Donald C. Nugent

In this case, plaintiff Mary Moxley sued defendant Joseph Pfundstein, an attorney and debt collector, under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act for including a request for $50 in attorney fees in a state court complaint seeking to collect on her defaulted consumer loan. The loan agreement contained a one-sided attorney fee shifting provision that allowed the lender to recover fees upon default but provided no reciprocal right to the borrower. Defendant moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that the complaint failed to state a viable FDCPA claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. The court denied the motion, holding that the contractual provision was unenforceable as a matter of Ohio law because it functioned as a penalty and was not reciprocal, and that the plaintiff had sufficiently alleged facts showing the fee request could be misleading to the least sophisticated debtor.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involved two Ohio workers who filed workers' compensation claims for job-related injuries and later purchased prescription drugs from Rite Aid after initial denials by the Bureau of Workers' Compensation's pharmacy benefit manager; they paid full cash prices and sought refunds for the difference when the BWC later reimbursed only the lower scheduled amounts, but Rite Aid refused. The plaintiffs filed a bilateral class action complaint asserting six claims, including violation of Ohio Rev. Code § 4121.44(E), breach of contract, unjust enrichment, violation of the Consumer Sales Practices Act, and claims for declaratory and injunctive relief. The court granted Rite Aid's motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), holding that the complaint failed to state any plausible claim because Rite Aid had no legal or contractual obligation to refund the difference between the cash price and the BWC fee schedule amount, the alleged conduct did not violate the cited statutes, and no basis existed for the equitable or declaratory claims.

labor & employmenthealthcarebusiness & regulatoryprocedure

This case involves consolidated class action complaints by plaintiffs against Howard Hanna Company and another defendant, alleging that the collection of an 'Administrative Fee' for real estate settlement services violated Section 8(b) of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA) because no services were performed in exchange, and that including the fee on HUD-1 settlement statements constituted fraud. Defendants moved to dismiss the RESPA claims and for judgment on the pleadings or partial summary judgment, arguing primarily that Section 8(b) requires a fee to be split with a third party and that the statements were not attributable to them. The court denied both motions, finding a circuit split on the RESPA interpretation with authority supporting application to single-party fees, and determining that factual questions remained regarding whether the fee representations were misrepresentations for fraud purposes, which must be resolved in plaintiffs' favor at this stage.

business & regulatoryprocedureproperty

This case concerns a patent infringement dispute between Bendix Commercial Vehicle Systems and Haldex Brake Products over U.S. Reissue Patent No. RE 38,874 involving ModulX brake products. The court granted partial summary judgment to Haldex on its defense of absolute intervening rights under 35 U.S.C. § 252, holding that Haldex has no liability for any infringement based on products made, used, sold, or imported before the reissue patent issued on November 15, 2005. Summary judgment was denied on Haldex's claims for equitable intervening rights and equitable estoppel, as well as on the question of whether Bendix could obtain a permanent injunction, because those issues require resolution of disputed facts. The decision rests on the statutory language protecting parties who relied on the scope of the original patent before a broadened reissue.

business & regulatoryprocedure

In Gill v. Kovach, plaintiff Heidi Gill sued Officer Richard Kovach, the City of Warren, and other officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged Fourth Amendment violations, including excessive force during a taser incident, false arrest, and related state-law claims such as assault, battery, false arrest, and negligent infliction of emotional distress, all arising from her September 2, 2007 arrest after she was intoxicated, gave false information, and entered a vehicle without permission. The district court addressed multiple summary judgment motions and granted the City, Chief Mandopoulos, and Mr. Franklin full summary judgment; granted Officer Kovach summary judgment in part while denying it in part; and granted the defendants summary judgment on the later-added spoliation-of-evidence claim. The court reasoned that undisputed facts established probable cause for arrest on charges such as disorderly conduct and public intoxication, that the officer's use of force was objectively reasonable under the circumstances given Gill's intoxication, resistance, and flight, that no municipal policy or custom supported liability, and that the spoliation claim lacked evidentiary support.

civil rightscriminal lawprocedure

This case involved a high school student, Gina Lausin, and her mother suing school officials, the school board, and city police officers after Gina was investigated and arrested for allegedly writing a racist death threat on a school bathroom wall in March 2006. The court granted summary judgment to all defendants on the federal § 1983 claims and related state claims. The core reasoning was that school officials and police had probable cause to suspect Gina based on surveillance video, handwriting comparisons, her prior comments, and other evidence; that any questioning or searches were lawful; and that the school board's expulsion decision was properly noticed and immune from suit under state law.

civil rightscriminal lawprocedure

The case was a class action ERISA lawsuit brought by participants in the KeyCorp 401(k) Savings Plan against KeyCorp, its officers, directors, and plan fiduciaries, alleging that defendants breached fiduciary duties by imprudently continuing to offer and hold company stock as a plan investment option despite known risks from business practices, failing to disclose risks to participants, and engaging in related monitoring and conflict-of-interest violations. The court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss the consolidated complaint in full. The core reasoning was that ERISA imposes strict fiduciary standards of prudence and loyalty, the plaintiffs' factual allegations were sufficient to make their claims plausible under pleading standards, the Moench presumption of prudence did not apply at the motion-to-dismiss stage, and defenses such as efficient market theory were inappropriate for resolution before discovery.

labor & employmentbusiness & regulatoryprocedure

In Ross v. Kelley, petitioner Denny F. Ross filed a federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his Ohio state court convictions for attempted murder, rape, intimidation of a crime victim, and two counts of felonious assault, along with his resulting sentence. The district court adopted the magistrate judge's report and recommendation in full after de novo review. It dismissed the petition with prejudice, finding the report well-supported and the petitioner's objections without merit. The court further certified that any appeal would not be taken in good faith and denied a certificate of appealability. The underlying claims involved alleged constitutional errors in the state proceedings, including sentencing issues under Ohio law.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Steven L. Gardner challenging two traffic violation notices issued under Cleveland's automated photo enforcement ordinance for speeding, claiming the ordinance was unconstitutional on its face and as applied, and that the hearing process violated his rights under the U.S. and Ohio Constitutions. He sought declaratory and injunctive relief plus damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after being found liable at an administrative hearing. The court granted summary judgment to the defendants on the federal claims, finding no constitutional violation based on the Ohio Supreme Court's ruling in Mendenhall v. Akron that upheld similar municipal automated traffic enforcement systems imposing civil penalties, and because the plaintiff failed to show any due process or equal protection deprivation. The court declined supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims and remanded them to state court.

civil rightscriminal law

The case involved plaintiff Bonnie Kramer, a disabled individual and self-described ADA 'tester,' who sued defendant Midamco, Inc., the owner of Solon Square Shopping Center, alleging that barriers at the facility violated the Americans with Disabilities Act by denying her access to goods and services. After extensive discovery disputes, the court considered the defendant's motion for summary judgment, which was supported by Kramer's deposition testimony and other evidence. The court granted the motion, finding that Kramer had not provided specific facts showing she encountered actionable barriers or suffered the injuries alleged in the complaint. Her testimony revealed that she visited only a few stores, encountered no barriers at several locations including Quiznos and Office Max, and made statements that contradicted prior declarations and interrogatory responses regarding restroom access and other issues. The decision rested on Kramer's failure to establish standing or prove the substantive ADA claims with competent evidence.

civil rightsprocedure

The case involved Paul D. Lowe's federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his Ohio conviction for sexual battery under Ohio Rev. Code § 2907.03(A)(5), which prohibits sexual conduct between a stepparent and stepchild; the conviction stemmed from Lowe's admitted consensual relationship with his adult stepdaughter. Lowe argued that the statute infringed on his fundamental right to privacy in consensual sexual relationships, relying on Lawrence v. Texas to claim that strict scrutiny should apply rather than rational basis review. The district court adopted the magistrate judge's report and recommendation, denied the petition and motion for summary judgment, and dismissed the case. The court reasoned that Lawrence does not clearly establish constitutional protection for incestuous relationships between stepparents and adult stepchildren, and the Ohio Supreme Court's application of rational basis scrutiny was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.

criminal lawfamily lawcivil rightsfederal power

The case involves multiple plaintiffs suing brokerage firms including SG Cowen, Cowen & Company, Hambrecht & Quist, and J.P. Morgan Chase for claims stemming from an employee's alleged malfeasance in securities accounts between 1982 and 2002. The court addressed several motions to dismiss time-barred or insufficiently pled claims, related joinders, a motion for judgment on the pleadings, and one plaintiff's motion for leave to file a second amended complaint. It applied Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standards under Twombly, requiring factual allegations to raise plausible claims rather than mere speculation or legal conclusions, while reviewing the procedural history including a prior arbitration stay. The core reasoning emphasized evaluating the complaints' sufficiency on issues like statute of limitations and vicarious liability without deciding the ultimate merits.

business & regulatoryprocedurecriminal law

In Hart v. Ridge Tool Co., plaintiff Hart sued his former employer alleging wrongful termination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act due to disability discrimination, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act due to age discrimination, and the ADEA's anti-retaliation provision after he complained about an age-related remark. The district court adopted the magistrate judge's report and granted the employer's motion for summary judgment on all claims. The court reasoned that Hart was not a qualified individual under the ADA or ADEA because he had applied for and received a Social Security disability determination finding him totally disabled as of a date before his termination, and the record showed he could not perform the essential functions of his sales manager position with or without accommodation. On the retaliation claim, the court found no causal link between Hart's 2001 complaint and his 2004 termination, as the decision-makers were not shown to have been involved with or motivated by the earlier complaint.

labor & employmentcivil rights

This case involved a First Amendment challenge by Shirley Phelps-Roper, a member of the Westboro Baptist Church, to Ohio Revised Code § 3767.30, which prohibits picketing or other protest activities within 300 feet of funeral or burial services and funeral processions. The plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming the statute imposed unconstitutional prior restraints and overbroad time, place, and manner restrictions on her religious protests at military funerals. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the court upheld the fixed buffer zone around funeral locations as a content-neutral regulation that was narrowly tailored to the state's significant interest in protecting mourners from disruption while leaving open ample alternative channels for communication. However, the court struck the floating buffer zone for funeral processions as burdening substantially more speech than necessary and severed those provisions from the statute.

free speechreligious liberty

The Commodity Futures Trading Commission brought this enforcement action under the Commodity Exchange Act against Carnegie Trading Group and its president John Glasé, alleging that two Carnegie employees made false and misleading sales solicitations to customers by touting enormous profit potential with minimal or no risk and by distributing false advertisements for a trading program. The employees had already settled with the CFTC before trial. After a bench trial, the court found that the employees violated Sections 4b(a)(2)(i) and (iii) and 4c(b) of the Act and Regulation 33.10, that Carnegie was liable for those violations under Section 2(a)(1)(B) because they occurred within the scope of employment, and that Glasé was liable both as a controlling person under Section 13(b) and for failing to diligently supervise under Regulation 166.3. The court ordered Carnegie and Glasé to pay restitution totaling $229,971.31 to specified customers, to disgorge $32,850 in earnings, and to pay a civil monetary penalty of $98,550.

business & regulatory

The case involved the Secretary of Labor suing First National Lending Corporation and an individual defendant under the Fair Labor Standards Act for failing to pay minimum wage and overtime compensation to clerical workers and loan officers, as well as for inadequate record-keeping, covering the period from August 2001 through December 2004. After a three-day bench trial, the court ruled in favor of the plaintiff on all claims, issuing an injunction against future violations and ordering the defendants to pay $186,099.74 in back wages, liquidated damages, and interest. The court determined that the loan officers qualified as employees rather than independent contractors under the FLSA's economic reality test, considering factors such as the degree of control by the employer, lack of opportunity for profit or risk of loss, and the integral nature of their work to the business. It also found that the defendants had conceded liability for overtime violations regarding hourly workers and had not provided credible evidence to rebut the Department of Labor's calculations.

labor & employment

The case involved Ohio residents suing NBC Studios, Andrew Glassman, and Krasnow Productions for breach of implied-in-fact and oral contracts, breach of confidence, and fraud, claiming the defendants used their ideas, concepts, and formats for the "Average Joe" television series without payment or credit. The defendants moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction over the California-based parties, improper venue in Ohio, or alternatively to transfer the case. The court granted the motions to transfer venue to the Central District of California, reasoning that it lacked personal jurisdiction over Glassman and Krasnow Productions under Ohio's long-arm statute and due process standards, that venue was therefore improper as to all defendants, and that transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) was in the interest of justice to allow adjudication in a single forum where jurisdiction and venue were proper over all parties.

procedure

The case involved a workplace intentional tort claim brought by the administratrix of David Hinderman's estate against Ford Motor Company. Hinderman, a long-time employee at Ford's Cleveland Casting Plant, contracted and died from Legionnaire’s Disease in March 2001 after exposure to Legionella bacteria at the facility. The plaintiff alleged that Ford knowingly maintained dangerous conditions by failing to maintain water systems and follow industry standards. The court granted Ford's motion for summary judgment on all claims. It reasoned that there was no evidence Ford had actual knowledge of the bacteria's presence or that injury was substantially certain to occur, as there were no prior incidents at the plant or in U.S. foundries, no applicable regulations or guidelines requiring pre-incident testing, and no violations of safety standards.

labor & employmenttorts & liability

This case involved insurance companies seeking a declaratory judgment in federal court regarding their coverage obligations for claims brought against the United Church of Christ and two individuals in an underlying state lawsuit. The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that complete diversity of citizenship was lacking because the UCC, as an unincorporated association, shared citizenship with members in the same states as the plaintiffs. The court granted the motion and dismissed the action without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. It reasoned that the incorporation of the UCC's General Synod in Ohio did not extend to the entire denomination, which was formed as an unincorporated voluntary association with separately incorporated subdivisions, and that the plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of establishing diversity.

procedure

The case involved Ohio Citizen Action's challenge to the City of Mentor-On-The-Lake's Chapter 850 ordinance, which required licenses, fees, fingerprinting, and background checks for door-to-door canvassers and solicitors, exempted certain nonprofit groups, and imposed a curfew on such activities after 5 p.m. or sunset. The plaintiff alleged violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments and sought injunctive, declaratory, and damages relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, arguing the rules were facially invalid and unconstitutional as applied to its activities. The court granted judgment to the plaintiff, holding the licensing and curfew provisions facially unconstitutional, permanently enjoining their enforcement, and finding they had been applied to restrict protected speech and fundraising. The decision rested on Supreme Court precedent from Watchtower Bible & Tract Society v. Village of Stratton, concluding that the licensing scheme was not narrowly tailored, the curfew was content-based and overbroad, and less restrictive alternatives like no-solicitation signs existed to protect privacy interests. A hearing was scheduled to address damages.

free speechcivil rights