Deference to government powerSkepticism of government power
Enforces constitutional limits on state action in [6] by invalidating school-access order under Article VIII §7, while upholding local ordinances and convictions elsewhere. Tanner v. City of Virginia Beach ↗ Com. v. Doe ↗
David Ligon sued Goochland County under the whistleblower protection provision of the Virginia Fraud Against Taxpayers Act, alleging he was terminated from his job in the county's Building and Grounds Department because he reported his supervisor's misuse of county property and employees for personal projects. The circuit court sustained the county's demurrer and dismissed the claim. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed, ruling that the doctrine of sovereign immunity protects the county and its political subdivisions from liability unless a statute contains an express waiver. The court held that the VFATA lacks any such explicit waiver allowing employees of the Commonwealth or its subdivisions to sue their employers for retaliatory discharge.
The case involved a dispute among members of an LLC formed to develop water rights, in which the plaintiffs claimed that one member's attempt to exercise an option to purchase land within a protected area breached the non-compete clause of the operating agreement. The parties' agreement required arbitration of any dispute regarding the LLC, and the arbitrators awarded the land option to the member subject to granting the LLC an easement for water rights. The circuit court confirmed the award, and the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed on appeal, holding that the broad arbitration clause authorized the arbitrators to interpret the clause and that they did not exceed their powers under the Federal Arbitration Act merely by adopting a particular interpretation of its terms.
This case involved Ronald Lee Jones's conviction for unreasonably refusing a blood or breath test under Virginia's implied consent law after his arrest for driving under the influence. The central issues were whether a defendant's refusal to perform field sobriety tests could be considered as evidence supporting probable cause for the DUI arrest and whether the evidence overall was sufficient to establish such probable cause. The Virginia Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that the refusal was admissible as circumstantial evidence of consciousness of guilt and that the officer's observations—including the odor of alcohol, glassy and red eyes, slurred speech, and inconsistent statements—combined with the refusal provided probable cause. The Court reasoned that prior precedent permitted similar refusals to be treated as tacit admissions in other contexts, supporting their use in the probable cause analysis.
The case concerned whether Bea Antisdel, appointed as administrator of her deceased son's estate solely to pursue a wrongful death action under Virginia Code § 8.01-50, had standing to assert survival claims for personal injuries on behalf of the estate. The circuit court granted the defendants' pleas in bar, ruling that Antisdel lacked standing because her appointment order expressly limited her authority to wrongful death claims and declined to retroactively expand that authority via a nunc pro tunc order. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed, holding that the clerk's appointment accurately reflected Antisdel's own limited request and oath, and that nunc pro tunc relief cannot create fiduciary powers that never existed. The Court also rejected arguments that the defendants waived the standing issue or that the clerk lacked authority to limit the appointment, noting that survival and wrongful death claims are distinct and that this action was separate from prior nonsuited proceedings.
This case involved Douglas Michael Brown, Jr., who was convicted of involuntary manslaughter after fleeing police in a high-speed chase following traffic violations, during which a pursuing officer's cruiser struck and killed another driver at an intersection. The Virginia Supreme Court affirmed the conviction on appeal from the Court of Appeals, holding that the evidence was sufficient to establish that Brown's conduct was the proximate cause of the death. The court reasoned that Brown's criminal negligence in eluding officers at speeds up to 110 mph set a foreseeable chain of events in motion, and the officer's pursuit actions were an intervening cause rather than a superseding one that would break the causal link. The analysis applied common-law elements of involuntary manslaughter without addressing the reasonableness of the police conduct itself.
This case involved Chauncey Lamont Montague's appeal of his convictions for possession of cocaine, possession of a firearm by a felon, possession of a firearm with cocaine, and assault and battery on a law enforcement officer. Montague challenged the denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained after police officers approached him at an apartment complex, asked for identifying information, and checked for outstanding warrants, arguing that the interaction constituted an unlawful seizure under the Fourth Amendment. He also contested the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his assault conviction. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision, holding that the encounter was consensual because Montague voluntarily provided information and did not attempt to leave, and that the evidence of Montague pushing and striking an officer during the arrest was sufficient to establish assault and battery with intent to harm. The court reasoned that the officers' actions in obtaining warrant information while waiting did not transform the voluntary interaction into a seizure.
