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Minnick v. CLEARWIRE US LLC
Washington Supreme Court · 2012-05-03 · cited 7×
This case involved a certified question from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals asking whether Washington law treats early termination fees (ETFs) in fixed-term wireless service contracts offered by Clearwire as alternative performance provisions or as liquidated damages clauses subject to penalty analysis. The plaintiffs, a group of customers, had entered into one- or two-year contracts with discounted monthly rates and faced ETFs ranging from flat $180 fees to diminishing amounts starting at $220 when they sought to cancel early due to dissatisfaction with service. The Washington Supreme Court held that the ETFs are alternative performance provisions, not liquidated damages clauses. The core reasoning was that, at the time of contracting, the ETFs provided customers with a real option between paying the fee to terminate or continuing payments to fulfill the contract, and the two alternatives were of relatively equal value depending on the timing of termination.
business & regulatory
State v. Hurst
Washington Supreme Court · 2012-01-26 · cited 16×
In State v. Hurst, the defendant was charged with third-degree assault, a felony, but proceedings were stayed after he was twice found incompetent to stand trial and committed for 90-day competency restoration periods. When he remained incompetent, the state sought a third commitment of up to 180 days, raising the question of whether due process under the Fourteenth Amendment requires the state to prove the statutory criteria—dangerousness or likelihood of criminal acts and a substantial probability of restored competency—by clear and convincing evidence rather than the statutory preponderance standard. Applying the Medina framework for challenges to criminal procedural rules rather than Mathews balancing, the Washington Supreme Court held that the preponderance standard satisfies due process because the overall statutory scheme provides adequate protections to ensure fundamental fairness. The court therefore affirmed the Court of Appeals and upheld the commitment order entered on the jury's findings under the lower evidentiary standard.
criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure
Bank of America, NA v. Owens
Washington Supreme Court · 2011-10-27 · cited 13×
This case arose from the property distribution in the dissolution of Kenneth Treiger and J'Amy Lyn Owens' marriage, where a home (the Maplewood property) was sold and its proceeds placed in trust, with Bank of America claiming rights via a prior writ of attachment. The Washington Supreme Court held that the Supplemental Decree created an equitable lien on the property in favor of Treiger for one-half of the net sale proceeds and that Documents 1375 and 1376 were valid judgments supporting additional awards to him, while Document 1370 was not given separate effect. The court reasoned that the decree's explicit award language established the lien under principles of equitable distribution and applied statutory construction rules prioritizing the judgment summary requirements of RCW 4.64.030(3) to determine the validity and priority of the various post-decree orders. It further concluded that the absence of required summaries rendered some documents ineffective as judgments despite their substantive content.
family lawpropertyprocedure
City of Seattle v. May
Washington Supreme Court · 2011-10-21 · cited 35×
The case involved Robert May, who was convicted under a Seattle ordinance for violating a permanent domestic violence protection order by contacting his ex-wife multiple times in 2005. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding that the collateral bar rule prevented May from challenging the validity of the protection order in the criminal proceeding unless the order was void, which it was not, and that the order provided sufficient notice that violation was a criminal offense. The court reasoned that the superior court had jurisdiction to issue such orders, so any errors did not make the order void and subject to collateral attack, and relied on prior precedent regarding due process notice requirements.
criminal lawfamily lawprocedure
Mohr v. Grantham
Washington Supreme Court · 2011-10-13 · cited 74×
In Mohr v. Grantham, the plaintiffs sued multiple physicians and a hospital for medical malpractice, alleging that negligent delays in neurological assessment, diagnosis of a stroke, and administration of appropriate treatment after a car accident substantially reduced Linda Mohr's chance of avoiding or minimizing permanent brain damage. The Washington Supreme Court held that a cause of action for loss of chance exists in medical malpractice cases even when the ultimate harm is serious injury short of death. The court reasoned that this extends the doctrine recognized in Herskovits v. Group Health Cooperative, under which a plaintiff can establish proximate causation by showing that the defendant's negligence probably caused a substantial reduction in the chance of a better outcome, and therefore reversed the order granting summary judgment to the defendants.
torts & liabilityhealthcare
City of Seattle v. McKenna
Washington Supreme Court · 2011-09-01 · cited 15×
The case concerned whether the Washington Supreme Court should issue a writ of mandamus ordering the state attorney general to withdraw Washington as a plaintiff from a federal lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. The court held that mandamus was unavailable because the attorney general possessed discretionary statutory authority under RCW 43.10.030 to initiate or participate in litigation on behalf of the state. It further reasoned that the Washington Constitution does not confer common-law powers on the attorney general and that the scope of the office is instead defined by statute or constitutional provisions enacted by the people.
healthcarefederal powerprocedure