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In Re the Estate of Kirkes
Court of Appeals of Arizona · 2012-03-08 · cited 1×
The case concerned the probate of Fred Kirkes’s estate after his death, specifically whether his widow Gail was automatically entitled to half of a community-property IRA under its beneficiary designation (which gave her 17% and his son Joshua 83%) or whether the division should instead be evaluated in the aggregate across all community assets. The trial court granted Gail partial summary judgment, invalidating the designation to the extent it gave Joshua more than half the IRA. The Arizona Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Arizona follows the aggregate theory of community-property division for non-probate transfers such as IRA beneficiary designations, that A.R.S. § 14-3916 permits consideration of non-probate transfers to achieve equal value, and that the decedent’s intent should be given effect consistent with the surviving spouse’s fiduciary-protected interest. The court remanded for further proceedings to determine whether the designation constituted a fraud on Gail’s community-property rights.
family lawproperty
State v. Simon
Court of Appeals of Arizona · 2012-02-16 · cited 5×
In State v. Simon, the State of Arizona brought a special action challenging a justice court judge’s orders that barred prosecutors from using blood alcohol content (BAC) test results as evidence in several DUI cases under A.R.S. § 28-1381(A)(1), because the state had not completed the testing by a case-management conference deadline. The Arizona Court of Appeals accepted special-action jurisdiction in part, vacated the preclusion orders in five of the six cases, and held that the trial judge had abused his discretion. The court reasoned that the local Pima County Justice Court rules expressly preserve the disclosure procedures of Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure 15.1 and 15.6 and do not authorize a blanket preclusion sanction for late BAC reports outside that framework. The decision emphasized that any discovery sanctions must follow the established statewide rules rather than an ad-hoc deadline.
criminal lawprocedure
Freeport McMoran Corp. v. Langley Eden Farms, LLC
Court of Appeals of Arizona · 2011-12-16 · cited 16×
In this case, Freeport McMoRan sought a declaratory judgment that its planned sulfur trans-load facility, located about twenty miles from its copper mine in Graham County, was exempt from county zoning ordinances under A.R.S. § 11-812(A)(2) because the facility would support mining operations; adjacent landowner Langley Eden Farms counterclaimed on the exemption issue and added nuisance and invasion claims. The trial court granted Freeport declaratory relief after an evidentiary hearing, finding the facility exempt, and later entered summary judgment against Langley on the remaining claims. On appeal, the Arizona Court of Appeals vacated those rulings and remanded with instructions to dismiss the action. The court held that the parties were required to exhaust administrative remedies by first seeking a zoning interpretation or variance from the county board of adjustment under A.R.S. § 11-816 before filing suit, following the exhaustion doctrine applied in Minor v. Cochise County and the statutory framework for county zoning disputes. Because the administrative process had not been pursued, the trial court lacked authority to decide the exemption or related claims.
business & regulatorypropertyproceduretorts & liability
In Re Pima County Mental Health No. Mh Xxxx-X-Xx
Court of Appeals of Arizona · 2011-11-30 · cited 2×
This case involved an appeal from a trial court order for involuntary inpatient mental health treatment for up to 180 days, after it found that the appellant was persistently or acutely disabled due to a mental disorder, a danger to himself and others, and in need of treatment he would not accept voluntarily. The Arizona Court of Appeals vacated the order and remanded for further proceedings, holding that the trial court erred in finding the appellant had knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to be present at the second day of the hearing. The court reasoned that due process in involuntary treatment cases requires the patient’s presence at hearings under A.R.S. § 36-539(B), that waiver of this right cannot be presumed from mere absence without evidence of notice and a knowing, intelligent decision, and that the appellant had received no personal notice of the continued hearing date while the trial court’s own findings on his capacity to waive rights were inconsistent.
civil rightshealthcareprocedure
Motzer v. Escalante
Court of Appeals of Arizona · 2011-11-22 · cited 19×
In Motzer v. Escalante, Robin Motzer sued the Escalantes for breach of contract and unjust enrichment arising from a home remodeling project, while the Escalantes asserted counterclaims; the trial court dismissed the contract claim because Motzer lacked a required contractor license, and a jury ultimately awarded Motzer a net recovery of about $5,900. The trial court found Motzer the successful party for purposes of costs, awarded her some but not all requested costs, and denied attorney fees to both sides. On appeal, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of attorney fees under A.R.S. § 12-341.01, holding that the trial court had a reasonable basis for exercising its discretion after considering the totality of circumstances, including a settlement offer and the parties' partial successes, without any presumption in favor of an award. The court reversed the denial of $444.10 in deposition costs as taxable under A.R.S. § 12-332(A) but affirmed the denial of jury notebook expenses because they were not incurred pursuant to a court order. It awarded Motzer appellate costs but denied her request for attorney fees on appeal.
business & regulatoryprocedure
Chavez v. ARIZONA SCHOOL RISK RETENTION
Court of Appeals of Arizona · 2011-05-18
This case involved parents of two minor students injured while waiting to board a school bus who sued the Arizona School Risk Retention Trust for underinsured motorist (UIM) benefits under the school district's motor vehicle liability policy. The trial court granted summary judgment to the Trust, but the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding that the students qualified as insureds entitled to UIM coverage. The court reasoned that Arizona statutes require UIM coverage to extend to all persons insured under the liability policy, including permissive users of the vehicle, and that the students were 'using' the specialized school bus with permission because they were waiting in line to board while its safety features were active.
torts & liability