Deference to government powerSkepticism of government power
Denies petition challenging FDA marketing denial after finding the agency's statutory application reasoned and consistent with the Act. GRIPUM LLC v. FDA ↗
In United States v. Roger Pace, the defendant was charged with methamphetamine distribution after an officer discovered the drugs during a nighttime vehicle stop in a closed business parking lot; Pace moved to suppress the evidence and later sought sentencing relief under the statutory “safety valve” provision. The district court denied both requests, and Pace appealed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the officer had reasonable suspicion for the stop based on the late hour, Pace’s connection to a known drug user, his nervous behavior, and his drug-related criminal history. It further held that Pace was ineligible for the safety valve because his criminal history points exceeded the statutory limit under the correct conjunctive reading of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1). A dissent disagreed with the majority’s interpretation of the safety-valve eligibility criteria.
Gripum LLC, which makes flavored e-liquids for open-system e-cigarettes, petitioned for review after the FDA denied its premarket tobacco product application under the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act. The FDA concluded that Gripum had not shown its products were “appropriate for the protection of public health,” because it failed to supply evidence that any benefits to existing adult smokers would outweigh the risks of youth initiation posed by flavored products. The Seventh Circuit denied the petition, holding that the FDA’s comparative-risk analysis followed the statute’s requirements in 21 U.S.C. § 387j(c) and was not arbitrary. The court noted that Gripum’s application lacked product-specific data or bridging studies demonstrating a meaningful “switching” effect from combustible cigarettes, while the agency reasonably considered even limited youth uptake as a relevant harm.
Jose Ageo Luna Vanegas, an H-2A visa worker hired by Signet Builders, sued the company under the Fair Labor Standards Act for unpaid overtime after regularly working more than 40 hours per week constructing livestock confinement buildings on farms in Wisconsin and Indiana. The district court granted Signet’s motion to dismiss, ruling that the work fell within the FLSA’s agricultural exemption under 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(12). The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the exemption is an affirmative defense that must ordinarily be raised in an answer rather than a Rule 12(b)(6) motion and that its application turns on fact-intensive factors not conclusively established by the complaint. The court noted that the complaint alleged purely construction duties with no contact to animals or farming operations, and that H-2A visa certification does not automatically satisfy the narrower FLSA agricultural exemption.
The case arose after Benita Levy missed a premium payment on her West Coast Life term policy and died five months later; the insurer treated the policy as forfeited and denied the death benefit to her sons, the named beneficiaries. The sons sued for breach of contract and declaratory relief, alleging that the insurer’s pre-lapse notice failed to satisfy the specific requirements of section 234(1) of the Illinois Insurance Code, which bars cancellation within six months of a missed payment unless the notice contains prescribed language. The district court dismissed the complaint, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court held that the notice adequately tracked the statutory command by warning that nonpayment would render the policy “forfeited and void,” and that the phrase “the company or its agents” did not obligate the insurer to list multiple payees when the statute’s first sentence already permitted identification of a single recipient. Because the breach-of-contract claim failed as a matter of law, the duplicative declaratory-judgment claim was also properly dismissed.
The case involved Martel Settles’s appeal of his 87-month prison sentence for being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). After Settles pleaded guilty, the district court adopted the presentence report’s advisory guidelines range of 33–41 months but imposed a higher sentence, citing the offense’s seriousness—Settles’s armed arrival at his ex-girlfriend’s home in violation of a no-contact order while their child was present—and his extensive history of violence against romantic partners. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit held that the district court’s unusual “mathematical” approach of adding equivalent offense levels to account for § 3553(a) factors was arbitrary and not recommended. Nevertheless, because the district court also provided a separate, traditional explanation of the sentence under § 3553(a) that independently supported the result, any procedural error was harmless, and the court affirmed the sentence.
Daryl Holloway, exonerated by DNA after 24 years in prison for two 1992 sexual assaults in Milwaukee, sued the City and several police officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He alleged that suggestive photo arrays and lineups, withheld exculpatory information, an arrest without probable cause, a conspiracy among officers, and the City’s lack of policies on notes, identifications, and DNA testing violated his constitutional rights. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court held that the identification procedures may have been impermissibly suggestive, but the officers were entitled to qualified immunity because the law was not clearly established at the time; it found no Brady violation, probable cause supported the arrest, no evidence showed a conspiracy, and the City had no notice of a pattern or obvious risk that would support Monell liability.
