In this case, plaintiff Mary Moxley sued defendant Joseph Pfundstein, an attorney and debt collector, under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act for including a request for $50 in attorney fees in a state court complaint seeking to collect on her defaulted consumer loan. The loan agreement contained a one-sided attorney fee shifting provision that allowed the lender to recover fees upon default but provided no reciprocal right to the borrower. Defendant moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that the complaint failed to state a viable FDCPA claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. The court denied the motion, holding that the contractual provision was unenforceable as a matter of Ohio law because it functioned as a penalty and was not reciprocal, and that the plaintiff had sufficiently alleged facts showing the fee request could be misleading to the least sophisticated debtor.
This case involved two Ohio workers who filed workers' compensation claims for job-related injuries and later purchased prescription drugs from Rite Aid after initial denials by the Bureau of Workers' Compensation's pharmacy benefit manager; they paid full cash prices and sought refunds for the difference when the BWC later reimbursed only the lower scheduled amounts, but Rite Aid refused. The plaintiffs filed a bilateral class action complaint asserting six claims, including violation of Ohio Rev. Code § 4121.44(E), breach of contract, unjust enrichment, violation of the Consumer Sales Practices Act, and claims for declaratory and injunctive relief. The court granted Rite Aid's motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), holding that the complaint failed to state any plausible claim because Rite Aid had no legal or contractual obligation to refund the difference between the cash price and the BWC fee schedule amount, the alleged conduct did not violate the cited statutes, and no basis existed for the equitable or declaratory claims.
This case involves consolidated class action complaints by plaintiffs against Howard Hanna Company and another defendant, alleging that the collection of an 'Administrative Fee' for real estate settlement services violated Section 8(b) of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA) because no services were performed in exchange, and that including the fee on HUD-1 settlement statements constituted fraud. Defendants moved to dismiss the RESPA claims and for judgment on the pleadings or partial summary judgment, arguing primarily that Section 8(b) requires a fee to be split with a third party and that the statements were not attributable to them. The court denied both motions, finding a circuit split on the RESPA interpretation with authority supporting application to single-party fees, and determining that factual questions remained regarding whether the fee representations were misrepresentations for fraud purposes, which must be resolved in plaintiffs' favor at this stage.
This case concerns a patent infringement dispute between Bendix Commercial Vehicle Systems and Haldex Brake Products over U.S. Reissue Patent No. RE 38,874 involving ModulX brake products. The court granted partial summary judgment to Haldex on its defense of absolute intervening rights under 35 U.S.C. § 252, holding that Haldex has no liability for any infringement based on products made, used, sold, or imported before the reissue patent issued on November 15, 2005. Summary judgment was denied on Haldex's claims for equitable intervening rights and equitable estoppel, as well as on the question of whether Bendix could obtain a permanent injunction, because those issues require resolution of disputed facts. The decision rests on the statutory language protecting parties who relied on the scope of the original patent before a broadened reissue.
In Gill v. Kovach, plaintiff Heidi Gill sued Officer Richard Kovach, the City of Warren, and other officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged Fourth Amendment violations, including excessive force during a taser incident, false arrest, and related state-law claims such as assault, battery, false arrest, and negligent infliction of emotional distress, all arising from her September 2, 2007 arrest after she was intoxicated, gave false information, and entered a vehicle without permission. The district court addressed multiple summary judgment motions and granted the City, Chief Mandopoulos, and Mr. Franklin full summary judgment; granted Officer Kovach summary judgment in part while denying it in part; and granted the defendants summary judgment on the later-added spoliation-of-evidence claim. The court reasoned that undisputed facts established probable cause for arrest on charges such as disorderly conduct and public intoxication, that the officer's use of force was objectively reasonable under the circumstances given Gill's intoxication, resistance, and flight, that no municipal policy or custom supported liability, and that the spoliation claim lacked evidentiary support.
This case involved a high school student, Gina Lausin, and her mother suing school officials, the school board, and city police officers after Gina was investigated and arrested for allegedly writing a racist death threat on a school bathroom wall in March 2006. The court granted summary judgment to all defendants on the federal § 1983 claims and related state claims. The core reasoning was that school officials and police had probable cause to suspect Gina based on surveillance video, handwriting comparisons, her prior comments, and other evidence; that any questioning or searches were lawful; and that the school board's expulsion decision was properly noticed and immune from suit under state law.
