In D'Amico v. Structural I Co., a framing company fired its CEO, Irene D'Amico, before the end of her five-year contract, leading her to sue for breach of contract and unpaid wages and bonuses; the company countersued on claims including breach of fiduciary duty. After a jury largely favored D'Amico on the contract claims while finding her liable for $150,000 on the fiduciary-duty counterclaim, Structural I appealed, arguing that the trial court wrongly admitted testimony from the owners' counselor (protected by psychologist-patient privilege) and should have awarded treble damages on the wage claims. The Arizona Court of Appeals held that Structural I lacked standing to challenge the admission of the privileged testimony because the privilege belonged to the McLeods, not the company, and therefore only they could assert it on appeal. The court also ruled that the trial court has discretion under A.R.S. § 23-355(A) to decline treble damages even when wages were withheld without good faith, but vacated and remanded that portion of the judgment because the trial court's stated reasons did not reflect a proper exercise of discretion. The court otherwise affirmed the judgments, including reversal of the fiduciary-duty verdict against D'Amico.
The case arose after a motorist injured in a freeway construction accident settled claims against the general contractor (DBA) and ADOT for a $750,000 stipulated judgment, with DBA’s excess insurer (Colorado Casualty) paying part of the settlement and, together with DBA and ADOT, assigning rights to the claimant (Roman) to pursue the subcontractor (Safety Control) and its primary insurer (EMC), which had refused to defend DBA. The Arizona Court of Appeals held that the Damron agreement was enforceable, that EMC had breached its duty to defend and therefore could be bound by the stipulated judgment provided it was neither collusive nor fraudulent, and that Safety Control had breached its subcontract by failing to obtain the required completed-operations coverage. The court affirmed summary judgment on those points but remanded for a determination of whether the stipulated judgment fell within EMC’s policy coverage and for clarification of the circumstances and amount of any damages for which Safety Control could be liable, noting that such damages are not automatically measured by the full stipulated judgment.
This case arose from a 1992 warranty deed that, due to a scrivener’s error copying an earlier legal description, omitted a quarter-acre parcel (the “Corner”) from the conveyance of over a thousand acres at Baseline and Crismon Roads in Mesa. The omission went unnoticed through later sales, easements dedicated to the City, and a 2002 purchase from the City, until a 2003 title search revealed record title remained with the original partnership; this sparked competing claims among successors (including SWC/A.R. Development and Augusta Ranch) over ownership and related torts. The Arizona Court of Appeals addressed reformation of the deeds based on mutual mistake or unilateral mistake with knowledge, slander-of-title claims arising from recorded dedications and conveyances, trespass and conversion allegations tied to use of the parcel, and liability under the false-recording statute (A.R.S. § 33-420), while also reviewing attorney-fee allocations and the denial of certain amendments or punitive damages. The court resolved these issues by applying traditional property and tort principles to the chain of title and the parties’ knowledge and intent at each transaction.
In State v. Vega, Jose Vicente Montano Vega was convicted by a jury of five sex offenses against his two young nieces. On appeal, he challenged the trial court's admission of testimony about an uncharged prior incident in which he allegedly touched the older victim at a beach in Mexico. The Arizona Court of Appeals held that the superior court erred by admitting this other-act evidence without first making the specific findings on proof, relevance, and prejudice required by Arizona Rule of Evidence 404(c), and without adequately limiting its use to the charges involving only the older victim. The court nonetheless affirmed the convictions, concluding that the error was harmless because the properly admitted evidence was overwhelming and the improper evidence did not affect the verdicts.
The case involved Allstate Utility Construction's attempt to foreclose a construction lien on property owned by ALC Builders for work performed starting in April 2007, with Towne Bank (holder of a later-recorded deed of trust) challenging the lien's validity on summary judgment. The superior court ruled the lien invalid due to defects in Allstate's preliminary 20-day notice and related service documents under Arizona statutes. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding the lien valid because the 20-day notice sufficiently manifested Allstate's intent to authenticate via its company name and "SIGNATURE AND TITLE ON FILE" notation (without requiring a handwritten signature), the service affidavit adequately identified the date, place, and manner of mailing (without needing the exact time of day or a separate acknowledgment form), and lien statutes require only substantial compliance to fulfill their dual purposes of protecting workers and providing notice to owners.
In State v. Boehler, three defendants were convicted under Phoenix City Code § 23-7(B)(4) for vocally soliciting spare change from passersby after dark in downtown public areas following a baseball game. The Arizona Court of Appeals reversed the convictions, ruling that the ordinance's prohibition on oral requests for money or goods after sunset in public places violates the First Amendment. The court found the measure overbroad because it criminalized a substantial amount of protected speech—peaceful panhandling—without being narrowly tailored to the city's interests in public safety and preventing aggressive solicitation, as the defendants had not engaged in any threatening or obstructive behavior.