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Decision levers
AI-measured from their own opinions — each lever cites its cases
Willing to revisit precedentStrong stare decisis
Repeatedly states 'we are bound by precedent' in [3] and applies SCOTUS holding in Randolph directly in [5] without questioning it. State v. Yencer ↗ State v. Broussard ↗
The case concerned whether the arrest of defendant Julie Yencer for driving while impaired by a Davidson College campus police officer violated the Establishment Clause because the college's religious affiliation made the statutory delegation of state police power under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 74G unconstitutional. The trial court denied the motion to suppress, finding Davidson not to be a religious institution, and Yencer pled guilty while preserving the issue for appeal. The Court of Appeals held that it was bound by precedent treating Campbell University and Pfeiffer University as religious institutions, and therefore concluded that Davidson College is likewise a religious institution; applying the Lemon test, the court focused on whether the delegation created excessive government entanglement with religion.
In State v. Ligon, the defendant was convicted of first-degree sexual exploitation of a minor and taking indecent liberties with a child after police discovered photographs he took of a five-year-old girl, A.B., showing her sitting with legs spread and one image pulling aside her shorts to reveal the crotch area; the photos were taken after the defendant's dog scratched the child, and the defendant claimed they were for documentation to avoid lawsuits. The court reversed the sexual exploitation conviction, holding that the images did not meet the statutory definition of "sexual activity" under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-190.16 because lighting prevented clear visibility of private parts and the statute must be strictly construed without broadening it to cover this conduct. The court upheld the indecent liberties conviction, finding sufficient evidence that the defendant took the photos for sexual gratification based on his statements to police. The decision emphasized that the legislature could have criminalized such behavior if intended but did not.
This case involved a defendant charged with robbery with a dangerous weapon and first-degree murder who was retried after a mistrial was declared in his initial noncapital trial due to the state's failure to provide discovery. The defendant moved to dismiss the second trial on double jeopardy grounds but was convicted, and he appealed the denial of that motion. The court dismissed the appeal, holding that the defendant failed to preserve his double jeopardy claim by not objecting to the trial court's declaration of a mistrial. The reasoning relied on precedent that in noncapital cases, a defendant waives such a claim by failing to object when the trial is terminated by mistrial, and the defendant had opportunities to object here but did not.
In Davis v. Swan, the plaintiff sought joint legal and physical custody of the biological child of her former domestic partner, the defendant, after the couple had planned the pregnancy together through IVF, shared parenting responsibilities before and after separation, and presented themselves as co-parents. The trial court granted the plaintiff joint legal custody and secondary physical custody after applying the best-interest-of-the-child standard. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the defendant had acted inconsistently with her constitutionally protected parental rights by jointly creating a family unit, fostering the plaintiff's parent-like relationship with the child, appointing the plaintiff as guardian in her will, executing powers of attorney, and sharing decision-making and financial duties. These uncontested findings established that the defendant intended the relationship to be permanent, allowing the best-interest standard to govern the custody dispute rather than a presumption favoring the biological parent. The court did not reach the defendant's remaining arguments once the threshold constitutional issue was resolved in favor of applying the best-interest test.
The case involved a dispute over title to real property where the plaintiff had filed a notice of lis pendens after suing the initial grantee for fraudulent conveyance. The grantee then encumbered the property with a deed of trust to the defendants, but a consent judgment later restored title to the plaintiff. The trial court dismissed the plaintiff's action to quiet title against the defendants, but the appellate court reversed, holding that the properly filed lis pendens bound subsequent encumbrancers to the judgment resolving the title dispute.
In Frank v. Savage, plaintiffs Tamera Frank and Peter Franklin alleged that the Yancey County Board of Commissioners improperly revoked their appointments to the county DSS Board of Directors after a change in board membership, claiming violations of North Carolina open meetings and appointment statutes as well as due process rights. The trial court granted defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motion and dismissed the complaint. The Court of Appeals reversed in part, holding that the complaint sufficiently stated statutory claims against the Board upon which relief could be granted, but affirmed dismissal of the due process claims because plaintiffs failed to allege the absence of an adequate state remedy.