dispute in which Continental Casualty Company sought judicial review of a Texas Division of Workers' Compensation decision finding that James Baker's 2000 on-the-job knee injury extended to a meniscus tear identified on an MRI in 2005. A jury found in Baker's favor and awarded attorney fees, leading to a trial court judgment for Baker. The appellate court reversed the judgment and remanded for further proceedings, holding that the jury charge contained reversible error in its definition of producing cause. Specifically, the instruction failed to require that the workplace accident be a substantial factor in causing the injury, contrary to the Texas Supreme Court's standard in Transcontinental Insurance Co. v. Crump, and this error was harmful because causation was the sole contested issue at trial.
labor & employmentprocedure
Waterman Steamship Corp. v. Ruiz
Texas Court of Appeals, 1st District (Houston) · 2011-08-25 · cited 51×
This case involves an interlocutory appeal by Waterman Steamship Corporation and Maersk Line from the denial of their special appearances in Texas state court. Crewmembers sued the companies for negligence and unseaworthiness under the Jones Act and general maritime law, alleging injuries from a 2009 pirate hijacking of the M/V MAERSK ALABAMA off Somalia. The court granted rehearing but left the disposition unchanged, affirming in part and reversing and rendering in part. It held that the defendants, both foreign corporations with no principal places of business in Texas, lacked sufficient minimum contacts for general personal jurisdiction, and their prior actions in a related suit did not waive the jurisdictional challenge.
proceduretorts & liability
Bullseye PS III LP v. Harris County Appraisal District
Texas Court of Appeals, 1st District (Houston) · 2011-08-03 · cited 8×
The case concerned Bullseye PS III LP's challenge to the 2008 appraised market value of its Harris County storage facility property, initially set at $6,283,781 by the Harris County Appraisal District. Bullseye protested the valuation through an agent at a hearing before the Appraisal Review Board, where the agent and the district's representative agreed on that value, leading the Board to issue a final order confirming it. Bullseye then sued for judicial review in district court, alleging excessive and unequal appraisal. The trial court granted HCAD's plea to the jurisdiction and dismissed the suit, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the agreement at the protest hearing made the valuation final under Tax Code section 1.111(e) and barred further review, as the chief appraiser could delegate authority to appear and agree on behalf of the district.
taxespropertyprocedure
Ansell Healthcare Products, Inc. v. United Medical
Texas Court of Appeals, 1st District (Houston) · 2011-07-14 · cited 9×
This case involved a dispute over statutory indemnity under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Chapter 82, where United Medical, a seller of latex gloves, sought reimbursement from manufacturer Ansell for defense costs in a products liability suit filed by a plaintiff whose daughter suffered an allergic reaction. After the underlying claims were resolved through nonsuit and settlement, the trial court awarded United Medical indemnity for certain losses plus attorney’s fees following a bench trial. Ansell appealed, challenging the segregation of fees, the reasonableness of the fee award, and the lack of contingencies on appellate fees. The appellate court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the indemnity and trial-level fee awards but modified the judgment to make appellate attorney’s fees contingent on Ansell prevailing on appeal, then affirmed the judgment as modified.
torts & liability
GSF ENERGY, LLC v. Padron
Texas Court of Appeals, 1st District (Houston) · 2011-06-02 · cited 1×
This case arose from the death of Adan Padrón, who was killed by falling debris while cleaning the inside of a pressurized tank at a landfill-gas processing plant operated by GSF Energy; his family sued GSF and his employer CES for negligence and premises liability, alleging GSF retained control over the work of the independent contractor. The trial court entered judgment for the plaintiffs after a jury trial. On appeal, the court reversed the judgment and remanded for further proceedings, holding that the trial court erred in submitting the jury charge by failing to include a comparative-responsibility question based on evidence that Padrón may have contributed to the accident. The court did not reach other issues regarding control, chapter 95 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code, or damages.
torts & liabilityprocedurelabor & employment
Barnes v. State
Texas Court of Appeals, 1st District (Houston) · 2011-05-25
In Barnes v. State, the appellant pleaded guilty before a jury to aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and received a 40-year prison sentence. He appealed on the ground that the trial court violated Code of Criminal Procedure article 26.13 by failing to admonish him of the applicable punishment range, rendering his plea involuntary. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that references to the punishment range during voir dire, which occurred before the plea and in the appellant's presence, demonstrated he was aware of the consequences. It further noted that a guilty plea to the jury constitutes a jury trial, and no objection was raised at trial regarding lack of awareness.
criminal lawprocedure
Martinez v. Hays Construction, Inc.
Texas Court of Appeals, 1st District (Houston) · 2011-05-12 · cited 23×
The case involved the family of Luis Martinez, who was killed in a traffic accident with dump truck driver Delfino Bello while Bello was hauling excavated dirt from a Hays Construction worksite under a subcontracting arrangement involving multiple independent truckers. Martinez sued Hays Construction for negligent hiring, negligence per se, and vicarious liability under federal and state motor carrier regulations, among other claims. The trial court granted summary judgment to Hays Construction on all claims, but the appeals court reversed and remanded, finding that fact issues existed regarding Hays's hiring practices and oversight of the truckers, that the Texas Motor Carrier Safety Regulations could impose liability, and that not all claims had been properly presented for summary judgment.
torts & liabilityprocedurebusiness & regulatory
Gordon v. West Houston Trees, Ltd.
Texas Court of Appeals, 1st District (Houston) · 2011-04-28 · cited 77×
This case concerned a dispute over title to a tract of land in Fort Bend County, Texas, after West Houston Trees obtained a judgment lien against Gordon's father, conducted an execution sale, and purchased the property, while Gordon recorded various documents claiming a prior conveyance from his father and later sued for wrongful foreclosure. The trial court granted summary judgment to West Houston Trees on Gordon's wrongful foreclosure claim, its own suit to quiet title, and a claim for filing fraudulent documents. The appellate court affirmed the rulings on the title and foreclosure issues, reasoning that the abstract of judgment created a valid superior lien, the purchase and sale agreement did not convey title, and Gordon's recorded instruments were invalid clouds on title. It reversed the fraudulent document ruling, however, because there was insufficient evidence that Gordon knew the filings were fraudulent, and remanded that claim.
propertyprocedure
Enterprise Products Partners, L.P. v. Mitchell
Texas Court of Appeals, 1st District (Houston) · 2011-04-06 · cited 19×
The case arose from a 2007 liquid propane pipeline explosion in rural Mississippi that killed two people, injured seven others, and caused property damage, leading Mississippi-resident plaintiffs to sue Texas-based defendants Enterprise and Dixie in a Texas court. The defendants sought application of Mississippi law, which imposes a $1 million cap on noneconomic damages, while the plaintiffs contended Texas law should govern compensatory damages. The appeals court applied the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws most-significant-relationship test, weighing factors including the companies' principal place of business and operational control in Texas, the pipeline's manufacture in Texas, and the defendants' minimal presence in Mississippi. It concluded Texas had the stronger connection to the damages issue and affirmed the trial court's interlocutory order applying Texas law.
torts & liabilityprocedure
Cernosek Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Mont Belvieu
Texas Court of Appeals, 1st District (Houston) · 2011-03-10 · cited 13×
This case arose from a 2007 settlement between the City of Mont Belvieu and Enterprise allowing underground hydrocarbon storage wells after prior litigation, which Hill Lumber (a local business) challenged for allegedly violating city ordinances on permits and zoning, the Open Meetings Act, due-process rights, and inverse condemnation, while also asserting tort claims against Enterprise. Hill Lumber sought to revoke the permits, enjoin operations, and obtain damages, arguing that required owner consents within 2,500 feet and proper notices were not obtained. The trial court granted pleas to the jurisdiction and special exceptions. The Court of Appeals affirmed, reasoning that Hill Lumber lacked standing because it alleged only generalized community interests rather than particularized injury, the ordinances created no private right of action, the City could grant exceptions, and the meetings satisfied notice requirements.
business & regulatoryprocedure
Aspenwood Apartment Corp. v. Coinmach, Inc.
Texas Court of Appeals, 1st District (Houston) · 2011-02-10 · cited 20×
In Aspenwood Apartment Corp. v. Coinmach, Inc., the dispute centered on whether a 1980 lease for coin-operated laundry equipment in an apartment complex survived a 1994 foreclosure sale and subsequent purchase by Aspenwood, which sought to evict Coinmach and claimed the lease was terminated, while Coinmach maintained the lease was binding and remained on the premises. The trial court granted Coinmach summary judgment dismissing Aspenwood's breach of contract and DTPA claims. The appellate court affirmed those dismissals, reasoning that the foreclosure terminated the lease and Aspenwood was not a DTPA consumer, but reversed and remanded on the trespass, trespass to try title, tortious interference, and declaratory judgment claims after finding Coinmach was a tenant at sufferance following the lease termination.
propertybusiness & regulatorytorts & liability
Hot-Hed, Inc. v. Safehouse Habitats (Scotland), Ltd.
Texas Court of Appeals, 1st District (Houston) · 2011-01-24 · cited 39×
The case involved a dispute between Hot-Hed, Inc., which had used and registered the mark 'Habitat' for inflatable welding enclosures since the 1990s, and Safehouse Habitats, which began selling similar products under names including 'habitat' in 2002. Hot-Hed sued for common-law and statutory trademark infringement under Texas law, while Safehouse counterclaimed for a declaratory judgment that the term 'habitat' was generic or descriptive and ineligible for trademark protection, along with cancellation of Hot-Hed's state registration. After a jury found the mark ineligible for protection, the trial court entered declaratory relief and awarded attorney's fees to Safehouse but declined to cancel the registration or issue orders regarding federal USPTO proceedings. The appellate court modified and affirmed the judgment, upholding the determination of ineligibility based on evidence that the term was commonly used descriptively in the industry without secondary meaning, and confirming the fee award under the UDJA while addressing procedural issues like post-judgment interest.
business & regulatoryprocedure
Livanos v. Livanos
Texas Court of Appeals, 1st District (Houston) · 2010-12-30 · cited 27×
In this case, a father filed a petition under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction seeking the return of his minor son from Texas after the mother allegedly wrongfully removed the child from Greece in violation of Greek custody orders. The trial court entered a default judgment against the mother, who did not appear, ordering the child's return and awarding the father over $68,000 in attorney's fees and costs. The mother appealed, arguing defects in service of process that rendered the default order void and violated due process. The appellate court reversed the judgment, holding that the record showed improper service and return of citation under Texas rules, which apply even in expedited Hague Convention proceedings, and remanded for a new trial.
family lawprocedure
KEW v. State
Texas Court of Appeals, 1st District (Houston) · 2010-12-30
In K.E.W. v. State, the appellant challenged trial court orders for temporary inpatient mental health services and administration of psychoactive medication under the Texas Mental Health Code after he was hospitalized following expressions of delusions about impregnating multiple women, including his adult stepdaughter, while diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder. The Texas Supreme Court had previously ruled the evidence legally sufficient to support the orders and remanded for review of factual sufficiency. On remand, the Court of Appeals examined the full record, including testimony from treating physicians about K.E.W.'s statements, agitation, and perceived risk of harm to women. The court affirmed both orders, concluding that the evidence permitted the factfinder to form a firm belief that K.E.W. was likely to cause serious harm to others.
civil rightshealthcare
Henry v. Masson
Texas Court of Appeals, 1st District (Houston) · 2010-12-30 · cited 112×
This case arose from bitter disputes between two doctors who formed a limited liability partnership for their orthopedic surgery practice, leading to multiple lawsuits alleging breaches of contract, fraud, fiduciary duties, and other claims involving partnership management and a real estate investment called the Hepburn Estates. The parties mediated and executed a Settlement Agreement to wind up the partnership, physically separate their practices, and transfer the property in exchange for $150,000. A jury found that Henry materially breached the agreement first, and the trial court awarded Masson $75,000 in damages while granting summary judgment to Masson on Henry's property claims based on releases in the agreement. On appeal, the court held the evidence legally sufficient to support the breach finding and damages but concluded the trial court erred in the summary judgments, entitling Henry to an offset or return of the property, and it affirmed in part while reversing and remanding on those issues after also addressing jurisdiction and cross-appeals.
business & regulatorypropertyprocedure
Sedeno v. Mijares
Texas Court of Appeals, 1st District (Houston) · 2010-12-23 · cited 4×
In Sedeno v. Mijares, the plaintiff sued a physician and his professional association for sexual assault, intentional infliction of emotional distress, gross negligence, and (in later amendments) ordinary negligence, alleging the association failed to supervise the physician, maintain safe premises, and protect patients during medical visits. The association moved to dismiss under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 74.351, arguing the claims were health care liability claims requiring a timely expert report that the plaintiff never served. The trial court denied the motion, but the Court of Appeals reversed and ordered dismissal, reasoning that the negligence allegations against the association rested on lapses in professional judgment regarding patient monitoring, employee supervision, and safety protocols integral to the rendition of health care. The court rejected attempts to recast the claims as non-health-care matters and confirmed that the expert-report deadline ran from the filing of the first petition raising such claims.
criminal lawhealthcareproceduretorts & liability