The case concerned an appeal by plaintiff Laura Revolinsky challenging the district court’s denial of her attorneys’ request for additional fees from a $15 million class settlement in multidistrict litigation over the marketing and safety of Seresto flea and tick collars. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of Revolinsky’s separate post-settlement motion seeking compensation for pre-MDL work and untimely reported time and expenses. The court held that the district court acted within its discretion by enforcing its earlier Case Management Order No. 4, which required Class Counsel’s advance approval for compensable work, monthly time submissions, and generally limited recovery to post-leadership-appointment efforts unless Class Counsel exercised discretion to include earlier common-benefit time. Revolinsky’s attorneys had received notice of these rules, did not object to them or to the fee application that excluded the disputed time, and filed their motion well after the deadlines for objections to the fee award had passed. The court noted that any reallocation would necessarily reduce payments to other firms from the fixed fee pool, and it distinguished the unchallenged total fee award from the internal allocation dispute among plaintiffs’ counsel.
The case concerned an appeal by plaintiff Laura Revolinsky challenging the district court’s denial of her attorneys’ request for additional fees from a $15 million class settlement in multidistrict litigation over the marketing and safety of Seresto flea and tick collars. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of Revolinsky’s separate post-settlement motion seeking compensation for pre-MDL work and untimely reported time and expenses. The court held that the district court acted within its discretion by enforcing its earlier Case Management Order No. 4, which required Class Counsel’s advance approval for compensable work, monthly time submissions, and generally limited recovery to post-leadership-appointment efforts unless Class Counsel exercised discretion to include earlier common-benefit time. Revolinsky’s attorneys had received notice of these rules, did not object to them or to the fee application that excluded the disputed time, and filed their motion well after the deadlines for objections to the fee award had passed. The court noted that any reallocation would necessarily reduce payments to other firms from the fixed fee pool, and it distinguished the unchallenged total fee award from the internal allocation dispute among plaintiffs’ counsel.
The case concerned a dispute between employer Penske Truck Leasing and the Central States multiemployer pension plan over Penske’s withdrawal liability. Penske had aligned the expiration dates of multiple collective bargaining agreements to potentially reduce its liability by tens of millions of dollars; in response, the plan’s trustees voted to expel one bargaining unit (Local 745) unless Penske agreed to treat any 2022 withdrawal as occurring in 2021. Penske sued to block the expulsion, while the plan counterclaimed for a declaratory judgment on the withdrawal date. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings that the trustees had authority under the Trust Agreement to expel the unit, that their decision was not arbitrary or capricious, and that the counterclaim must first proceed to arbitration under 29 U.S.C. § 1401 before federal court review. The court applied deferential review to the trustees’ reasonable interpretation of the agreement and held that the statute requires arbitration of withdrawal liability disputes prior to judicial resolution.
The case involved a dispute between employer Penske Truck Leasing and the Central States multiemployer pension plan over withdrawal liability under the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act. Penske aligned the expiration dates of its collective bargaining agreements with multiple unions to trigger a single complete withdrawal (rather than partial withdrawals plus a complete one), potentially saving tens of millions of dollars; the plan responded by threatening to expel one bargaining unit (Local 745) unless Penske agreed to treat any 2022 withdrawal as occurring in 2021, prompting Penske to sue for an injunction and the plan to counterclaim for a declaratory judgment on the withdrawal date. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the plan on Penske’s claims and its dismissal of the counterclaim. It held that the plan’s Trust Agreement granted trustees discretionary authority to interpret its terms and to expel a participating employer or group when their arrangements threatened economic harm or actuarial soundness, that the trustees’ decision to expel Local 745 was reasonable and not arbitrary or capricious, and that the counterclaim concerning the precise withdrawal date must first proceed to arbitration under 29 U.S.C. § 1401 before federal court review.
In United States v. McKay, defendant Dennis McKay appealed one condition of his supervised release after pleading guilty to Hobbs Act robberies and a firearm offense. The condition (Special Condition 13) allowed a probation officer to require McKay to notify third parties if the officer determined he posed a "risk" to them, including details of his criminal history. The Seventh Circuit held that McKay had not waived the challenge, because his counsel's statement at sentencing—when the district court specifically asked about the condition—constituted a sufficient objection that preserved the issue, and Yee v. City of Escondido permits new legal arguments supporting a preserved claim on appeal. The court then vacated the condition and remanded for further proceedings, reasoning that its undefined terms rendered it impermissibly vague under circuit precedent.
In Nikko D'Ambrosio v. Meta Platforms, Inc., the plaintiff sued Meta, a woman he briefly dated and her parents, and the operators of a large Facebook group for women discussing Chicago-area dates, alleging that posts sharing his photos along with comments about his clingy behavior and a vulgar text he sent after a breakup violated the Illinois Right of Publicity Act, the Doxing Act, and other state-law claims for defamation and privacy invasion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the Second Amended Complaint with prejudice under Rule 12(b)(6). It held that the posts did not use D'Ambrosio's likeness for a commercial purpose under the IRPA, that the allegations failed to meet the Doxing Act's requirements of intent or reckless disregard of likely severe harm such as stalking or bodily injury, and that the remaining claims were not plausibly pled. The court separately ordered D'Ambrosio and his counsel to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed for pursuing a frivolous appeal against the ex-girlfriend and her parents and for filing a brief containing fictitious quotations and citations.