Barbara Madsen

The case involved Eric Flint's personal restraint petition challenging his return to total confinement after a third violation of community custody conditions under a 2007 amendment to RCW 9.94A.737(2). Flint, convicted in 2002 of robbery and drug possession, argued that applying the amended statute—which mandates return to prison after repeated violations—violated the ex post facto clauses of the state and federal constitutions because it took effect after his crimes. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition as frivolous, and although the Supreme Court noted the case was moot due to Flint completing his sentence, it addressed the merits and affirmed the dismissal on different grounds. The court reasoned that the amendment did not increase the quantum of punishment available under prior law, as the Department of Corrections already had discretion to impose the same total confinement sanction for violations.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved David McCuistion, who had been civilly committed as a sexually violent predator under Washington law, petitioning for an evidentiary hearing on his release after three years based on an expert declaration asserting he had never met the commitment criteria. The trial court denied the hearing, and the Court of Appeals declined review. The Washington Supreme Court held that McCuistion was not entitled to a hearing because he failed to present prima facie evidence of a physiological change or treatment-based change in his condition under RCW 71.09.090, and it rejected challenges to the 2005 statutory amendments as violating substantive due process or separation of powers. The court reasoned that the amendments properly limit hearings to relevant evidence of changed dangerousness while preserving constitutional protections.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

In State v. Meredith, the Washington Supreme Court addressed a petition for review filed by criminal defendant Gary Daniel Meredith after his conviction. The underlying dispute concerned the standard for establishing a prima facie case of racial discrimination in jury selection under Batson v. Kentucky. The court granted review on a limited basis, specifically to clarify the scope of the bright-line rule previously set out in State v. Rhone for satisfying that prima facie showing. Supplemental briefing was authorized within thirty days, after which the matter would proceed to en banc consideration.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

The consolidated cases involved two defendants arrested after traffic stops in Washington, where police conducted warrantless searches of their vehicles incident to arrest and found evidence of drug possession and identity theft. The Washington Supreme Court considered whether the "Thornton" exception from Arizona v. Gant—allowing a vehicle search when it is reasonable to believe evidence of the crime of arrest may be found inside—applies under article I, section 7 of the state constitution, which the U.S. Supreme Court had recognized under the Fourth Amendment. The court held that this exception does not apply under the state constitution because article I, section 7 provides broader protections than the federal Fourth Amendment and does not permit warrantless searches based solely on the crime of arrest without the arrestee being unsecured and within reach of the vehicle. As a result, the court reversed the defendants' convictions and remanded the cases.

criminal lawprocedure

This case concerned a preelection challenge by Mukilteo Citizens for Simple Government to a local initiative, Proposition 1, that would repeal a city ordinance authorizing automated traffic safety cameras, limit fines from such cameras, and require voter approval for any future camera system. The Washington Supreme Court held that the subject matter of the initiative was not within the local initiative power. The court reasoned that the state legislature had expressly granted authority to the city's governing body under former RCW 46.63.170 to enact ordinances on the use of automated traffic safety cameras, placing the topic outside the initiative process reserved for voters. Although the initiative passed and was later implemented by the city council, the court reached the merits because the dispute presented a justiciable controversy warranting review.

electionscriminal law

The case involved a contract dispute between Snohomish County Public Transportation Benefit Area Corporation (Community Transit) and FirstGroup America, Inc. (First Transit) over an indemnity provision in a service agreement for commuter bus operations. Community Transit sought indemnification from First Transit after settling claims from a multi-vehicle accident caused by the combined negligence of a third-party driver and a Community Transit bus driver, where First Transit was not at fault and the accident was not due solely to Community Transit's negligence. The trial court and Court of Appeals ruled in favor of First Transit, but the Washington Supreme Court reversed, holding that the contract language—specifically excepting only losses from Community Transit's sole negligence—clearly and unequivocally required First Transit to indemnify Community Transit for its partial negligence. The court remanded the case for further proceedings, applying principles of contractual freedom and interpreting the sole-negligence exception as evidence of intent to cover shared fault.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

This case involves the State of Washington prosecuting Victor Albert Lyle Whalen. The petitioner filed a motion to supplement and a petition seeking review by the Washington Supreme Court. Department I of the court, consisting of Chief Justice Madsen and Justices C. Johnson, Chambers, Fairhurst, and Stephens, considered the matter at its November 21, 2011, motion calendar. The court unanimously denied the motion to supplement and also denied the petition for review pursuant to RAP 13.4(b).

criminal lawprocedure

The case involves a petition for review filed by Allan Parmelee against the Franklin County Sheriff's Office, Franklin County Correctional Center, and Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney's Office. The Washington Supreme Court considered motions on filing fees and whether to allow the petition to proceed. The court granted Parmelee's motion to waive filing and copying fees, denied the respondents' motion to strike the petition for review, and granted the petition itself. This procedural order permits the parties to serve and file supplemental briefs within 30 days.

procedure

This case involves petitioners Douglas Campbell, Michelle Campbell, and Robert Sukert seeking discretionary review in the Washington Supreme Court of a lower court decision against respondents Donald and Cherris Oakland, along with Paul and Judie Ingram and Ingram Realty LLC. The Supreme Court denied the petition for review under RAP 13.4(b). The court granted the respondents' request for attorney fees and expenses under RAP 18.1, to be determined by the Supreme Court Clerk after the respondents file an affidavit. The order reflects a unanimous decision by Department I of the court.

procedureproperty

In State v. Franklin, the defendant challenged his sentences for third-degree assault and cocaine possession with intent to deliver, arguing that new 2009 legislation required the trial court to resentence him by reducing his terms of community custody so that the combined confinement and custody periods would not exceed the statutory maximums of 60 and 120 months. The Washington Supreme Court held that the legislation applies retroactively to cases like Franklin's but assigns the task of adjusting community custody terms to the Department of Corrections rather than the sentencing court. The court reasoned that the statutes direct DOC to modify the end date of community custody for offenders already serving sentences, and prior case law upheld similar variable-term sentences with notations limiting total time served. Accordingly, the court affirmed the Court of Appeals and concluded that Franklin was not entitled to resentencing by the trial court.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Thorgerson, a jury convicted Kenneth Thorgerson of four counts of child molestation based on allegations by his stepdaughter that he had forced her to touch him sexually over several years. Thorgerson appealed, claiming prosecutorial misconduct through vouching for the victim's credibility, shifting the burden of proof, and impugning defense counsel, though he did not object at trial. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, agreeing with the Court of Appeals that while some challenged conduct was improper, it did not rise to the level of reversible error under the applicable standard requiring a substantial likelihood that the misconduct affected the verdict. The court emphasized that unobjected-to remarks are waived unless flagrant and ill-intentioned, and reviewed the statements in the context of the full trial record where the State's case relied on the victim's testimony and corroborating witnesses without physical evidence.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Brousseau, the defendant was convicted of first degree rape of a child and child molestation based on statements from a seven-year-old victim, J.R. The trial court held a pretrial hearing on the child's competency to testify and the admissibility of her hearsay statements under RCW 9A.44.120, allowing testimony from a defense psychologist but declining to call the child herself as a witness. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the child competent based on the psychologist's testimony regarding the Allen factors, that due process does not require examining the child witness at every competency hearing, and that the statute does not mandate the child's testimony at the hearsay hearing. The court also rejected claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned a newspaper's request for access to the deposition of a key prosecution witness in a criminal case against a sitting judge, which was conducted in a courtroom with the presiding judge present but closed to the public without applying the Ishikawa closure factors. The newspaper sought a writ of mandamus, claiming violations of article I, section 10 of the Washington Constitution and the First Amendment right of access. The Washington Supreme Court denied the writ, concluding that the deposition was not a public proceeding because it was not introduced at trial and did not form part of the court's decision-making process. The court reasoned that under these circumstances, neither constitutional provision required the deposition to be open absent the Ishikawa inquiry.

criminal lawfree speechprocedure

This case involved Washington Imaging Services, a medical imaging company, and the Washington State Department of Revenue over business and occupation (B&O) tax liability. Washington Imaging contracted with Overlake Imaging Associates to provide radiologist interpretations of images, billed patients and insurers a single global fee covering both imaging and interpretation, and then paid Overlake a percentage of collections under their contracts. The trial court ruled that the payments to Overlake did not qualify as nontaxable pass-through amounts, but the Court of Appeals reversed. The Washington Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, holding that Washington Imaging owed B&O tax on the full amounts received because it did not make the payments to Overlake as an agent on behalf of patients who had no direct obligation to Overlake. The court reasoned that the payments were instead part of Washington Imaging's gross income for services it provided, as both the technical and professional components were integral to its business and the patients dealt only with Washington Imaging.

taxesbusiness & regulatory

The case involved Raymond Martinez's personal restraint petition challenging his conviction for first degree burglary on the ground that the State failed to prove he was armed with a deadly weapon. The Washington Supreme Court held that the petition was properly before it and that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction, reversing the Court of Appeals and vacating the conviction. The court reasoned that under RCW 9A.04.110(6), a knife is a deadly weapon only if it is actually used, attempted to be used, or threatened to be used in a manner likely to cause death or great bodily harm, considering the totality of the circumstances; here, there was no evidence that Martinez reached for, displayed, or threatened to use the knife during the burglary. The court distinguished this standard from per se deadly weapon provisions in other statutes and disapproved a prior appellate decision that treated a dangerous item as a deadly weapon based solely on its potential without regard to use or threatened use.

criminal law

This case involved a proposed nationwide class action by AT&T wireless customers alleging that the company violated the Washington Consumer Protection Act and breached customer contracts by billing a Universal Connectivity Charge without adequate prior disclosure or notice of increases. The trial court denied class certification, finding that individual issues predominated, but the Court of Appeals reversed. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the contracts' choice-of-law clauses were enforceable and required application of the law of each customer's state rather than Washington law alone for the CPA claims. It remanded for the trial court to reconsider class certification under the correct legal standards, emphasizing deference to the trial court's discretion on predominance and manageability when multiple state laws apply.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case arose from a 2004 airplane crash in Mexico that killed seven people, leading the personal representative of the decedents' estates to file wrongful death actions against Twin Commander Aircraft LLC, the holder of the aircraft's type certificate. The trial court granted summary judgment to Twin Commander, ruling that the General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994 (GARA) barred the claims because the aircraft had been delivered to its first purchaser more than 18 years earlier. The Washington Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the summary judgment, holding that Twin Commander qualified as a manufacturer under GARA and that the plaintiff failed to produce evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact on the fraud exception, specifically the required showing that the company knowingly misrepresented or withheld material information from the FAA. The court reasoned that the e-mails and other evidence cited by the plaintiff did not establish the necessary knowing state of mind, even if reevaluation or additional reporting of prior accidents might have been required.

torts & liabilityprocedure

Alizon Veit sued Burlington Northern Santa Fe Corporation after her car collided with a train at a railroad crossing, alleging negligence including that the train exceeded the company's internal speed limits. The trial court granted partial summary judgment to BNSF on the excessive speed claim, finding it preempted by federal law since the train was under the federal speed limit for the track class. After a jury found BNSF not negligent on remaining claims, Veit appealed the preemption ruling and evidentiary issues. The Supreme Court of Washington affirmed, holding that federal regulations under the Federal Railroad Safety Act preempt common law claims based on exceeding internal speed limits when the federal limit is not exceeded.

torts & liabilityfederal power

Alizon Veit sued Burlington Northern Santa Fe Corporation (BNSF) after her car collided with a train at a railroad crossing in Bellingham, Washington, claiming negligence including that the train exceeded BNSF's internal speed limits. The trial court granted partial summary judgment to BNSF on the excessive speed claim, ruling it preempted by federal law under the Federal Railroad Safety Act because the train was traveling below the applicable federal speed limit for the track class, then proceeded to trial where the jury found BNSF not negligent. On appeal, the Washington Supreme Court affirmed, holding that federal speed regulations preempt common law claims based on internal company speed limits when the train complies with federal limits, and that issues of contributory negligence or excluded evidence did not affect the outcome given the jury's finding.

torts & liabilityfederal powerprocedure

The case involved Kristina Grier's conviction for second-degree murder after a confrontation in which she shot and killed Gregory Owen. Grier appealed, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel because her attorney withdrew proposed jury instructions on the lesser included offenses of first- and second-degree manslaughter, pursuing an all-or-nothing defense. The Washington Supreme Court held that Grier's agreement to the withdrawal did not preclude her claim but that the strategic choice was a legitimate trial tactic that did not violate her rights under the state or federal constitutions. The court therefore reversed the Court of Appeals' finding of ineffective assistance and remanded for consideration of Grier's remaining claims.

criminal law