Richard Allen Posner

The case concerned Jaime C. Lopez, who was convicted by a jury of fifteen counts of wire fraud, four counts of money laundering, and one count of securities fraud after soliciting roughly $450,000 from four investors for purported investments in major corporations such as Coca-Cola and ExxonMobil, then using the funds primarily for personal expenses like mortgage and car payments while altering promissory note terms without consent. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the convictions. The court reasoned that the district judge’s evidentiary rulings—permitting a summary witness to describe certain payments as “lulling,” allowing a closing-argument reference to Bernie Madoff, denying expert-witness labeling for one defense witness, and excluding extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement—did not rise to the level of reversible error or deprive Lopez of a fair trial.

criminal lawbusiness & regulatoryprocedure

Chessie Logistics, a rail carrier, sued neighboring industrial property owner Krinos Holdings for trespass, negligence, and violating a federal rail statute after Krinos's sewer and drainage work allegedly damaged Chessie's tracks by burying them and directing runoff onto them. The district court dismissed the federal claim and later granted Krinos summary judgment on the common-law claims, ruling that Chessie failed to prove easements and that an independent contractor performed the work; it also barred Chessie's attempt to add a negligence-per-se theory based on an Illinois excavation statute. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that 49 U.S.C. § 10903 creates no private right of action and that Chessie forfeited the new negligence theory by raising it for the first time in summary-judgment briefing rather than earlier in the case. The court noted that Chessie did not challenge the summary judgment on its original trespass and negligence claims.

propertyproceduretorts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

This case was a class-action products-liability suit against Sears and Whirlpool alleging two defects in certain front-loading washing machines sold between 2004 and 2006. After the parties settled, the district court awarded class counsel $4.77 million in attorney fees by taking their $2.73 million lodestar and applying a 1.75 multiplier, citing the case’s complexity, public interest, and the settlement obtained. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that counsel were entitled only to the $2.7 million base amount. The court reasoned that factors such as novelty and complexity are already incorporated into the lodestar calculation of hours and rates, that fees presumptively should not greatly exceed the class’s actual recovery (here estimated at no more than $900,000), and that counsel had not shown why a higher fee was justified.

torts & liabilityprocedure

In this habeas corpus appeal, John Stephenson challenged his Indiana state convictions for three 1996 murders and related crimes, along with his resulting death sentence, on grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel and juror misconduct. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the convictions, finding that new witness testimony and other evidence did not establish actual innocence and that any juror misconduct did not prejudice the guilt phase. However, the court reversed the denial of relief on the death sentence and remanded to vacate it, holding that Stephenson's counsel performed deficiently by failing to object to his wearing a visible stun belt during the brief penalty phase without any evidence of courtroom danger. The panel reasoned that the belt's presence, known to at least four jurors, risked improperly influencing the jury's assessment of Stephenson's character and dangerousness when deciding on the death penalty.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

Derick Berry sued Wells Fargo, his mortgage servicer, and HSBC, the trustee for the mortgage holder, in federal court after losing his Chicago home to foreclosure in Illinois state court proceedings that concluded with a 2015 judicial sale. Berry alleged improper fees, misstated debt amounts, failure to provide a loan modification, and racial discrimination under the Fair Housing Act, along with related state-law claims. The district court dismissed the suit, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that claim preclusion barred the federal action because a final state-court judgment had resolved the same underlying mortgage and foreclosure dispute between the same parties or their privies. The court explained that the federal claims arose from the identical group of operative facts as the state litigation, including Berry’s challenges to the foreclosure, payment disputes, and modification requests, and that any new allegations about unrelated third-party conduct did not state a claim against the named defendants.

propertycivil rightsprocedure

Dorette Brownlee sued her former employer, Hospira, Inc., under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, alleging that her discharge violated the statute. The parties reached a preliminary understanding to settle the case but explicitly agreed in writing that no binding agreement would exist until a formal typed settlement document was signed by both sides, which never occurred. The district court nevertheless ruled that the case had been settled based on the lawyers’ negotiations and closed the litigation. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit held that the unsigned document did not create an enforceable settlement under the parties’ own terms. The court therefore vacated the district court’s order and remanded the case for further proceedings, leaving the underlying lawsuit open.

civil rightslabor & employmentprocedure

In United States v. Murtaza Ali, the defendant, a naturalized U.S. citizen, pleaded guilty to international parental kidnapping under 18 U.S.C. § 1204 after taking his three children out of the country without his wife’s knowledge or consent, in violation of a court custody order that barred him from removing them from Illinois. He was intercepted in Turkey and returned to the U.S., where the district court sentenced him to 18 months in prison after applying a three-level sentencing guidelines enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2J1.2(b)(2) for substantially interfering with the administration of justice. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the sentence, holding that the government’s unreimbursed costs—such as a $4,600 commercial flight and the multi-day, around-the-clock efforts of several federal agencies and agents to secure the children’s return—qualified as an “unnecessary expenditure of substantial governmental or court resources” under the guidelines’ application note. The court noted that these costs were not trivial relative to the modest increase in the guidelines range (from 8–14 months to 15–21 months) and therefore supported the enhancement.

criminal lawfamily law

Melissa Vanprooyen applied for Disability Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Security Income, claiming disability from a 2010 fall that caused a brain hemorrhage and seizures, along with anxiety, PTSD, ADHD, fibromyalgia, and related conditions. An administrative law judge found her impairments severe but not disabling and denied benefits, a ruling upheld by the district court. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, concluding that the ALJ improperly discounted the claimant's reports of pain and limitations without objective medical support, gave inadequate weight to her treating psychiatrist's opinions on mental functioning without sufficient justification or consideration of treatment records, overlooked a consultative examiner's finding that she could not manage her own money, and relied too heavily on non-examining physicians' opinions. These errors in the ALJ's analysis required further administrative proceedings.

healthcareprocedure

The case involved Meryl Squires-Cannon’s federal lawsuit against the Forest Preserve District of Cook County and related defendants, claiming false arrest and malicious prosecution after she was arrested for criminal trespass while entering the 400-acre property to tend horses. The property had been foreclosed on and purchased by the District in 2013, and a state court dispossession order required her and her husband to vacate; she continued daily visits until her arrest in August 2014, following an explicit email warning the night before that any entry would be treated as trespass. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the suit, holding that probable cause for arrest existed under Illinois law because she had received and defied clear notice that she was not authorized to enter the property for any reason. The court rejected her argument that her status as an employee of the former lessee (Royalty Farms) created any right to enter, and it found no issue with considering the warning email and related documents on a motion to dismiss since their accuracy was undisputed.

criminal lawpropertycivil rightstorts & liability

The case involved a dispute over the terms of an oral settlement agreement in litigation stemming from Terence Chancellor’s home mortgage loan with Select Portfolio Servicing and JPMorgan Chase Bank. The defendants required Chancellor to release any claims against two non-party entities—an unnamed bank and a trust company—as part of the deal, and the district court enforced that requirement. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case. It held that there was no evidence from an evidentiary hearing showing Chancellor had been informed of or agreed to the release of claims against the non-parties during settlement negotiations, so the lower court lacked a factual basis for its ruling.

propertyprocedurebusiness & regulatory

The case involved a lawsuit by Reginald Pittman’s guardian against Madison County jail guards Randy Eaton and Matt Werner, alleging they were deliberately indifferent to Pittman’s risk of suicide in violation of the Eighth Amendment after he attempted to hang himself in his cell in 2007, leaving him in a vegetative state. After a jury returned a verdict for the defendants, the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded for a new trial. The court held that the district judge abused her discretion by excluding a 2007 videotaped interview with key witness Bradley Banovz, who had described the guards ignoring Pittman’s requests for crisis counselors; the defendants had stipulated before trial that the video could be admitted if Banovz testified, and stipulations cannot be unilaterally withdrawn. Although Banovz later gave weak live testimony at trial, the court found the exclusion prejudicial because the video was the centerpiece of the plaintiff’s case and could have meaningfully affected the jury’s assessment of the guards’ credibility and conduct.

civil rightsprocedure

The case involved a contract dispute between Tate & Lyle, which purchased a custom granulator machine from Glatt, and Glatt after a 2009 fire damaged the machine at Tate’s Illinois facility; Tate and its insurer sued for property damage, repair costs, and related losses allegedly caused by defective filters or missing fire suppression, while Glatt counterclaimed for the unpaid contract balance. The district court ruled that a contract clause barring “special damages” did not prevent recovery of attorneys’ fees and expenses by a prevailing party under a separate fee-shifting provision, allowed Tate to present evidence that defective filters caused the fire despite its earlier Rule 36 admissions, and entered judgment on the jury’s verdict awarding the insurer damages plus fees to Tate. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the admissions were not contradicted by the evidence (which focused on stress and poor fit rather than cracks or chips) and that treating fees as “special damages” would nullify the contract’s express fee award to the prevailing party.

business & regulatorypropertyproceduretorts & liability

In United States v. Marvin Bennett, the defendant pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which normally carries a maximum sentence of 10 years, but faced a mandatory minimum of 15 years under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) due to three prior convictions, including one for resisting law enforcement under an Indiana statute (Ind. Code § 35-44-3-3) that the district court classified as a "violent felony." The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court's sentencing decision, vacated Bennett's plea agreement, and remanded the case, holding that the Indiana conviction did not qualify as a violent felony under ACCA's elements clause (18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i)). The court reasoned that the statute's provision for "inflicting bodily injury" during resistance can be satisfied by non-violent conduct, such as passive actions that cause officers to injure themselves while attempting an arrest, without requiring the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against another person.

gunscriminal law

The case involved a contract dispute in which Prime Choice Services performed cross-docking work for Schneider Logistics but withdrew its workers after Schneider failed to make timely payments, including an $82,000 invoice. Prime sued for approximately $289,000 in unpaid amounts, and Schneider countersued for $853,000 in damages from the alleged repudiation. In the first trial, the jury found that Prime had repudiated the contract but awarded Schneider zero damages; the district judge granted a new trial limited to damages under Rule 59, and a second jury awarded Schneider $564,000 net. The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the first jury’s zero-damages verdict was not against the manifest weight of the evidence or a miscarriage of justice. A rational jury could have concluded that Schneider failed to mitigate its damages—such as by promptly resolving the payment dispute, which might have prevented Prime from leaving and avoided any loss—making the district judge’s decision to override the verdict improper.

business & regulatoryprocedure

Yehuda Frager sued the Indianapolis Colts for conversion under Indiana law, alleging that the team unlawfully took his rights to 94 season tickets by refusing to renew the tickets he had purchased for the 2015 season into 2016 tickets. The district court dismissed the suit with prejudice, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court reasoned that the ticket contract expressly reserved to the Colts the right to reject any renewal, so Frager possessed no legal ownership interest in future tickets—only an unenforceable expectation or speculation of renewal, as distinguished in an analogy to Holmes’s 1901 opinion in Emery v. Boston Terminal Co.

propertytorts & liability

The case involved a class action by current and former foundry workers from Wisconsin, Indiana, and Tennessee against Waupaca Foundry, alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (and Wisconsin wage law) for the company’s failure to pay them for time spent changing clothes and showering after shifts to remove hazardous foundry dust, which the workers claimed was integral to their jobs. The district court conditionally certified an FLSA collective action, then later certified a Rule 23 class limited to Wisconsin employees, partially decertified the broader FLSA class, severed the Indiana and Tennessee claims, and transferred them to courts in those states. On appeal under Rule 23(f), the Seventh Circuit held that this was not an abuse of discretion. It reasoned that the Wisconsin plaintiffs shared sufficient commonality for class treatment under state law, while the out-of-state opt-ins lacked enough overlap with the Wisconsin claims to remain in a single FLSA action and could be more efficiently handled separately in their home states. The court emphasized district judges’ broad discretion to manage collective actions and noted that further proceedings on the severed claims would occur on remand.

labor & employmentprocedure

The case concerned Affordable Recovery Housing, a faith-based organization that moved dozens of men into former school buildings in Blue Island to operate a recovery home for addiction without first obtaining required permits or installing a sprinkler system demanded by the city’s fire code. After the residents were evicted and Affordable later secured a state license that preempted the local sprinkler rule, it sued the city and fire chief seeking damages and attorneys’ fees under the Illinois Religious Freedom Restoration Act, the federal Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, and the Fair Housing Amendments Act. The district court allowed the facility to operate without sprinklers but rejected the damages claims, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The appeals court held that the eviction resulted from legitimate fire-safety enforcement rather than any targeting of religious exercise, that Affordable had voluntarily assumed the regulatory risk by beginning operations without compliance or research, and that none of the cited statutes provided a basis for relief because the sprinkler requirement did not substantially burden religion, did not constitute zoning action under RLUIPA, and did not involve exclusion of handicapped persons under the Fair Housing Act.

religious libertycivil rightspropertybusiness & regulatory

Joseph Lombardo, serving a life sentence for racketeering, murder, and obstruction of justice, filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 claiming ineffective assistance of trial counsel. His new attorney filed the motion after the one-year deadline under § 2255(f)(1), mistakenly believing the limitations period began when the Supreme Court denied rehearing rather than when it denied certiorari. The district court dismissed the motion as untimely, and Lombardo sought equitable tolling based on the attorney’s error, which he attributed partly to a paralegal’s misinformation. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal, holding that an attorney’s miscalculation of the statute of limitations does not justify equitable tolling, consistent with longstanding precedent, even when it prevents review of an ineffective-assistance claim.

criminal lawprocedure

Methodist Health Services Corp. sued OSF Healthcare System (Saint Francis Medical Center), alleging that Saint Francis violated the Sherman Act by using its larger size and broader services in the Peoria-area market to secure exclusive in-network contracts with commercial health insurers, which kept Methodist out of those networks and reduced its patient volume. The district court granted summary judgment to Saint Francis on the antitrust claims (and related state claims), and the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court reasoned that the contracts were ordinary, fixed-term exclusive dealing arrangements—common in the form of requirements contracts—that insurers could rebid every one to three years, allowing Methodist an opportunity to compete for them; Methodist offered no evidence of significant market foreclosure, higher prices caused by the contracts, or harm beyond its own lost business as a smaller competitor. The opinion noted that Saint Francis’s status as a “must-have” hospital for certain services explained the insurers’ preferences without proving anticompetitive conduct, and competition for such contracts itself is protected by antitrust law.

business & regulatoryhealthcare

John Lee Futrell, an Army Reserve captain who retired in 2014 on disability grounds after injuries and a diabetes diagnosis sustained during service, sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act for financial and emotional harm caused by the government's failure to pay him incapacitation benefits between late 2011 and early 2013. The district court dismissed the suit, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court held that the claim was barred by the Feres doctrine, under which the FTCA does not authorize suits by service members for injuries that arise out of or occur in the course of activity incident to military service. The opinion explained that this rule, established in Feres v. United States (1950) and still controlling, applies to reservists as well as active-duty personnel, covers claims involving military benefits processed by military staff, and is not avoided merely because the specific negligence concerned delayed payments rather than the original physical injuries.

torts & liabilityfederal powerprocedure