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Decision levers
AI-measured from their own opinions — each lever cites its cases
Willing to revisit precedentStrong stare decisis
In [7] explicitly follows longstanding precedent barring equitable tolling for attorney miscalculation of §2255 limitations period. Joseph Lombardo v. United States ↗
Deference to government powerSkepticism of government power
In [6] reverses to permit Eighth Amendment deliberate-indifference claim against county jail officials, indicating skepticism of government power. Pittman Ex Rel. Hamilton v. Coun… ↗
The case concerned Jaime C. Lopez, who was convicted by a jury of fifteen counts of wire fraud, four counts of money laundering, and one count of securities fraud after soliciting roughly $450,000 from four investors for purported investments in major corporations such as Coca-Cola and ExxonMobil, then using the funds primarily for personal expenses like mortgage and car payments while altering promissory note terms without consent. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the convictions. The court reasoned that the district judge’s evidentiary rulings—permitting a summary witness to describe certain payments as “lulling,” allowing a closing-argument reference to Bernie Madoff, denying expert-witness labeling for one defense witness, and excluding extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement—did not rise to the level of reversible error or deprive Lopez of a fair trial.
Chessie Logistics, a rail carrier, sued neighboring industrial property owner Krinos Holdings for trespass, negligence, and violating a federal rail statute after Krinos's sewer and drainage work allegedly damaged Chessie's tracks by burying them and directing runoff onto them. The district court dismissed the federal claim and later granted Krinos summary judgment on the common-law claims, ruling that Chessie failed to prove easements and that an independent contractor performed the work; it also barred Chessie's attempt to add a negligence-per-se theory based on an Illinois excavation statute. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that 49 U.S.C. § 10903 creates no private right of action and that Chessie forfeited the new negligence theory by raising it for the first time in summary-judgment briefing rather than earlier in the case. The court noted that Chessie did not challenge the summary judgment on its original trespass and negligence claims.
This case was a class-action products-liability suit against Sears and Whirlpool alleging two defects in certain front-loading washing machines sold between 2004 and 2006. After the parties settled, the district court awarded class counsel $4.77 million in attorney fees by taking their $2.73 million lodestar and applying a 1.75 multiplier, citing the case’s complexity, public interest, and the settlement obtained. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that counsel were entitled only to the $2.7 million base amount. The court reasoned that factors such as novelty and complexity are already incorporated into the lodestar calculation of hours and rates, that fees presumptively should not greatly exceed the class’s actual recovery (here estimated at no more than $900,000), and that counsel had not shown why a higher fee was justified.
In this habeas corpus appeal, John Stephenson challenged his Indiana state convictions for three 1996 murders and related crimes, along with his resulting death sentence, on grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel and juror misconduct. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the convictions, finding that new witness testimony and other evidence did not establish actual innocence and that any juror misconduct did not prejudice the guilt phase. However, the court reversed the denial of relief on the death sentence and remanded to vacate it, holding that Stephenson's counsel performed deficiently by failing to object to his wearing a visible stun belt during the brief penalty phase without any evidence of courtroom danger. The panel reasoned that the belt's presence, known to at least four jurors, risked improperly influencing the jury's assessment of Stephenson's character and dangerousness when deciding on the death penalty.
Derick Berry sued Wells Fargo, his mortgage servicer, and HSBC, the trustee for the mortgage holder, in federal court after losing his Chicago home to foreclosure in Illinois state court proceedings that concluded with a 2015 judicial sale. Berry alleged improper fees, misstated debt amounts, failure to provide a loan modification, and racial discrimination under the Fair Housing Act, along with related state-law claims. The district court dismissed the suit, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that claim preclusion barred the federal action because a final state-court judgment had resolved the same underlying mortgage and foreclosure dispute between the same parties or their privies. The court explained that the federal claims arose from the identical group of operative facts as the state litigation, including Berry’s challenges to the foreclosure, payment disputes, and modification requests, and that any new allegations about unrelated third-party conduct did not state a claim against the named defendants.
Dorette Brownlee sued her former employer, Hospira, Inc., under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, alleging that her discharge violated the statute. The parties reached a preliminary understanding to settle the case but explicitly agreed in writing that no binding agreement would exist until a formal typed settlement document was signed by both sides, which never occurred. The district court nevertheless ruled that the case had been settled based on the lawyers’ negotiations and closed the litigation. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit held that the unsigned document did not create an enforceable settlement under the parties’ own terms. The court therefore vacated the district court’s order and remanded the case for further proceedings, leaving the underlying lawsuit open.
