The case involved Eric Flint's personal restraint petition challenging his return to total confinement after a third violation of community custody conditions under a 2007 amendment to RCW 9.94A.737(2). Flint, convicted in 2002 of robbery and drug possession, argued that applying the amended statute—which mandates return to prison after repeated violations—violated the ex post facto clauses of the state and federal constitutions because it took effect after his crimes. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition as frivolous, and although the Supreme Court noted the case was moot due to Flint completing his sentence, it addressed the merits and affirmed the dismissal on different grounds. The court reasoned that the amendment did not increase the quantum of punishment available under prior law, as the Department of Corrections already had discretion to impose the same total confinement sanction for violations.
The case involved David McCuistion, who had been civilly committed as a sexually violent predator under Washington law, petitioning for an evidentiary hearing on his release after three years based on an expert declaration asserting he had never met the commitment criteria. The trial court denied the hearing, and the Court of Appeals declined review. The Washington Supreme Court held that McCuistion was not entitled to a hearing because he failed to present prima facie evidence of a physiological change or treatment-based change in his condition under RCW 71.09.090, and it rejected challenges to the 2005 statutory amendments as violating substantive due process or separation of powers. The court reasoned that the amendments properly limit hearings to relevant evidence of changed dangerousness while preserving constitutional protections.
In State v. Meredith, the Washington Supreme Court addressed a petition for review filed by criminal defendant Gary Daniel Meredith after his conviction. The underlying dispute concerned the standard for establishing a prima facie case of racial discrimination in jury selection under Batson v. Kentucky. The court granted review on a limited basis, specifically to clarify the scope of the bright-line rule previously set out in State v. Rhone for satisfying that prima facie showing. Supplemental briefing was authorized within thirty days, after which the matter would proceed to en banc consideration.
The consolidated cases involved two defendants arrested after traffic stops in Washington, where police conducted warrantless searches of their vehicles incident to arrest and found evidence of drug possession and identity theft. The Washington Supreme Court considered whether the "Thornton" exception from Arizona v. Gant—allowing a vehicle search when it is reasonable to believe evidence of the crime of arrest may be found inside—applies under article I, section 7 of the state constitution, which the U.S. Supreme Court had recognized under the Fourth Amendment. The court held that this exception does not apply under the state constitution because article I, section 7 provides broader protections than the federal Fourth Amendment and does not permit warrantless searches based solely on the crime of arrest without the arrestee being unsecured and within reach of the vehicle. As a result, the court reversed the defendants' convictions and remanded the cases.
This case concerned a preelection challenge by Mukilteo Citizens for Simple Government to a local initiative, Proposition 1, that would repeal a city ordinance authorizing automated traffic safety cameras, limit fines from such cameras, and require voter approval for any future camera system. The Washington Supreme Court held that the subject matter of the initiative was not within the local initiative power. The court reasoned that the state legislature had expressly granted authority to the city's governing body under former RCW 46.63.170 to enact ordinances on the use of automated traffic safety cameras, placing the topic outside the initiative process reserved for voters. Although the initiative passed and was later implemented by the city council, the court reached the merits because the dispute presented a justiciable controversy warranting review.
The case involved a contract dispute between Snohomish County Public Transportation Benefit Area Corporation (Community Transit) and FirstGroup America, Inc. (First Transit) over an indemnity provision in a service agreement for commuter bus operations. Community Transit sought indemnification from First Transit after settling claims from a multi-vehicle accident caused by the combined negligence of a third-party driver and a Community Transit bus driver, where First Transit was not at fault and the accident was not due solely to Community Transit's negligence. The trial court and Court of Appeals ruled in favor of First Transit, but the Washington Supreme Court reversed, holding that the contract language—specifically excepting only losses from Community Transit's sole negligence—clearly and unequivocally required First Transit to indemnify Community Transit for its partial negligence. The court remanded the case for further proceedings, applying principles of contractual freedom and interpreting the sole-negligence exception as evidence of intent to cover shared fault.