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State v. MENDOZA-TAPIA
Court of Appeals of Arizona · 2012-04-03 · cited 20×
In State v. Mendoza-Tapia, the defendant appealed his jury convictions and sentences for kidnapping and theft by extortion, both class-two dangerous felonies, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to prove use of a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument during the ransom demands, that the trial court erred in denying a retroactive competency hearing, and that his presentence incarceration credit was miscalculated. The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions and sentences, holding that the victim's and his wife's testimony about threats involving a knife and gun, combined with the circumstances of the abduction and ransom calls, provided sufficient evidence to support the dangerous-offense findings and that the law-of-the-case doctrine did not apply from a co-defendant's separate trial. The court further concluded that the trial judge did not abuse her discretion in denying the competency hearing because the record lacked clear evidence of incompetence before trial. It remanded solely for recalculation of the presentence credit after noting a possible 24-day discrepancy.
criminal lawprocedure
State v. Bustamante
Court of Appeals of Arizona · 2012-03-29 · cited 31×
In State v. Bustamante, defendant Martin Abel Bustamante appealed his convictions for kidnapping, theft by extortion, aggravated assault, and misconduct involving weapons, which arose from a ransom kidnapping in which he and accomplices abducted a victim at gunpoint from a parking lot, demanded a Mercedes-Benz and cash from the victim's girlfriend, and were apprehended at the drop-off site. The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions and sentences, finding no reversible error on either the sufficiency of the evidence or the Batson challenge to jury selection. The court held that circumstantial evidence—including the defendant's presence in the getaway car with the ransom cell phone, his proximity to a visible loaded handgun as a convicted felon, and his role in the ongoing restraint of the victim—permitted the jury to conclude he participated as a principal or accomplice. It also ruled that the prosecutor provided credible, race-neutral reasons for striking a prospective juror, and the defendant had not met his burden to show those reasons were pretextual.
criminal lawgunscivil rightsprocedure
Thomas v. MONTELUCIA VILLAS, LLC
Court of Appeals of Arizona · 2012-03-27 · cited 2×
In this case, the Thomases sued Montelucia Villas after backing out of a $3.295 million contract to purchase a luxury villa, alleging breaches including failure to complete infrastructure, provide ownership privileges, and obtain a certificate of occupancy by the scheduled May 2008 closing; they sought return of their $659,000 earnest money deposits. Montelucia counterclaimed that the Thomases breached by refusing to close. The trial court granted summary judgment to the Thomases, but the Arizona Court of Appeals reversed, directing judgment for Montelucia. The court held that the Thomases’ May 6, 2008 letter was an anticipatory repudiation that unequivocally terminated the contract without following the purchase agreement’s Section 12 notice-and-cure process, thereby excusing Montelucia from further performance or proof of its own readiness to close.
propertyprocedure
Alliance Trutrus, L.L.C. v. Carlson Real Estate Co.
Court of Appeals of Arizona · 2012-02-28 · cited 1×
The case involved a dispute over whether a supplier's lawsuit against a property owner and its surety bond was timely filed after a mechanic's lien was recorded on a commercial construction project. Alliance TruTrus recorded a lien in September 2008 for unpaid materials, Carlson posted a discharge bond in February 2009, and Alliance sued on the bond in May 2009—more than six months after the lien. The trial court granted summary judgment to Alliance, interpreting A.R.S. § 33-1004(D)(2) to give it ninety days from service of the bond to file suit. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the statute's ninety-day extension applies only to adding the bond's principal and sureties as parties to a lien foreclosure action that was already timely commenced under the six-month limit of A.R.S. § 33-998; it does not extend the deadline for initially filing suit. Because Alliance filed no action within six months of recording its lien, the bond and underlying claim were discharged as a matter of law.
propertyprocedure
State v. Bonfiglio
Court of Appeals of Arizona · 2011-12-29 · cited 8×
In State v. Bonfiglio, Austin James Bonfiglio was convicted by a jury of aggravated assault, a class 3 dangerous felony, after a large party fight in which one attendee was stabbed multiple times; the evidence included eyewitness identification, testimony that Bonfiglio later admitted the stabbing, and recorded jail calls in which he threatened a potential witness. On appeal, Bonfiglio argued that the prosecutor’s rebuttal comment about the absence of additional witnesses amounted to improper vouching and that the trial court improperly used a jury-found aggravating factor (“ability to walk away”) to impose a sentence above the presumptive term. The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed both the conviction and the 13-year aggravated sentence. It held that the prosecutor’s remark drew a permissible inference from admitted evidence of witness intimidation rather than suggesting undisclosed facts, and therefore did not constitute misconduct. The court further held that Bonfiglio’s two admitted historical prior felonies automatically exposed him to the enhanced sentencing range under A.R.S. § 13-702, so the trial court’s consideration of the additional jury-found aggravator did not violate due process or require resentencing.
criminal lawprocedure
Cliff Findlay Automotive, LLC v. Olson
Court of Appeals of Arizona · 2011-09-27
In Cliff Findlay Automotive, LLC v. Olson, the seller sued Susan Olson for the full unpaid balance on a vehicle purchase contract after her adult daughter filed for bankruptcy, the car was sold by the trustee, and the seller recovered only a partial distribution as an unsecured creditor. Olson had signed the documents alongside her daughter but claimed she did so only as an accommodation party without intending to own or use the car; she argued that the seller’s failure to perfect its lien within the required twenty days impaired the collateral and entitled her to a reduction in liability under Arizona’s version of the UCC. The trial court granted summary judgment to the seller, finding Olson liable despite recognizing her accommodation status and the seller’s delay. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that material factual and legal questions remained about whether Olson qualified as an accommodation party, the extent to which the lien failure impaired the collateral’s value, and whether she had abandoned any defenses by later releasing her interest in the vehicle. The court remanded for further proceedings to determine any offset Olson might be owed based on the vehicle’s value and the seller’s prior recovery.
business & regulatoryproperty