This case concerned a preelection challenge by the King County Prosecuting Attorney to Initiative 18, a proposal by the King County Corrections Guild to amend the county charter by reducing the council from 13 to 9 members and placing the matter before voters. The superior court ruled the initiative exceeded the scope of the initiative power under the state constitution and county charter, relying on precedent distinguishing amendments from repeals. The Washington Supreme Court reversed, holding that the initiative power allows voters to propose ordinances amending the charter, as it is distinct from repealing the entire charter and is authorized by relevant constitutional and charter provisions permitting voter-initiated changes.
This case involved a dispute between Clark County Public Utility District and the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers over layoffs of ten union employees, where the union claimed the district violated a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) by failing to make efforts to place the workers in other available positions as required by portions of the district's personnel policy manual incorporated into the CBA. The arbitrator ruled for the union after interpreting the CBA as ambiguous and finding that the district had not complied with its obligations. The trial court and Court of Appeals vacated the award, but the Washington Supreme Court reversed, holding that judicial review of labor arbitration awards is extremely limited and extends only to whether the arbitrator exceeded the authority granted by the parties, not to the merits of the arbitrator's legal conclusions or contract interpretations. The court concluded the arbitrator had acted within her authority by construing the CBA and fashioning a remedy.
This case was a judicial disciplinary proceeding against part-time municipal court Judge Steven Michels, who also served as a public defender and private attorney in the same courts. The Commission on Judicial Conduct found that Michels violated Canons 1, 2(A), 3(A)(1), and 3(D)(1) of the Code of Judicial Conduct by presiding over criminal cases involving defendants he had previously represented as counsel, failing to disqualify himself, and accepting guilty pleas without advising defendants of the elements of the crimes or obtaining proper written statements as required by CrRLJ 4.2. Michels admitted the conduct but argued the recommended sanction was excessive. The Washington Supreme Court upheld the Commission's recommendation of censure and a 120-day suspension without pay, plus a requirement to complete an approved judicial training course before resuming duties, reasoning that the violations undermined public confidence in judicial impartiality and that the sanction aligned with precedent.
The case involved whether a vacant tax lot purchased by Rory Crispin at a 1990 auction had been legally created under a 1972 Seattle ordinance and chapter 58.17 RCW governing land divisions. The Washington Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and held that tax lot 164 was a legally created lot exempt from subdivision requirements. The court reasoned that the 1972 reconfiguration of boundaries among three existing parcels into three condominiums and one vacant lot constituted a boundary line adjustment that created no new lots, triggering the statutory exemption in RCW 58.17.040(6).
The case concerned the admissibility of evidence of prior sexual misconduct with a child under Evidence Rule 404(b) to prove a common scheme or plan in a prosecution for second-degree rape of a child and child molestation. The Washington Supreme Court held that such evidence requires only substantial similarities between the prior acts and the charged conduct that indicate a common plan, rejecting any need for the method to be unique or atypical. The court affirmed the conviction, finding that the prior acts involving a 10-year-old girl—near-nudity, massages, and sexual contact with warnings not to disclose—showed marked similarities to the charged acts with a 12-year-old girl that naturally suggested a common grooming plan.
In State v. Goldberg, the defendant was convicted of premeditated first-degree murder after killing his son-in-law, who was expected to testify as a witness in a pending marriage dissolution proceeding involving child custody. The trial court had ordered the jury to continue deliberating on a special verdict form for the aggravating circumstance after the jury initially returned a non-unanimous 'no' answer, and the jury ultimately found the factor proved, leading to a life sentence without parole. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed the underlying murder conviction, holding that the statutory aggravating factor under RCW 10.95.020(8) applies even when the defendant is not a party to the proceeding where the victim was to testify. However, the court vacated the aggravating factor finding, reasoning that special verdicts need not be unanimous to be final and that ordering further deliberations after the jury's initial response improperly coerced the verdict.