Fredrick Michael Baer was convicted in Indiana state court of murdering a woman and her four-year-old daughter, along with related robbery, theft, and attempted rape charges, and was sentenced to death after the jury rejected his guilty-but-mentally-ill defense. He sought federal habeas relief, arguing that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance under Strickland v. Washington by failing to object to misleading jury instructions on the GBMI standard and to repeated prosecutorial misstatements during voir dire and trial that confused legal standards, implied life without parole might not be permanent, and referenced victim preferences for a death sentence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed Baer's convictions but reversed the district court's denial of habeas relief as to the penalty phase alone. It held that the Indiana Supreme Court unreasonably applied Strickland when it found no deficient performance or prejudice, because counsel's failures allowed the cumulative effect of the improper statements and instructions to taint the jury's sentencing decision and undermine confidence in the death sentence. The court therefore ordered a new penalty-phase trial while leaving the underlying convictions intact.
ADM Alliance Nutrition sued SGA Pharm Lab and its president for breach of contract and fraud, alleging that SGA had overstated the potency of Chlortetracycline supplied under a 2013 Purchase and Development Agreement, causing ADM to overpay more than $1.1 million and later pay an unwarranted $750,000 under a 2014 Termination and Settlement Agreement. The district court granted judgment on the pleadings to the defendants, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court held that the Termination Agreement’s broad release clause expressly covered all claims, known or unknown, against SGA and its officers, and that the agreement’s integration clause stated no other representations had induced the parties to sign. Because the Purchase Agreement’s Certificate of Analysis obligations did not survive termination and no continuing warranties about potency existed, the release barred both the contract and fraud claims. The court also upheld the award of attorneys’ fees to the prevailing defendants under the Termination Agreement.
Sophie Toulon purchased a long-term care insurance policy from Continental Casualty Company in 2002 that included a ten-year premium rate guarantee, after which Continental raised her premiums by 76.5% in 2013. She sued on behalf of herself and others, claiming the insurer had used misleading sales practices to attract elderly buyers with artificially low initial rates while concealing plans for later large increases, and asserted claims for fraudulent misrepresentation, fraudulent omission, violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Practices Act, and unjust enrichment. The district court dismissed the complaint, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court held that Toulon had not identified any false statement by Continental or any duty to disclose further information, had not alleged a deceptive act, material omission, or unfair practice under the ICFA, and could not maintain an unjust enrichment claim because the fraud and statutory claims were insufficient and an express contract already governed the parties’ relationship.
In United States v. Johnson and Lang, the defendants were charged under the Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act (AETA) after traveling from California to an Illinois mink farm, releasing about 2,000 minks from their cages, destroying breeding records and equipment, and causing $120,000–$200,000 in property damage before being arrested en route to a second farm. They moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that AETA is unconstitutionally overbroad because it criminalizes protected speech or expressive conduct that causes only economic losses such as lost profits or goodwill, is void for vagueness, and violates substantive due process by labeling them “terrorists” for non-violent property damage. The district court denied the motion, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the statute requires damage to tangible real or personal property and does not reach lawful advocacy causing only economic harm, that its terms are sufficiently definite to avoid arbitrary enforcement, and that Congress had a rational basis for using “terrorism” in the non-codified title given the statute’s focus on violent acts such as arson and bombings.
In United States v. Reginald Walton, the Indianapolis Land Bank manager and his associate David Johnson were convicted of honest services wire fraud, wire fraud, conspiracy to commit money laundering, and (for Walton) bribery after they exploited a nonprofit loophole to buy city-owned properties at low fixed prices and resell them for personal profit, resulting in a $282,782 loss to the city. On appeal, the defendants challenged the sufficiency of the evidence for their fraud and money-laundering convictions, the district court’s jury instructions on bribery and the lack of a good-faith instruction, and the application of sentencing enhancements for abusing a position of trust and targeting vulnerable victims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed all convictions and sentences, holding that substantial evidence—including kickbacks and false statements—proved the required specific intent, that the jury instructions correctly required proof of bribes rather than gratuities and that a good-faith instruction was unnecessary given the intent element, and that the enhancements were proper because Walton held decision-making authority over Land Bank sales and the purchasers were low-income Hispanic families with limited English proficiency who had previously been defrauded.
In United States v. Ali Al-Awadi, the defendant was convicted of making and attempting to make child pornography after, while alone with napping children at a daycare, he pulled back a four-year-old girl's underwear and took multiple photos of her vagina, claiming he was checking for injury after she hurt herself on his lap. Al-Awadi appealed, contending that the jury received improper instructions on uncharged evidence of digital penetration, that too much molestation evidence was admitted, and that the evidence was insufficient to prove he acted for the purpose of producing visual depictions. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the convictions, ruling that the pattern jury instruction correctly guided the jury on other-acts evidence while requiring proof of the charged crimes beyond a reasonable doubt, that the molestation evidence was admissible under Federal Rules of Evidence 404(b) and 414(a) as relevant to intent and not unduly repetitive, and that the record—including the photos' focus on the genital area, the defendant's prior interest in the child, and his history with child pornography—provided sufficient support for the jury's findings.
