Ralph D. Gants

This case involved Robert O'Brien's challenge to a District Court harassment prevention order issued under G.L. c. 258E after Alan Borowski, a police officer, reported O'Brien making offensive middle-finger gestures toward him on three occasions. O'Brien petitioned under G.L. c. 211, § 3, claiming the statute was facially overbroad because it regulated protected speech and unconstitutional as applied to his conduct. The court first addressed procedural issues, noting the order had expired and the case was moot but reaching the merits due to the public importance of interpreting the new statute, and directing future appeals of such orders to the Appeals Court rather than a single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court. Interpreting the statute to require three willful and malicious acts intended to cause fear, intimidation, abuse, or property damage, and limiting its reach to fighting words and true threats, the court held that c. 258E was not unconstitutionally overbroad on its face. The court vacated the expired order on other grounds without deciding whether its application to O'Brien violated the First Amendment.

free speechcriminal lawprocedure

In this case, the defendant was charged with assault and battery after his girlfriend called 911 reporting that he had just beaten her, and the recording of that call was admitted at trial even though the victim invoked her right not to testify. The trial court convicted the defendant on one count, and the Appeals Court affirmed. On further review, the Supreme Judicial Court held that the 911 statements were admissible as excited utterances under hearsay rules because they were made spontaneously while the victim was still upset and in distress. The court further concluded that the statements were nontestimonial under the Sixth Amendment confrontation clause because the victim's primary purpose was to seek immediate police assistance amid an ongoing emergency, as she indicated the defendant was still in the apartment and she needed help before he left. The court therefore affirmed the conviction.

criminal lawprocedure

The Department of Children and Families petitioned under G. L. c. 119, § 24, to find Daisy a child in need of care and protection based on her reports of sexual abuse by her father, which her mother refused to believe; after a trial, the Juvenile Court judge found Daisy in need of care, dispensed with parental consent to adoption, and effectively terminated the parents' rights, with only the mother appealing. The Appeals Court affirmed, and the Supreme Judicial Court granted further review limited to whether G. L. c. 233, § 82 permits admission of a child's out-of-court statements describing sexual contact if the child was under age ten when making them but older at trial. The court held that the statute applies based on the child's age at the time the statements were made, so Daisy's statements were admissible as substantive evidence because she was nine when she made them, she was found unavailable due to likely trauma, and the statements met the reliability requirements under § 82(c). The ruling rests on the plain statutory language referring to statements of a child under ten, without regard to age at trial, supported by the statute's purpose and comparisons to other states' laws.

family lawprocedure

The case involved a law firm that entered a contingent fee agreement to represent a client in a medical malpractice action but sought to withdraw after the handling attorney left the firm and the client could not retain successor counsel, leaving discovery behind schedule. The Superior Court judge denied withdrawal and ordered the named partner to file an appearance to ensure the case proceeded. On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court concluded that the judge did not abuse his discretion in requiring another attorney from the firm to appear, but could not designate the named partner specifically. The core reasoning rested on the limits of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.16 and Mass. R. Civ. P. 11(c), under which withdrawal is not permitted when it would have a material adverse effect on the client absent one of the enumerated grounds, particularly after suit has been filed on a contingent fee basis. The matter was remanded to affirm the order requiring firm representation while vacating the specification of the individual attorney.

proceduretorts & liability

The case involved a defendant convicted of deriving support from the earnings of a prostitute and maintaining a house of prostitution based on evidence that his salon offered sexual services during massages. The court vacated the conviction for maintaining a house of prostitution, finding that the jury instructions erroneously defined sexual intercourse in a way that created a substantial risk of miscarriage of justice and that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction. It affirmed the other conviction, concluding that email exchanges were properly authenticated for admission and that the failure to give a limiting instruction on out-of-court statements was not prejudicial. The reasoning centered on the requirements for each offense under Massachusetts law and the standards for authentication and instructional errors.

criminal lawprocedure

A jury convicted the defendant of two counts of first-degree murder on theories of deliberate premeditation, extreme atrocity or cruelty, and felony murder, along with related charges of armed robbery while masked, assault, and firearm offenses, arising from a December 2006 masked armed robbery in Springfield during which two victims were shot and killed. On appeal, the defendant raised multiple claims of error, including the admission of testimony that he was a drug dealer, improper statements in the prosecutor's closing argument, the partial closure of the courtroom during sentencing by removing some family members and supporters, insufficient time to prepare closing argument, and issues with the admission of recorded calls, joint venture instructions, and the absence of a second-degree felony murder instruction. The Supreme Judicial Court concluded that any errors were not prejudicial, that the judge's rulings were proper, and that there was no basis under G. L. c. 278, § 33E to reduce the verdicts or order a new trial, and therefore affirmed the convictions.

criminal lawprocedure

In Commonwealth v. Pytou Heang, the defendant was convicted by a jury of two counts of first-degree murder on theories of deliberate premeditation and felony-murder, as well as armed home invasion and unlawful firearm possession, stemming from a 2005 home invasion shooting in Lynn, Massachusetts, that killed Robert Finnerty and Amy Dumas. On appeal, the defendant challenged the admission of expert ballistics and gunshot residue testimony, his own statements to police, codefendant statements, security video evidence, aspects of jury voir dire, and the sufficiency of the evidence overall. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the convictions, holding that the trial judge's evidentiary rulings were either correct or not prejudicial, that the evidence was sufficient to support the verdicts when viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, and that there was no basis under G. L. c. 278, § 33E to reduce the degree of guilt or grant a new trial.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved two banks acting as trustees for securitized mortgage trusts that foreclosed on properties owned by Antonio Ibanez and Mark and Tammy LaRace, then purchased the properties at the foreclosure sales before seeking Land Court declarations that they held clear title. The court denied the declarations and affirmed the denial on appeal, ruling the foreclosure sales invalid. The core reasoning was that under Massachusetts law, specifically G.L. c. 244, § 14, only the current holder of a mortgage may foreclose, the required notices must accurately identify that holder, and the plaintiffs failed to show they held the mortgages at the time of the notices or sales, as the assignments occurred afterward.

propertyprocedure

The case involved a defendant charged with assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon (his automobile) causing serious bodily injury, assault by means of a dangerous weapon (a handgun), and leaving the scene of an accident after a road-rage incident in which he allegedly swerved his vehicle at the victim on a motorcycle. The jury convicted the defendant of leaving the scene and of assault by means of a dangerous weapon as a lesser included offense but was deadlocked on the greater charge of aggravated assault and battery; the Appeals Court reversed the assault conviction due to a risk that the defendant was convicted of an act not charged in the indictment. The Supreme Judicial Court concluded that the defendant could be retried for assault by means of a dangerous weapon limited to the final swerve under a threatened battery theory only, as the prior conviction constituted an implied acquittal of the greater charge and the evidence did not support an attempted battery theory for retrial.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved the 2002 murder of Christa Worthington in Truro, Massachusetts, where defendant Christopher McCowen was convicted by a jury of first-degree murder on theories of extreme atrocity or cruelty and felony-murder, as well as aggravated rape and aggravated burglary. On appeal, McCowen challenged the convictions and the denial of new trial motions, raising issues including the validity of his Miranda waiver and post-arrest statements, grand jury proceedings, venue and juror sequestration, various evidentiary rulings, the discharge of a deliberating juror, nondisclosure of exculpatory evidence, and alleged racial bias affecting jury impartiality. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the convictions and the trial judge's denial of the new trial motions. After full review of the record under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, the court found no error warranting reversal or reduction of the degree of guilt.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

In this insurance coverage dispute, George Billings sought a declaratory judgment that Commerce Insurance had a duty to defend him under a personal umbrella policy in a 2000 civil action alleging malicious prosecution and intentional infliction of emotional distress, which stemmed from a 1998 zoning-related lawsuit Billings had filed against the Petersons before the policy period began. The policy provided defense coverage for personal injuries including malicious prosecution and defamation if caused by an occurrence during the March 2000 to March 2001 term. The court held that Commerce had no duty to defend, ruling that the occurrence date for malicious prosecution is the filing of the underlying action (here, 1998, outside coverage) rather than its later termination, and that the alleged rumor-spreading did not constitute defamation occurring within the policy period. The decision joined the majority of jurisdictions on the timing issue for malicious prosecution claims and applied standard rules requiring the complaint or known facts to sketch a covered claim within the policy term.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

This case concerned a juvenile charged with multiple assault offenses who had previously been found incompetent to stand trial; the court addressed whether a pretrial dangerousness hearing under G. L. c. 276, § 58A could proceed, whether the Commonwealth could meet its burden using only hearsay evidence such as police reports, and whether any resulting detention could exceed the statute's 90-day maximum due to ongoing incompetency. The Supreme Judicial Court answered all three questions in the affirmative. It reasoned that due process permits certain pretrial proceedings to continue despite incompetency, that § 58A does not require live testimony, and that the detention period may be tolled during incompetency provided it does not exceed the time the juvenile could face if adjudicated delinquent, with mandatory periodic competency reviews every 90 days.

criminal lawprocedurefamily law

In Commonwealth v. Goodwin, the case concerned whether a judge could add GPS monitoring and geographic exclusion zones as conditions of probation during a modification hearing for a defendant convicted of rape of a child and kidnapping, where no probation violation had occurred and the original sentence had already been served in part. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that a judge lacks authority to impose such GPS conditions absent a finding of a probation violation, a material change in the defendant's circumstances, or other justification, because GPS monitoring paired with exclusions is punitive and would significantly increase the severity of the original probation terms. The court reasoned that probation modifications are discretionary only when supported by changed circumstances or violations, drawing on prior precedent like Commonwealth v. Cory that recognized GPS as imposing a substantial burden on liberty. It affirmed the lower judge's denial of the Commonwealth's request to add these conditions post-release from civil commitment as a sexually dangerous person. The decision emphasized limits on ex post facto punitive additions to existing probation without new grounds.

criminal lawprocedure

In this case, the defendant was charged with assault and battery, assault by dangerous weapon, and home invasion after attacking his girlfriend. After marrying the victim, she invoked spousal privilege and refused to testify, prompting the Commonwealth to seek admission of her prior out-of-court statements to friends, family, and police under the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine. The court held that the doctrine, consistent with both state precedent in Edwards and the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Giles v. California, applies when a defendant acts with intent to make a witness unavailable, including through marriage to enable spousal privilege. It found the hearsay admissible on a preponderance of the evidence standard, with sufficient indicia of reliability to satisfy due process, and upheld the conviction for assault and battery despite an improper closing argument. The decision clarified the scope of forfeiture by wrongdoing in Massachusetts and rejected arguments for a higher proof standard.

criminal lawprocedure

In this case, the defendant was convicted by a jury of first-degree murder on theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty, as well as armed assault with intent to murder, based on evidence that he shot two men, killing one and injuring the other, after an encounter on a Boston street. On appeal, the defendant raised multiple claims, including violations of his confrontation rights regarding DNA testimony from a witness who did not perform the testing, improper admission of evidence about an uncharged prior murder and related statements, post-Miranda denials, an autopsy photograph, and inadequate jury instructions on uncharged conduct evidence and unrecorded interrogations. The court found some trial errors but determined they were not prejudicial enough to require reversal. After reviewing the full record, the court also declined to reduce the murder conviction or order a new trial under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, and therefore affirmed the convictions.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned a shareholder derivative action in which the plaintiff demanded that the board of a Massachusetts business trust investigate and sue its trustees for breaching fiduciary duties by approving new investment advisory agreements without seeking competitive bids. The plaintiff filed suit more than ninety days after the demand but before the board formally rejected it; the board later declined to pursue the claims and moved to dismiss under the business judgment rule. The Supreme Judicial Court answered a certified question from the Second Circuit by holding that Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 156D, § 7.44 permits dismissal of a timely filed derivative complaint when independent directors, after a good-faith inquiry, determine that continued prosecution is not in the corporation’s best interests. The court reasoned that the statute focuses on whether the proceeding may be maintained rather than when it was commenced, that the Legislature expressly distinguished “commence” from “maintain,” and that the statutory scheme allows for stays while inquiries are completed. The decision therefore applies the business judgment rule to the post-rejection motion to dismiss.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case concerned a dispute over the interpretation of Section 8.1(d) in a 1998 cable television renewal license between the City of Springfield and Comcast, specifically whether the provision barred Comcast from including any franchise-related costs (such as public, educational, and governmental access support) in its calculation of basic service tier rates charged to subscribers. The City challenged Comcast's rate filings before the Department of Telecommunications and Cable, arguing that the license prohibited passing through these costs entirely and seeking rebates for prior inclusions. The department interpreted the provision, consistent with federal cable regulations and FCC guidance, as prohibiting only increases in such costs beyond those already embedded in prior rates, and approved the filings accordingly. On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the department's order, holding that the term 'pass through' is a term of art in this regulatory context that permits continuation of embedded costs while barring new increments, aligning with the license's intent and federal policy on rate adjustments at renewal.

business & regulatory

The case involved a plaintiff who slipped and fell on ice in a Target store parking lot, where the ice had formed from snow piled on a median by snowplowing; he sued Target and the snow removal contractor for negligence. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants, and the Appeals Court affirmed, applying the longstanding rule that property owners owe no duty to remove natural accumulations of snow and ice. On further review, the Supreme Judicial Court abolished the distinction between natural and unnatural accumulations of snow and ice. It held that property owners and those responsible for maintenance must exercise reasonable care to protect lawful visitors from all hazards arising from snow and ice, just as with other dangers on the premises. The decision applies the general negligence standard to such slip-and-fall claims going forward.

torts & liabilityproperty

The case involved a defendant convicted in Boston Municipal Court of distributing cocaine, possessing cocaine, and distributing cocaine within 100 feet of a public park, based on police observations of the defendant interacting with others in Franklin Square Park, including handing an item to a woman who was later found with cocaine. The Appeals Court had reversed the convictions due to an error in denying a motion to suppress. On further review, the Supreme Judicial Court held that the evidence was legally insufficient to support the distribution convictions because it did not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant distributed cocaine, and therefore ordered judgments of acquittal on those counts. The Court also reversed the possession conviction on different grounds, finding errors in the suppression hearing regarding the admissibility of a witness statement and the allocation of burdens on whether a seizure occurred before drugs were dropped, and remanded for a new suppression hearing and trial.

criminal lawprocedure

In Commonwealth v. Linton, a jury convicted the defendant of first-degree murder on a theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty for the manual strangulation of his wife. The defendant appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict, that the trial judge erred in admitting the victim's account of a prior assault by the defendant and in refusing to instruct the jury on involuntary manslaughter, and that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to challenge aspects of the prosecution's case. The court held that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, was sufficient to establish the elements of the crime, including the time and manner of death based on medical examiner testimony and circumstantial evidence placing the defendant at the scene. The court further concluded that the prior assault evidence was properly admitted, that an involuntary manslaughter instruction was not warranted given the evidence of malice, and that counsel's performance did not fall below constitutional standards. Accordingly, the court affirmed the conviction and the denial of the motion for a new trial.

criminal law