Joseph W. Howard

The case concerned the probate of Fred Kirkes’s estate after his death, specifically whether his widow Gail was automatically entitled to half of a community-property IRA under its beneficiary designation (which gave her 17% and his son Joshua 83%) or whether the division should instead be evaluated in the aggregate across all community assets. The trial court granted Gail partial summary judgment, invalidating the designation to the extent it gave Joshua more than half the IRA. The Arizona Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Arizona follows the aggregate theory of community-property division for non-probate transfers such as IRA beneficiary designations, that A.R.S. § 14-3916 permits consideration of non-probate transfers to achieve equal value, and that the decedent’s intent should be given effect consistent with the surviving spouse’s fiduciary-protected interest. The court remanded for further proceedings to determine whether the designation constituted a fraud on Gail’s community-property rights.

family lawproperty

In State v. Simon, the State of Arizona brought a special action challenging a justice court judge’s orders that barred prosecutors from using blood alcohol content (BAC) test results as evidence in several DUI cases under A.R.S. § 28-1381(A)(1), because the state had not completed the testing by a case-management conference deadline. The Arizona Court of Appeals accepted special-action jurisdiction in part, vacated the preclusion orders in five of the six cases, and held that the trial judge had abused his discretion. The court reasoned that the local Pima County Justice Court rules expressly preserve the disclosure procedures of Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure 15.1 and 15.6 and do not authorize a blanket preclusion sanction for late BAC reports outside that framework. The decision emphasized that any discovery sanctions must follow the established statewide rules rather than an ad-hoc deadline.

criminal lawprocedure

In this case, Freeport McMoRan sought a declaratory judgment that its planned sulfur trans-load facility, located about twenty miles from its copper mine in Graham County, was exempt from county zoning ordinances under A.R.S. § 11-812(A)(2) because the facility would support mining operations; adjacent landowner Langley Eden Farms counterclaimed on the exemption issue and added nuisance and invasion claims. The trial court granted Freeport declaratory relief after an evidentiary hearing, finding the facility exempt, and later entered summary judgment against Langley on the remaining claims. On appeal, the Arizona Court of Appeals vacated those rulings and remanded with instructions to dismiss the action. The court held that the parties were required to exhaust administrative remedies by first seeking a zoning interpretation or variance from the county board of adjustment under A.R.S. § 11-816 before filing suit, following the exhaustion doctrine applied in Minor v. Cochise County and the statutory framework for county zoning disputes. Because the administrative process had not been pursued, the trial court lacked authority to decide the exemption or related claims.

business & regulatorypropertyproceduretorts & liability

This case involved an appeal from a trial court order for involuntary inpatient mental health treatment for up to 180 days, after it found that the appellant was persistently or acutely disabled due to a mental disorder, a danger to himself and others, and in need of treatment he would not accept voluntarily. The Arizona Court of Appeals vacated the order and remanded for further proceedings, holding that the trial court erred in finding the appellant had knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to be present at the second day of the hearing. The court reasoned that due process in involuntary treatment cases requires the patient’s presence at hearings under A.R.S. § 36-539(B), that waiver of this right cannot be presumed from mere absence without evidence of notice and a knowing, intelligent decision, and that the appellant had received no personal notice of the continued hearing date while the trial court’s own findings on his capacity to waive rights were inconsistent.

civil rightshealthcareprocedure

In Motzer v. Escalante, Robin Motzer sued the Escalantes for breach of contract and unjust enrichment arising from a home remodeling project, while the Escalantes asserted counterclaims; the trial court dismissed the contract claim because Motzer lacked a required contractor license, and a jury ultimately awarded Motzer a net recovery of about $5,900. The trial court found Motzer the successful party for purposes of costs, awarded her some but not all requested costs, and denied attorney fees to both sides. On appeal, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of attorney fees under A.R.S. § 12-341.01, holding that the trial court had a reasonable basis for exercising its discretion after considering the totality of circumstances, including a settlement offer and the parties' partial successes, without any presumption in favor of an award. The court reversed the denial of $444.10 in deposition costs as taxable under A.R.S. § 12-332(A) but affirmed the denial of jury notebook expenses because they were not incurred pursuant to a court order. It awarded Motzer appellate costs but denied her request for attorney fees on appeal.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involved parents of two minor students injured while waiting to board a school bus who sued the Arizona School Risk Retention Trust for underinsured motorist (UIM) benefits under the school district's motor vehicle liability policy. The trial court granted summary judgment to the Trust, but the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding that the students qualified as insureds entitled to UIM coverage. The court reasoned that Arizona statutes require UIM coverage to extend to all persons insured under the liability policy, including permissive users of the vehicle, and that the students were 'using' the specialized school bus with permission because they were waiting in line to board while its safety features were active.

torts & liability

The case concerned whether amendments to A.R.S. § 9-821.01, which barred partisan municipal elections and limited voting in ward-based elections to residents of the relevant district, applied to the City of Tucson or were superseded by the city's charter provisions allowing partisan at-large elections. The trial court granted summary judgment to the state, but the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded. The court held that, under the Arizona Constitution, charter cities enjoy autonomy over matters of solely local concern, and the method and manner of conducting municipal elections qualifies as such a local matter, so conflicting state statutes do not control. The opinion examined the city charter's incorporation of state election laws and concluded that the charter provisions prevailed over the 2009 amendments.

elections

In State v. Martinez, the petitioner challenged the trial court's summary denial of his second Rule 32 petition for post-conviction relief after pleading guilty to armed robbery and related dangerous-nature offenses. Martinez raised claims including breach of the plea agreement by the state and ineffective assistance of his of-right Rule 32 counsel for failing to assert certain arguments about the plea, sentencing, and restitution. The trial court had ruled the claims precluded under Rule 32.2(a)(2) as previously adjudicated and premature under Rule 32.4(a) prior to resentencing. The appellate court held that the claim of ineffective assistance by prior Rule 32 counsel was neither precluded nor premature because the necessary events had already occurred and Rule 32 does not bar such a filing before resentencing, remanding for further proceedings while upholding preclusion on the plea-breach claim.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Sprang, the defendant was charged with first-degree murder after evidence showed she was seen with the victim at a hotel where the victim's body was later discovered, having been strangled and struck with a heavy object. Over the defendant's objection, the trial court instructed the jury on the lesser-included offense of second-degree murder, leading to an acquittal on first-degree murder but a conviction on second-degree murder. The Arizona Court of Appeals vacated the conviction and sentence, holding that the instruction was improper because the defendant's theory denied any involvement in the killing and the evidence did not support a finding of a lack of premeditation. The court noted that Sprang had waived other challenges by failing to preserve them or argue fundamental error on appeal, but double jeopardy would not bar retrial on the second-degree murder charge.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Rivera, Michael Rivera was convicted after a jury trial of second-degree murder and related firearm offenses stemming from an incident in which he fired shots at a house from a moving vehicle, killing one person and endangering others. On appeal, he challenged the sufficiency of the evidence for the drive-by shooting and endangerment convictions, argued that consecutive sentences violated double punishment rules, and claimed a confrontation clause violation from admitting prior testimony of an unavailable witness. The court vacated the drive-by shooting conviction and sentence because the indictment and verdict specified a particular victim but the record lacked evidence that Rivera intentionally targeted that individual, while affirming the remaining convictions and sentences. It reasoned that the state was bound by the specific charging language and could not rely on jury instructions that broadened the offense. The court also upheld the trial judge's finding that the state made reasonable efforts to locate the unavailable witness, satisfying the confrontation requirement.

criminal lawprocedure

In this special action, the State of Arizona challenged a trial judge's plan to use Revised Arizona Jury Instruction (Criminal) 28.1381(A)(1)-1 in two aggravated DUI cases involving defendants Oliveri and Nelson, both charged with offenses requiring proof of impairment to the slightest degree under A.R.S. § 28-1381(A)(1). The court accepted jurisdiction and granted relief, directing the judge not to give the RAJI instruction as written. The core reasoning was that the instruction improperly adds an element by requiring proof that the defendant's ability to drive was impaired, whereas the statute only requires that the person be impaired to the slightest degree by intoxicating liquor; this could mislead the jury into thinking evidence of bad driving or physical impairment is needed. The court reviewed the statute's plain language de novo and found the RAJI misleading even if prior cases or history supported its phrasing.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned an appeal of a trial court's order for involuntary psychiatric treatment, after finding the appellant persistently or acutely disabled and in need of treatment he was unwilling or unable to accept voluntarily. The court of appeals vacated the 365-day treatment order (with up to 180 days inpatient), holding that the two psychiatrists' evaluations did not strictly comply with Arizona statutes (A.R.S. §§ 36-533(B), 36-539(B), and 36-501(14)), which require each physician to personally conduct a complete physical examination of the patient. One evaluation occurred remotely via telemedicine and neither included a full in-person physical exam, violating the statutory mandates as interpreted in prior precedent. The court rejected a separation-of-powers challenge, ruling that the statutes establish substantive requirements for civil commitment rather than conflicting with rules of evidence on expert testimony.

civil rightsprocedurehealthcare

In State v. Kinney, the defendant was convicted after a jury trial of possession of a deadly weapon by a prohibited possessor and placed on probation. On appeal, Kinney challenged the denial of his motion to suppress a statement he made to a detective at the police station, arguing it was tainted by an allegedly unlawful prolonged detention after officers determined he was not the subject of their warrant, and he further claimed insufficient evidence supported the conviction without that statement. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that Kinney had failed to properly preserve the suppression argument in his pretrial motions or at the hearing, as he did not specifically seek to exclude the station statement or cite supporting authority, resulting in waiver. The court also found substantial evidence in the record, including Kinney's admissions about his prior conviction and the weapon, to support the jury's verdict.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved David Hamill's claim against his insurer, Mid-Century, for underinsured motorist (UIM) benefits after he was injured by Susan Smith in a parking lot accident. Smith carried $100,000 in liability coverage, but her insurer agreed to pay any judgment or settlement; a jury awarded Hamill $165,000, though the parties later settled for $152,000, and an arbitrator later determined Hamill's net damages were only $126,000. Mid-Century denied the UIM claim on the ground that Smith was not underinsured, and the trial court granted it summary judgment. The appellate court affirmed, holding that the statutory definition of underinsured motorist coverage required comparing the applicable liability limits and actual damages at the relevant times, and here the liability policy effectively covered the full amount paid without any shortfall. The court rejected arguments that the original jury verdict fixed the damages or that the insurer could not benefit from the settlement.

torts & liability

The case involved a dispute between Baxter Group, Inc. and buyers Bennett and Meyerstein over a failed hotel purchase contract for $1.7 million, where the buyers could not secure financing, leading to claims about the retention of a $10,000 escrow deposit and the recording of the purchase agreement. Baxter claimed slander of title due to the recording and breach of contract, while Bennett sued for return of the deposit and other issues. After a bench trial, the court ruled against Baxter on its slander of title and interference claims, awarded the deposit to Bennett on his breach claim, but the appellate court affirmed these rulings while vacating and remanding parts of the attorney fees, sanctions, and costs awards for recalculation. The core reasoning was that the recorded agreement was not groundless under Arizona statute § 33-420, and adjustments were needed for proper allocation of fees and costs between parties.

propertyproceduretorts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

In State v. Garcia-Navarro, the state appealed the trial court's suppression of marijuana found in the defendant's car after a border patrol agent stopped him for erratic driving, pursued him on foot, and searched the abandoned vehicle. The agent relied on Arizona's citizen's arrest statute (A.R.S. § 13-3884), which permits private citizens to detain someone for a breach of the peace, but the trial court ruled the statute did not apply and suppressed the evidence. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the agent's actions constituted state action subject to the Fourth Amendment because he was a federal officer using official authority, and that the observed driving—speeding and a near-collision without weaving or loss of control—did not rise to a breach of the peace as required by the statute, distinguishing it from cases like DUI. The court rejected the state's argument that suppression was an inappropriate remedy for an unlawful citizen's arrest.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Montes, the defendant was convicted of second-degree murder and aggravated assault after a jury rejected his self-defense claim under the pre-2006 version of A.R.S. § 13-205(A), which required him to prove justification by a preponderance of the evidence. Montes moved for reconsideration of his affirmed convictions, arguing that a 2009 legislative enactment (Senate Bill 1449) retroactively shifted the burden of disproving self-defense to the state for cases pending on April 24, 2006. The Arizona Court of Appeals denied the motion, ruling that the 2009 bill violated the Separation of Powers Clause of the Arizona Constitution. The court reasoned that the legislature cannot nullify the Arizona Supreme Court's prior interpretation in Garcia v. Browning by retroactively redefining existing law to apply to pending cases.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved two consolidated appeals by the State of Arizona concerning whether A.R.S. § 28-3320 required a juvenile court to notify the Motor Vehicle Division (MVD) when minors were adjudicated delinquent for possessing marijuana, a class one misdemeanor under A.R.S. § 13-3405(A)(1), even though no motor vehicles were involved in the offenses. The court held that the statute does not impose any obligation on the juvenile court to transmit such adjudication records to MVD, as it only specifies actions MVD must take upon receiving notice, and no other statute requires reporting in these circumstances. The court further concluded that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by choosing not to notify MVD, noting the broad discretion in juvenile dispositions aimed at rehabilitation and the fact that the offenses were not driving-related. The rulings affirmed the disposition orders placing both minors on six months' probation without MVD notification.

criminal law

The case involved a contract dispute between Richard E. Lambert, Ltd. (REL) and the City of Tucson over delays in completing improvements to a city park facility. After REL finished the project 319 days late, the City assessed liquidated damages of $500 per day and withheld final payment; REL appealed through administrative channels, arguing excusable delays due to unforeseen causes like city actions. The City Procurement Director upheld the damages after an evidentiary hearing, but the superior court partially reversed on summary judgment, reducing the award and granting REL attorney fees. On appeal, the court reversed the superior court, reinstating the Director's decision because substantial evidence supported the findings that the delays were inexcusable and not proven via critical path analysis or otherwise. The court also awarded the City its attorney fees as the prevailing party and remanded for entry of judgment.

business & regulatoryprocedure

In State v. Musgrove, the defendant was convicted after a jury trial of first-degree murder, conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, and two counts of endangerment arising from a shooting death following a physical altercation. The trial court imposed concurrent life sentences for the murder and conspiracy convictions and consecutive terms for the endangerment counts. On appeal, the court affirmed the murder and endangerment convictions and sentences, finding that claims regarding fabricated evidence and prosecutorial misconduct were forfeited without a showing of fundamental error, and that the trial court did not err in denying requested jury instructions on circumstantial evidence and lesser-included offenses. However, the court vacated the conspiracy conviction and sentence on double jeopardy grounds, because the trial court had granted a judgment of acquittal on that charge and later reversed its own ruling, which required further fact-finding proceedings to secure a conviction.

criminal lawprocedure