The case concerned Jeremy Jaynes's convictions under Virginia Code § 18.2-152.3:1 for sending over 10,000 unsolicited bulk emails per day with falsified routing information to AOL subscribers from his home in North Carolina. The trial court denied motions challenging jurisdiction, the dormant Commerce Clause, vagueness, and the First Amendment, and a jury found him guilty on three counts, resulting in a nine-year sentence. On appeal, the Virginia Supreme Court held that the statute was unconstitutionally overbroad on its face because it criminalized the anonymous sending of all unsolicited bulk emails, including those containing political, religious, or other protected speech. The court rejected a proposed narrowing construction as an impermissible rewriting of the statute and therefore reversed the Court of Appeals' judgment and vacated the convictions.
This case involved a dispute over custody of a minor child, BC, after the Lynchburg Division of Social Services removed her from her parents' home based on allegations of abuse, including claims of child pornography and neglect, leading to foster care proceedings and competing custody petitions from the parents and grandparents. The Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court and circuit court awarded custody to the grandparents, a decision affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed, holding that the lower courts failed to apply the proper statutory standards under Code §§ 16.1-278.2 and related provisions for determining custody and under Code § 16.1-278.19 for attorney's fees, which requires consideration of the parties' relative financial abilities rather than a non-statutory reasonableness test. The court remanded the case for further proceedings applying those standards, while leaving temporary custody with the grandparents pending resolution.
This case involved Thomas Alexander Porter's appeal of his capital murder conviction and death sentence from the Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk. Porter was convicted by a jury of capital murder for fatally shooting a police officer during an encounter after an argument in an apartment, along with related firearm and larceny charges; the jury found the aggravating factor of future dangerousness and imposed a death sentence, which the trial court entered. On direct review under Virginia Code § 17.1-313, the Supreme Court of Virginia considered Porter's assignments of error regarding trial procedures, evidence, and sentencing issues but found no reversible error in the record or arguments. The court therefore affirmed the convictions and the sentence of death.
The case concerned the Commonwealth of Virginia's petition to civilly commit Kenneth Edward Jackson as a sexually violent predator under the SVPA following his conviction for aggravated sexual battery. After a probable cause hearing, the circuit court dismissed the petition, concluding that the evidence, including conflicting expert opinions, did not establish probable cause. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the dismissal, holding that the circuit court properly acted within its role at the probable cause stage without improperly weighing evidence as a trier of fact.
This case involved a claim by Vickie Barker, the surviving spouse of a Pittsylvania County deputy sheriff who died of a heart attack while on duty in 2004, seeking death benefits and health insurance under the Virginia Line of Duty Act (Code §§ 9.1-400 et seq.). The Comptroller denied the claim, citing a pre-employment physical that noted hypertension and arguing that this barred the statutory presumption of occupational disease under Code § 65.2-402. The circuit court ruled in Barker's favor and awarded $75,000 plus benefits, but on appeal the Supreme Court of Virginia held that the presumption applied because the deputy died from heart disease, a condition separate from the noted hypertension, and that the Comptroller had not overcome the presumption. The Court therefore reversed the $75,000 award, entered judgment for the $25,000 amount available under former Code § 9.1-402(B), and affirmed the award of health insurance benefits under Code § 9.1-401.
The case involved homeowners in Newport News subdivisions who sued the city for inverse condemnation, alleging that the city's permitting of upstream development increased stormwater runoff into an undersized drainage system, causing repeated flooding of their properties, including severe damage during Hurricane Floyd in 1999. The circuit court sustained the city's demurrer, ruling that the complaint failed to state a claim and that Code § 8.01-187 provided the exclusive remedy for such takings claims against a municipality. The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed, holding that Article I, Section 11 of the Virginia Constitution is self-executing and creates a direct cause of action for inverse condemnation that is not superseded or limited by the statutory procedure. The court reasoned that the statute supplies an additional remedy rather than displacing the constitutional claim, as the General Assembly did not expressly indicate an intent to make it exclusive. The case was remanded for further proceedings on the merits of the takings claim.