In this § 1983 action, plaintiff Rodney Irvin alleged that Shaker Heights police officers, including Sgt. Mastnardo, violated his Fourth Amendment rights by making an unreasonable seizure and using excessive force during a 2005 traffic stop and arrest, when Mastnardo approached Irvin and his former brother-in-law, drew his weapon, and deployed a police dog that bit Irvin after a physical altercation; Irvin also asserted state-law assault and battery claims and sought municipal liability against the City. The court granted summary judgment in full to the City, the Mayor, and police chiefs, finding no unconstitutional policy or custom under Monell standards and no basis for respondeat superior liability. It granted summary judgment in part to the individual officers on most claims but denied it in part to Mastnardo on the unreasonable seizure, excessive force, and state-law claims, and denied it in part to the other officers on excessive force and assault and battery, because genuine disputes of material fact existed regarding the sequence of events, compliance with instructions, and whether the force used was objectively reasonable. The court also denied summary judgment on punitive damages as to the remaining claims, noting that a jury could potentially find reckless indifference.
Plaintiffs Leah Tolbert and Diana Barker sued Coast to Coast Dealer Services, Inc. (CTCDS) in state court alleging fraud under Ohio consumer-protection statutes and breach of contract arising from a used-car purchase and accompanying twelve-month vehicle service agreement that the plaintiffs claimed was not honored. After removal to federal court, CTCDS moved to compel arbitration under an arbitration clause contained in the service agreement. Following briefing and a hearing, the court determined that the clause was neither procedurally nor substantively unconscionable, was supported by consideration, and was therefore enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act; because every claim fell within the clause’s scope, the court granted the motion to compel and dismissed the action rather than staying it.
This case arose from a lawsuit alleging a fraudulent investment scheme in which plaintiff Papatheodorou placed $1 million in an escrow account at National City Bank (NCB) for investment, after which funds and profits allegedly became inaccessible. NCB filed cross-claims seeking indemnification from co-defendants Clark and Fortress Group USA, LLC. The court granted NCB's motion for summary judgment on those cross-claims, finding that Clark could be held personally liable because he exercised complete control over Fortress, used the corporate form to commit fraud by providing conflicting escrow agreements and instructions, and thereby injured NCB by forcing it to defend the underlying suit. The ruling also addressed sanctions against Clark and Fortress for discovery violations, including repeated failures to appear for depositions.
This case involves a commercial dispute between Skurka Aerospace and Eaton Aerospace arising from a 2005 Asset Purchase Agreement and Supply Agreement for aerospace motors, under which Skurka acquired assets from Eaton and agreed to supply products exclusively to Eaton through 2012. Skurka alleged that Eaton breached the agreements by misclassifying orders to obtain lower OEM pricing instead of aftermarket rates, improperly retaining intellectual property and trade secrets, and other claims including conversion, fraud, and replevin; Eaton counterclaimed that Skurka breached by failing to meet quality and delivery standards and sought declaratory relief on its rights to drawings and pricing for cargo conversions. Both parties moved for preliminary injunctions regarding access to intellectual property, inspections, and related obligations. The court granted Skurka's motion in part and denied it in part, while denying Eaton's motion entirely, after applying the four-factor test for injunctive relief and finding that contract enforcement and limited access to drawings for inspections favored limited relief for Skurka without violating regulatory requirements. It also denied a motion to strike a supplemental declaration and imposed specific conditions on the parties regarding creation of source control documents, access controls, and reporting to the court.
business & regulatorypropertyproceduretorts & liability
This case involved plaintiffs Froom-Lipman Group and its principals suing Forest City Enterprises over an alleged oral joint venture agreement to develop land around a Florida horse racing track, in which plaintiffs claimed they were promised a 15% equity interest for introducing Magna Entertainment Corp. to Forest City. After the court granted summary judgment dismissing the contract claims under Florida's Statute of Frauds, the remaining issue was plaintiffs' unjust enrichment claim for compensation as brokers who facilitated meetings and the relationship. Following a bench trial, the court awarded $750,000 in damages to the individual plaintiffs Froom and Lipman, finding that they had conferred a benefit through their services but that the LLC had not. The award was based on industry brokerage commission practices applied to Forest City's contemplated $15 million capital contribution, adjusted upward to reflect the nature and extent of the specific services provided beyond minimal brokerage efforts.
The case centered on Studio A Entertainment's claims against Action Software and its owner for copyright and trademark infringement arising from the purchase and resale of unauthorized copies of Studio A's adult film DVDs. After granting summary judgment to Studio A on the infringement claims and dismissing the defendants' counterclaim, the court considered the plaintiff's motion for attorneys' fees and costs under 17 U.S.C. § 505, as well as a request for sanctions against defendants' counsel under 28 U.S.C. § 1927. Applying factors from Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., including frivolousness, objective unreasonableness, and deterrence, the court found that the defendants' positions warranted an award against them. It determined a reasonable hourly rate and number of hours for plaintiff's counsel, resulting in a partial grant of the motion that awarded $139,449 in fees and $33,919.96 in costs to the plaintiff against the defendants, while denying the request for additional costs against counsel personally.